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Abstract 
 
The number of multinational enterprises has increased substantially. In part due to the 
integration of national economies (the European Union), improvements in communication 
and technology and the opportunity to reduce costs as a result of globalisation. Transfer 
pricing and especially business restructuring within multinationals is a fairly new concept. 
Professional legal and audit firms have different views on how to approach business 
restructurings.  
 
This research analyses important transfer pricing aspects and the anomalies that arise 
through business restructurings.  
 
The research method used in this research paper is primarily qualitative, comprising the 
analysis of various documentary sources of data. Relevant South African and international 
case law, tax legislation, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft and other reports were consulted and analysed. Further 
the views of recognised legal and tax experts that have been published in technical 
journals and text books were also considered and examined.  A hypothetical example of a 
business restructuring transaction was constructed in order to illustrate practical issues 
and different approaches to solving them.  
 
The research has argued that the arm’s length principle, which forms the bases of transfer 
pricing regulation, is not an exact science but theoretically it is the most suitable measure. 
It may not be able to incorporate all variables, such as the cost savings through synergies 
of multinational enterprises, but it promotes international trade and investment by ensuring 
that transactions are based on fair prices. Business restructurings create anomalies in 
applying the arm’s length principle but these anomalies can be dealt with within the 
regulatory structure. The business restructuring approach recommended is realistic and 
pragmatic, but more clarity may be needed in certain circumstances.  The research has 
also discussed the avoidance of transfer pricing audits, including having appropriate 
transfer pricing policies and documentation. 
 
Key words: transfer pricing; business restructurings; arm’s length principle; arm’s length 
range; OECD Guidelines; traditional transaction methods; transactional price methods; 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
Transfer pricing is defined by the Tax Foundation (2008) as follows: 
 
The price that is assumed to have been charged by one part of a company for 
products and services it provides to another part of the same company, in order to 
calculate each division's profit and loss separately. Generally, transfer pricing rules 
indicate that one affiliate must charge another affiliate the same price as would be 
demanded in an ’arm’s length transaction’ [,a] transaction between two related or 
affiliated parties that is conducted as if they were unrelated, so that there is no 
question of a conflict of interest.   
 
The main reason why a company would sell products more cheaply or more expensively 
than the prevailing market price to a related part of its enterprise may be for the purpose of 
“earnings stripping”. The Tax Foundation (2008) defines earnings stripping as follows: 
 
Earnings stripping is a process by which a firm reduces its overall tax liability by 
moving earnings from one taxing jurisdiction, typically a relatively high-tax 
jurisdiction, to another jurisdiction, typically a low-tax jurisdiction. Often, earnings 
stripping arrangements involve the extension of debt from one affiliate to another. 
Debt is accumulated in a high-tax jurisdiction that allows a company to deduct 
interest payments from their taxable income.  
 
An example of earnings stripping would be where a South African company sells semi-
finished goods to a Mauritian related party at a lower selling price when compared to the 
same product being sold to an independent party. This is to ensure that there will be no or 
a very small profit in South Africa. When the product is sold in Mauritius, at a market 
related price, the profit will be higher when compared to the same product being sold by an 
independent party. This is due to the fact that the independent party would have had to 
buy the semi-finished good at a higher market related input price whereas the related 
Mauritian company did not. The higher profit that is achieved in Mauritius will only be taxed 
at the maximum effective tax rate of 3 percent, compared to South Africa which is 34.55 
percent and will lead to a 31.55 percent tax saving for the group as a whole (Jain: 2008; 
Huxham & Haupt: 2009). 
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Transfer pricing is not a new issue. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (“OECD”), which was established in 1961 in France, has issued certain 
guidelines in this regard. The problem with the transfer pricing guidelines is that they are 
not established law but rather a guiding principle. This means that each problem needs to 
be looked at individually and no two cases are the same.  
 
In a recent transfer pricing dispute between the Internal Revenue Service in America 
(“IRS”) and a company developing and manufacturing pharmaceuticals, Glaxo SmithKline 
Holdings (Americas) Inc. and its Subsidiaries, the company agreed to pay the IRS 
approximately 3.4 billion US Dollars in back taxes and interest to resolve all the transfer 
pricing issues for the tax years from 1989 to 2005. Mark E. Everson, the Commissioner of 
the IRS at the time, acknowledged that “transfer pricing is one of the most significant 
challenges for [the IRS] in the area of corporate tax administrations. . . . The settlement of 
[the Glaxo SmithKline] case is an important development and sends a strong message of 
our resolve to continue to deal with [transfer pricing issues] going forward” (Altus 
Economics: 2006). 
 
Countries enact legislation to prevent the erosion of their tax base through aggressive 
transfer pricing deals by multi-national enterprises (“MNEs”). South Africa's transfer pricing 
provisions are set out in section 31 of the South African Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 
(referred to hereafter as the Income Tax Act), supplemented by the Income Tax Practice 
Note: No. 7 (1999) issued by the South African Revenue Services (“SARS”) in August 
1999. Section 31 must also be read in conjunction with the definition of “connected person” 
in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. In relation to a company, a connected person is 
defined in the Income Tax Act as any other company that would be part of the same group 
of companies as that company if the expression “at least 70 per cent” in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of the definition of “group of companies” in this section is replaced by the 
expression “more than 50 per cent”.  It also includes any company which holds a minimum 
of 20 percent of another company’s equity share capital, where no shareholder holds the 
majority voting rights. If a company is controlled or managed by any person who is a 
connected person in relation to another company the first mentioned and last mentioned 
companies will be connected persons.   
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In terms of section 31(2) of the Income Tax Act, where any supply of goods or services 
has been effected between those persons who are connected persons in relation to one 
another and at a price which is either less than the price which such goods or services 
might have been expected to fetch if the parties to the transaction had been independent 
persons dealing at arm’s length (such price being the arm’s length price or greater than the 
arm’s length price), the Commissioner for SARS may, for the purpose of this section in 
relation to either the acquirer or supplier, in the determination of the taxable income of 
either the acquirer or supplier, adjust the consideration in respect of the transaction to 
reflect an arm’s length price for goods or services. 
 
The Commissioner for SARS would only have the right to adjust the transfer price in the 
taxable income of the South African resident who is a party to the transaction. The Income 
Tax Act defines a South African resident in section 1 as, inter alia, a person (other than a 
natural person, thus including a company) that is incorporated, established or formed in 
South Africa or has its place of effective management in South Africa. 
 
The first OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (referred to hereafter as OECD Guidelines) on transfer pricing were 
established in 1979 and revised and approved by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 
June 1995 and by the OECD Council for publication on 13 July 1995 (OECD: 2001). The 
publication of 1995 is still the preferred version that SARS and consultants alike work with. 
There are also many discussion drafts and updates by the OECD for different issues 
regarding transfer pricing problems.  
 
The number of MNEs has increased substantially over the past years. In part, the reason 
for this is the integration of national economies, as has happened in Europe, new 
communication systems and technological progress, such as the internet, and the 
reduction in costs due to centralised management structures. The OECD (2001) 
expresses the opinion that the increase in MNEs leads to complex taxation issues for the 
MNEs as well as the relevant tax administrations because the transactions cannot be 
looked at in isolation. The tax administration must consider the broad international context 
to properly analyse the transactions for income tax purposes.  The problem for 
transactions within an MNE arises due to integrated operations as well as the issue of the 
arm’s length principle. The situation becomes even more complex if the countries involved 
in the cross-border transaction have different legal and administrative requirements 
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regarding the disclosure of transfer pricing. 
 
In order to value a cross-border transaction the tax administration can use different 
methods to calculate the margins. The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that it is common 
practice for tax administrations to look at the functions performed, assets used to perform 
the functions and the risks assumed by each corporate entity of the MNE in order to 
establish a profit margin using appropriate methods. SARS follows this practice through 
section 31 of the Income Tax Act and Practice Note 7. The higher the risk or the more 
assets that are used or the more complex the function, the higher the profit margin should 
be and vice versa. 
 
This research investigates one of the most relevant and problematic aspects of transfer 
pricing - business restructurings.  
 
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD, 2008:6) defines business restructurings as:  
 
the cross-border redeployment by a multinational enterprise of functions, assets 
and/or risks. A business restructuring may involve cross-border transfers of valuable 
intangibles. Business restructurings that are within the scope of the OECD’s project 
primarily consist of internal reallocation of functions, assets and risks within an MNE, 
although relationships with third parties ... may also be a reason for the restructuring 
and/or be affected by it.  
 
The OECD (2008) analysed business restructurings and determined that they mainly 
consist of: 
(i) conversion of fully-fledged distributors into limited risk distributors or 
commissionaires for a related party that may operate as a principal; 
(ii) conversion of fully-fledged manufacturers into contract-manufactures or toll 
manufactures for a related party that may operate as a principal; 
(iii) rationalisation and/or specialisation of operations (manufacturing sites, 
processes, research and development); 
(iv) transfer of intellectual property rights to a central entity within the group (IP 
company). 
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Business restructurings are typically accompanied by a reallocation of profits among the 
members of the MNE group, either immediately after restructuring or over a number of 
years. Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003), which embodies existing tax 
concepts and the framework for international tax, discusses the extent to which such a 
reallocation of profits is consistent with the arm’s length principle and more generally how 
the arm’s length principle applies to business restructurings. Barnes (2009) states that the 
OECD Model Tax Convention is a starting point for tax treaty negotiations as well as a 
benchmark used by countries to determine a consensus position for cross-border 
transactions.  
 
The OECD (2008) expresses the opinion that most restructurings of MNEs are done to 
maximise synergies and economies of scale, to centralise the management of businesses 
which are alike, to improve the efficiency of the supply chain, as well as taking advantage 
of internet based programs and technologies. These effects may not be achieved in the 
same way between independent parties, as they would not receive the same benefits at 
the same costs. The arm’s length principle, however, would treat the transaction as if it 
was entered into by independent parties which could result in the incorrect application of 
the arm’s length principle and therefore an approach needs to be developed that is 
realistic and reasonably pragmatic. 
 
The OECD (2008) acknowledged that the treatment of transfer pricing of business 
restructurings has been an issue of great controversy in 2008 and no conclusion to the 
problem has yet been found.  Business restructurings should not be seen only as an 
isolated problem, as it can change many aspects of how an MNE is taxed.  
 
Prevention of a problem is preferable to solving it. It may be impossible to avoid every tax 
dispute or controversy but a South African taxpayer should be able to show that all the 
necessary steps were taken in order to comply with section 31 of the Income Tax Act. This 
will help the taxpayer to minimise the chance of a transfer pricing audit in multiple 
jurisdictions. If there should be an adjustment and/or assessment in relation to the affected 
cross-border transaction, the taxpayer may be able to show that he acted in a bona fide 
manner by submitting his transfer pricing policy to SARS. Failing to show that the taxpayer 
acted in good faith may result in severe penalties. The penalties that the Commissioner for 
SARS may impose for non-compliance with transfer pricing or other transactions are set 
out in sections 75, 76 and 104 of the Income Tax Act. If, for example, a taxpayer is unable 
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to demonstrate to SARS that he is transacting at arm’s length with offshore related parties, 
SARS may adjust the transfer price to reflect what they regard as arm’s length price for the 
transaction involved. The amount adjusted by SARS in terms of section 31 will be 
subjected to the corporate income tax (at the rate of 28 percent) and may be subjected to 
Secondary Tax on Companies (at the rate of 10 percent). Furthermore, interest may be 
levied by SARS on the underpayment of taxes, as well as penalties of up to 200 percent of 
the underpayment of tax. 
 
From an operational view point of an MNE it is important always to weigh up the benefits 
and risks against the costs associated with having a transfer pricing policy in place. Raby 
(2009) states that proper transfer pricing documentation can cost a large amount and 
could ruin certain businesses and might not even be necessary because their cross-border 
transactions are not material. This thesis will assume that it is worthwhile for the company 
to have proper transfer pricing documentation in place and will analyse the steps an MNE 
will have to take in order to avoid the cost of disputes with SARS in relation to transfer 
pricing legislation.  
 
Further, this thesis will analyse advance pricing agreements, mutual agreement 
procedures and triangular cases. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) defines advance pricing 
agreements as agreements between a taxpayer and tax administration where the 
transaction and its pricing are agreed upon beforehand. This may result in more certainty 
regarding transfer pricing and business restructurings for the taxpayer and tax 
administration alike. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:G-6) define mutual agreement procedures as “a means 
through which tax administrations consult to resolve disputes regarding the application of 
double tax conventions”. It can be seen as an arbitration process involving two or more tax 
administrations to resolve transfer pricing conflicts.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) states that transfer pricing conflicts used to arise between 
the taxpayer and the two tax administrations involved in the transaction between two 
countries. However, businesses have changed over the years and more often there may 
be transfer pricing conflicts between more than two countries. This is also referred to as a 
triangular case. 
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1.2 Goals of the research 
 
The main objective of this research is to define and explain the business restructuring 
process, the regulation of transfer pricing transactions and the strictures that transfer 
pricing regulations impose on business restructurings. The following aims will be 
addressed in more detail: 
• the basis of transfer pricing, the arm’s length principle and the methods used to 
determine and apply an arms-length price; 
• business restructurings, why it creates anomalies within transfer pricing regulation 
in relation to cross-border transactions and the potential solutions to the anomalies; 
• advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement procedures, triangular cases, 
the  vital role they play in business restructurings and how they might help or hinder 
business restructurings;  
• best practice guidelines and how they may be applied to business restructurings; 
and 
• avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes. 
 
1.3  Research method and design  
 
The research method used in this thesis is primarily qualitative, comprising the analysis of 
various documentary sources of data. Relevant South African and international case law, 
tax legislation, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations and reports are consulted and analysed, as well as the views of 
recognised legal and tax experts that have been published in technical journals and 
textbooks. All potential problems relating to business restructurings are analysed from a 
SARS viewpoint, as well as from the taxpayer’s viewpoint. 
 
A hypothetical example of business restructuring transactions is analysed in order to 
discuss the practical issues that arise and to make recommendations. This attempts to 
establish whether the recommended business restructuring approach is realistic and 
reasonably pragmatic. 
 
Due to the fact that certain of the topics addressed above are still relatively new this 
research thesis makes recommendations on how to deal with certain problems in 
accordance with the OECD Guidelines and the Income Tax Act.  
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The research does not cover the following aspects: 
• the consequences of the existence of permanent establishments in the countries 
involved; 
• domestic anti-abuse rules and controlled foreign company legislation; 
• the domestic tax treatment of an arm’s length payment; 
• Value-Added Tax and indirect taxes; 
• Double Tax Agreements; 
• customs duty consequences; 
• section 31(3) issues relating to financial assistance;  
• mergers or external business restructurings; or 
• secondary tax on companies. 
 
As all documents are in the public domain, no ethical considerations apply.  
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 presented a brief outline of the context and goals of the research thesis. It 
explained the research method and design applied to yield the anticipated results, 
including certain limitations to the scope of the research thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the transfer pricing principles. The chapter introduces a car 
manufacturing example which is used to explain the basic concept of transfer pricing and, 
by continuously building on this example, the anomalies arising from business 
restructurings.   
 
Chapter 3 discusses the traditional transaction methods and the transactional profit 
methods used to apply the arm’s length principle and its relationship with Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. The chapter explains and analyses each method with the 
aid of an example which is continued from chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the concept and reason for business restructurings. It further 
analyses the actual restructure at hand taking functions, assets and risks into 
consideration and it determines an arm’s length compensation. The arm’s length 
compensation is dependent upon four main points, namely: 
• conversion of risk; 
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• the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation; 
• the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring; and 
• recognition of the actual transaction performed. 
 
Chapter 4 continues to build upon the examples from chapter 2 and 3 to discuss the 
concept of business restructurings in practice. 
 
Chapter 5 critically discusses the arm’s length principle having regard to the OECD 
Guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention. Further, the chapter compares the 
theory of business restructurings as set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) with how it actually is perceived by legal 
and audit firms to work in practice.  
 
Further chapter 5 determines why business restructurings may create anomalies within the 
transfer pricing regulation in relation to cross-border transactions and discusses potential 
solutions to the anomalies. Such solutions may include advance pricing agreements and 
mutual agreement procedures.  Finally, the chapter reviews global best practice in 
avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes on the findings of this research thesis and aligns the findings with the 
goals of the research. It discusses the problems encountered and how further research 
may solve them. 
  
 14
2 Chapter 2: The concept of and principles relating to transfer pricing 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the first of the research aims, namely, the basis of transfer pricing, 
the arm’s length principle and the methods used to determine and apply an arm’s length 
price. Based largely on OECD guidelines, this chapter introduces and defines all the 
concepts used in the thesis.  A hypothetical example is introduced and used to elucidate 
transfer pricing and business restructuring issues.  The reason for the existence of MNEs 
is briefly explained, as well as reasons why they may set non-arm’s length prices. 
 
The chapter presents a detailed discussion of the arm’s length principle and the basis on 
which an arm’s length price should be established, taking into account the 
• characteristics of the property or services provided by the MNE; 
• the functional analysis; 
• the contractual terms; 
• the economic circumstances; and 
• the business strategies. 
 
After demonstrating that, other than in exceptional circumstances, the actual transactions 
undertaken should be examined, the conclusion is reached that an arm’s length range 
should be derived, rather than a single value, and that loss-making transactions are not 
necessarily non-arm’s length.  General factors to be taken into account are also discussed, 
including the use of multi-year data, government policies and their impact, international 
set-offs, the use of a customs duty valuation, the use of more than one transfer pricing 
method and how non-comparable transactions are dealt with. 
 
2.2 The reason for multi-national enterprises to exist 
 
In order to be able to apply a correct transfer pricing method to satisfy the arm’s length 
principle, it is important to understand the reason for the existence of MNEs when 
compared to corporate entities going into the market alone. Once the reason is 
understood, a further analysis is needed to establish how this affects the arm’s length 
principle. Vannoni (n.d.) states that the relevant theoretical approaches which discuss the 
nature and existence of MNEs are the transaction costs theory, the monopolistic 
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advantage theory and the resources theory, which are discussed in detail below.  
 
Vannoni (n.d.) defines the ‘transaction cost’ as the cost involved in making an economic 
exchange between two parties and is the result of imperfect information in markets which 
behave irrationally and therefore lead to bounded rationality and opportunism. This implies 
that the cost of gathering the information, bargaining prices and the enforcement costs of a 
transaction fall within the transaction cost. MNEs exist because they manage to organise 
these costs more efficiently and therefore have transaction cost savings. 
 
The ‘monopolistic advantage’ which is established through a monopoly is defined by Philip 
Mohr, Louis Fourie and Associates (2008:246) as “a market structure in which there is only 
one seller of a good or service that has no close substitutes. A further requirement is that 
entry to the market should be completely blocked”. It may be argued that there is no such 
thing as a real monopoly but MNEs may come very close. Examples of MNEs in ‘near-
monopolies’ are: Microsoft, SABMiller or Coca-Cola. From such a ‘near-monopoly’ an 
MNE has certain advantages over smaller companies. One of the obvious reasons is that 
an MNE within a near-monopoly can charge higher prices for goods or services to its 
clients or customers when compared to a competitive market. If there is no substitute for a 
commodity or service, prices are higher because the customer cannot obtain the same 
good or service more cheaply anywhere else. MNEs gain most advantages by effectively 
managing inefficiencies that arise in markets, by communicating and assisting each other 
with information or resources, which is not the case between two competing independent 
parties.  
 
The final theory, the resource theory, is defined by Wade and Hulland (2004) as follows:  
 
firms possess resources, a subset of which enable them to achieve competitive advantage, 
and a subset of those that lead to superior long-term performance. Resources that are 
valuable and rare can lead to the creation of competitive advantage. That advantage can 
be sustained over longer time periods to the extent that the firm is able to protect against 
resource imitation, transfer, or substitution. In general, empirical studies using the theory 
have strongly supported the resource-based view. 
 
From the theories discussed above one can conclude that the reason for establishing an 
MNE is to save costs, acquire better information in a market, reduce risks and to be more 
competitive when compared to an independent corporate entity.  
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2.3 Automotive industry example 
 
In order to understand the concept of transfer pricing and business restructurings there are 
certain terms that need to be thoroughly understood. This chapter uses a simple example 
of an MNE to analyse and discuss the basic principles of transfer pricing. Throughout the 
thesis the example will be elaborated on until all concepts of business restructurings have 
been analysed and discussed. 
 
To be able to discuss all aspects of transfer pricing, the example needs to include all major 
parties that may be involved in a cross-border related transaction, their functions, risks and 
assets. For this reason the car manufacturing industry was chosen as it may include the 
following: 
• manufacturers (fully-fledged manufacturer, limited risk manufacturer or toll 
manufacturer);  
• distributors (fully-fledged distributor, limited risk distributor or agent) with or without 
marketing functions;  
• research and development departments; 
• financial institutions; 
• shared cost centres;  
• intellectual property or royalties; and  
• head office functions, such as shareholder functions. 
 
Car manufacturers have one of the most efficient group structures when compared to 
other industries. Deloitte (2009:3) believes this is due to the fact that the “automotive 
industry face[s] the challenge of optimising their activities at many different levels. 
Achieving a balance between profitability, safety, environmental compatibility, and 
customer benefit remains pivotal to a company’s successful existence in the market.”  
Taxes play a major role within a group structure and transfer pricing audits could 
potentially bankrupt a company. 
 
In the example to be used in the thesis, a South African car manufacturing group 
registered as EvoCar started its business as follows. The head office of EvoCar is 
incorporated in South Africa (“HeadCo (SA)”). HeadCo (SA) manufactures the cars and is 
responsible for all activities pertaining to the automotive industry. HeadCo (SA) is also the 
registered owner of all intellectual property (“IP”) researched and developed by the EvoCar 
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group. 
 
A distribution company (“DisCo (UK)”) is incorporated at the same time in the United 
Kingdom to increase EvoCar’s market share in Europe. DisCo (UK) will distribute only 
HeadCo (SA)’s cars initially and is wholly owned by HeadCo (SA). DisCo (UK) takes 
ownership of the cars once they leave HeadCo (SA)’s factory. 
 
The company’s distribution transaction can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
This example is the simplest form of a cross-border related party transaction. With the aid 
of this diagram, the concept of transfer pricing will be critically analysed with regard to the 
Income Tax Act, OECD Guidelines and business restructurings, describing all the related 
terms, definitions and aspects. Throughout the chapters Diagram 1A is elaborated on to 
include certain functions, assets and/or risks in order to fully discuss transfer pricing and 
business restructuring. 
 
2.4 Introduction to the concept of transfer pricing 
 
As stated in chapter 1, transfer pricing is defined by the Tax Foundation (2008) as:  
 
The price that is assumed to have been charged by one part of a company for 
products and services it provides to another part of the same company, in order to 
calculate each division's profit and loss separately. Generally, transfer pricing rules 
indicate that one affiliate must charge another affiliate the same price as would be 
demanded in an ’arm’s length transaction’ [,a] transaction between two related or 
affiliated parties that is conducted as if they were unrelated, so that there is no 
question of a conflict of interest.   
 
From the definition it is clear that it is of the utmost importance to understand the arm’s 
length principle as the whole transfer pricing methodology is based upon the arm’s length 
principle. It should be noted that transfer pricing issues in South Africa can only arise 
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between related party transactions which are cross border. South Africa does not have any 
legislation in place for local transfer pricing.  
 
2.5 The arm’s length principle 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The arm’s length principle is the basis of transfer pricing, which is not an exact science but 
rather a methodology which can be interpreted differently by different people. The arm’s 
length principle, simply stated, requires that each inter-company transaction is remitted to 
the same level that would have applied had the transaction taken place between 
independent parties, all other factors remaining constant. Although this may sound simple, 
Raby (2009) believes the actual application of the arm’s length principle in practice is 
notoriously difficult. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:G-1) agree with Raby and state that this is due to the fact 
that the arm’s length principle gives a range of “figures that are acceptable for establishing 
whether the conditions of a controlled transaction are arm's length and that are derived 
either from applying the same transfer pricing method to multiple comparable data or from 
applying different transfer pricing methods.”  
 
If the transfer pricing arrangements of MNEs do not reflect the arm's length principle the 
OECD Guidelines (2001:I-1) are of the opinion that, “the tax liabilities of the associated 
enterprises and the tax revenues of the host countries could be distorted.” Therefore, the 
arm’s length principle is the stepping stone to ensure that an MNE complies with section 
31 of the South African Income Tax Act, Practice Note 7 (SARS: 1999), as well as with the 
OECD Guidelines. The OECD Guidelines (2001:I-1) provide a “background discussion of 
the arm's length principle, which is the international transfer pricing standard that OECD 
member countries have agreed should be used for tax purposes by MNE groups and tax 
administrations.”  
 
The reason for establishing an arm’s length principle was to ensure that each tax 
jurisdiction will get its fair share from an affected transaction between related parties. The 
OECD (2001) further acknowledges that independent parties normally deal with each other 
within financial and commercial relations which are determined by market conditions. 
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These market forces that determine the price between independent parties are 
comparable to the arm’s length principle. This means that two independent parties do not 
have much choice in determining a price between them. If the price is too high the one 
party will find someone else to contract with and if the price is too low the other party may 
make losses and will not be interested in doing business under those terms. 
 
When related parties such as EvoCar and its related parties transact with each other, the 
financial and/or commercial relations may not affect a transaction in the same way as 
between independent parties. For example EvoCar may try to increase profits on a global 
basis rather than on a company to company basis, regardless of where the companies are 
incorporated. This means that EvoCar tries to be as profitable as possible on a global level 
even if a single entity of the group, such as DisCo (UK), has to make losses. If the 
transaction had to be done at arm’s length between HeadCo (SA) and DisCo (UK) within 
EvoCar, the group might make losses or may not be as profitable, which is unjustifiable 
from EvoCar’s perspective. This is one of the reasons why it may be so difficult to 
ascertain an arm’s length principle for some transactions. It is very difficult if not impossible 
to compare such an MNE transaction to an independent party transaction because an 
independent party would not enter into a contract which will only guarantee losses or fail to 
provide a proper return on investment. An MNE as a whole can achieve savings due to the 
loss on one transaction and therefore the transaction makes commercial sense from an 
MNE perspective. For example, EvoCar may offer a whole range of products in order to be 
competitive but a certain product can only be produced at a loss. The company 
manufacturing that product, for example a second manufacturer in China, would generally 
run at a loss even though the whole group benefits from having the whole product range. 
From an arm’s length perspective, this is not acceptable because an independent party 
would not transact with another party if it could only realise losses. In this case a tax 
administration would expect EvoCar to remunerate the loss-making entity, the 
manufacturer in China, with the arm’s length profit that an independent party would seek to 
achieve.  
 
On the other hand there may be justifiable reasons for losses. For example, at EvoCar’s 
start up stage there may have been high capital costs for the new manufacturing plant 
and/or manufacturing equipment or if EvoCar plans to penetrate the UK market, and 
therefore offers its products at a lower price to gain a niche in the market. The OECD 
(2001) further acknowledges that this is one of the reasons why tax administrations should 
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not automatically assume that related parties of a global MNE have sought to manipulate 
their profits, but should recognise that the MNE does have certain loss-leaders for valid 
economic and commercial reasons.   
 
There are other reasons for MNEs to deviate from an arm’s length consideration with 
regard to the affected transaction and in establishing the actual transfer price. The OECD 
Guidelines (2001) add that tax jurisdictions should not assume that every transaction 
between related parties will invariably deviate from an open market transaction. It is 
common for related parties to negotiate every transaction in order to achieve maximum 
profits. The directors of each company would like to establish good profit records and 
therefore would not reduce prices for related parties. The OECD (2001:I-1) further states 
that: 
 
There may be a genuine difficulty in accurately determining a market price in the absence 
of market forces or when adopting a particular commercial strategy. It is important to bear in 
mind that the need to make adjustments to approximate arm's length dealings arises 
irrespective of any contractual obligation undertaken by the parties to pay a particular price 
or of any intention of the parties to minimize tax. Thus, a tax adjustment under the arm's 
length principle would not affect the underlying contractual obligations for non-tax purposes 
between the associated enterprises, and may be appropriate even where there is no intent 
to minimize or avoid tax. The consideration of transfer pricing should not be confused with 
the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer pricing 
policies may be used for such purposes.  
 
Factors or reasons other than earnings stripping can lead to distortions of transfer prices 
between related companies. The OECD Guidelines (2001) give the following examples: 
conflicting governmental pressures, such as customs valuations and price controls, or 
shareholder pressure which demands that group companies show profits in their financial 
statements, through intercompany sales which the company might not otherwise have 
made.  
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2.5.2 Definition of the arm’s length principle 
 
2.5.2.1 Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the arm’s length principle 
 
Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003:12) defines the arm’s length 
principle as follows:  
 
[When] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in 
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise 
and taxed accordingly.  
 
From the above it is clear that it is of utmost importance, for the arm’s length principle, to 
compare conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises with those which 
would be made between independent enterprises. It is the basis of the arm’s length 
principle to compare independent party transactions to related transactions. The second 
point made by the above definition is that profits that would have accrued to the MNE if it 
had dealt at arm’s length, should be calculated.  
 
The OECD (2001) states that from a tax perspective, a major reason for establishing the 
arm’s length principle was to ensure fairness throughout the transaction for both 
transacting parties as well as the tax jurisdictions. In order to maintain tax neutrality, no 
two parties should be taxed differently for the same activity or transaction undertaken. If a 
related party transaction were to be treated differently when compared to an independent 
party transaction it may lead to tax advantages or disadvantages which may distort the 
relative competitive position of either business structure. Even though it may be very 
difficult at times to apply an arm’s length principle, for example in the production of very 
specialised goods, it is important to maintain consistency throughout tax jurisdictions to 
avoid double taxation which may threaten the international consensus. The arm’s length 
principle promotes international trade and investment by keeping transactions ‘fair’ so that 
each tax jurisdiction in their respective countries receives a fair share of the affected 
transaction. 
 
 22
On the other hand Fris (2003) argues that the arm’s length principle is inherently flawed 
mainly due to the fact that the principle does not account for the economies of scale 
related to integrated systems when compared to independent parties. MNEs are known to 
have great cost savings through centralised management structures and cost centres. 
These savings are, however, not considered in the determination of the arm’s length 
range. 
 
Article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003) stipulates that if one state 
effectively applies Article 9(1), the other state should make a corresponding adjustment to 
keep the fundamental bilateral character of the application of the arm’s length principle 
intact. 
 
2.5.2.2 Maintaining the arm’s length principle as the international consensus 
  
The OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that the arm’s length principle may not always 
be simple to use in practice but it is sound in theory and gives the closest approximation to 
a fair price between related parties. The arm’s length principle usually allocates 
appropriate levels of income between off-shore related parties and is therefore accepted 
by tax administrations. There may be instances when the arm’s length principle is flawed 
but it is the closest method of establishing a fair principle for each tax administration. 
There are no other acceptable principles or methods to determine values for cross-border 
related transactions that are fair and sound in theory. The arm’s length principle has been 
accepted internationally by the major corporations and tax administrations and the 
experience with the arm’s length principle has become “sufficiently broad and 
sophisticated to establish a substantial body of common understanding among [them]” 
(OECD, 2001:I-6). This understanding ensures that each tax administration receives its fair 
share of taxes and in addition the corporation does not suffer double taxation. 
 
OECD member countries follow the arm’s length principle and try to work closely together 
with tax authorities to elaborate on the principle to improve its administration with regard to 
clearer guidance and more timely examinations. Even though South Africa is not an OECD 
member country, Practice Note 7 (SARS, 1999:par. 3.2.1) states the following: “the OECD 
Guidelines are acknowledged as an important, influential document that reflects 
unanimous agreement amongst the member countries, reached after an extensive process 
of consultation with industry and tax practitioners in many countries. The OECD Guidelines 
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are also followed by many countries which are not OECD members and are therefore 
becoming a globally accepted standard.”  
 
2.5.3 Guidelines for applying the arm’s length principle correctly 
 
2.5.3.1 Comparables and comparability of the arm’s length principle 
 
In order for the arm’s length principle to be applied it needs to have certain comparables. 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that the main objective of the arm’s length principle is 
to compare a related party transaction to an independent party transaction. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) give five factors determining comparability, namely:  
• characteristics of the property or services;  
• functional analysis;  
• contractual terms;  
• economic circumstances; and  
• business strategies.  
 
It is important to consider all five factors as any one may change the characteristic of a 
transaction and therefore determine whether or not a transaction is comparable. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) further acknowledge that in order to establish comparability, 
it is important that the economically relevant characteristics of the situations within the 
transaction are comparable. Comparable in this instance means that there are no material 
differences within the transaction’s characteristics that could affect the comparable 
outcome and if there are any, that the conditions can be accurately adjusted, to eliminate 
such differences. In order to determine the degree of comparability and its necessary 
adjustments it is important to understand how a transaction is determined by independent 
parties. The norm is that independent parties would compare a potential transaction with 
all available options in the market. The independent party would normally choose the 
transaction that yields the highest profit margin. This can be achieved by a transaction 
which has lower costs or yields a higher resale value for its goods or service. For example 
costs could be cut through shorter delivery options or a price can be increased in less 
saturated markets. The point is that an independent party would always choose the best 
economic transaction available. 
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Characteristics of the property or services 
 
The first factor of the OECD Guidelines (2001) that needs to be considered is that of 
property versus service transactions. It may be easy to distinguish the two but it is of the 
utmost importance not to get this wrong. As discussed above, they need to be categorised 
correctly and only if both the uncontrolled and the controlled transaction have the same 
characteristics of property or service, are the two comparable.        
 
Functional analysis 
 
The functional analysis is the second factor analysed by the OECD Guidelines (2001). It 
determines what functions are performed, what assets are used and what risks are 
assumed in each controlled and uncontrolled transaction. In order to correctly account for 
the risks undertaken it is important to analyse the group and organisational structures of 
each enterprise. It may also be relevant to investigate the juridical capacity of the taxpayer 
in which he performs the functions. The compensation received by an independent party 
usually reflects its functions performed with regard to assets employed and risks assumed. 
In order to compare controlled transactions to uncontrolled transactions the functions 
performed must be comparable.  
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:I–10) describe some functions that taxpayers and tax 
administrations might need to identify and compare to have an efficient functional analysis. 
These include but are not limited to: “design, manufacturing, assembling, research and 
development, servicing, purchasing, distribution, marketing, advertising, transportation, 
financing and management.”  
 
The OECD Guidelines also provide guidance on how to approach a functional analysis. 
Firstly the primary functions performed by the party under examination should be 
identified. Once the functions performed are documented any necessary  
 
adjustments should be made for any material differences from the functions undertaken by 
any independent enterprises with which that party is being compared. While one party may 
provide a large number of functions relative to that of the other party to the transaction, it is 
the economic significance of those functions in terms of their frequency, nature, and value 
to the respective parties to the transactions that is important (OECD, 2001:I-10).  
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As mentioned above, transactions are compared by analysing the functions performed 
with regard to assets used and risks assumed. Therefore it is also important to compare 
the assets used, such as plant and equipment or intangible property, as well as the nature 
and characteristic of the asset used. Therefore the market value of the factory used to 
manufacture EvoCar’s cars should be similar to that of a comparable manufacturer. Lastly 
it is important to compare the actual risks assumed in the comparable transactions. In the 
open market, risk is measured by the return yield from the risk, meaning the higher the risk 
the higher the return, also known as the rate of return. This stipulates from a functional 
analysis point of view that comparable transactions must have the same risks, or that 
differences in the risks can be adjusted for, in order for a controlled and uncontrolled 
transaction to be comparable. It is important to analyse the risks in each transaction in 
order to have a complete functional analysis as the risk factor will be proportionally related 
to the returns received. The OECD Guidelines (2001:I-10) give a few types of risks to be 
considered: “market risks, such as input cost and output price fluctuations; risks of loss 
associated with the investment in and use of property, plant, and equipment; risks of the 
success or failure of investment in research and development; financial risks such as 
those caused by currency exchange rate and interest rate variability; credit risks; and so 
forth.” 
 
This process of the functional analysis leads to labelling of all the functions of the parties 
involved in the affected transaction. Commonly used labels within transfer pricing are:  
• fully-fledged manufacturer,  
• contract or toll manufacturer, 
• fully-fledged distributor,  
• limited risk distributor, and 
• commissionaire or agent.  
 
To discuss the labels further, refer to the example described above (Diagram 1A): 
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HeadCo (SA) could be described as a fully-fledged manufacturer if it develops its own 
product lines and usually undertakes substantial research and development (“R&D”) or 
uses specialised technology which has been obtained through licensing. As a fully-fledged 
manufacturer all functions related to the actual manufacturing of the product which are 
defined by Raby (2009:49) as “vendor qualification, materials purchasing, production 
scheduling and quality control procedures” and marketing of the product to the end 
customer, would fall within HeadCo (SA). A fully-fledged manufacturer usually bears many 
risks related to manufacturing, such as inventory risk and market risk. 
 
On the other hand, a contract manufacturer as defined by Raby (2009:48) provides 
“manufacturing services to fully-fledged manufacturers. They do not develop their own 
product lines but offer expertise in performing certain manufacturing functions only.” 
Contract manufacturers may perform certain functions such as material purchasing and 
production scheduling or may even own inventory. However, over the course of a contract, 
contract manufacturers do not face direct market risk. This is due to the fact that they have 
a guaranteed uptake of their product or revenue stream from the other contracting party. 
Remuneration may be based on either a fee basis or on a pre-established price per unit 
basis. The contract manufacturer’s assets are generally not specialised in comparison to 
other manufacturers and its intangible assets are limited and normally only consist of 
know-how pertaining to its manufacturing process (Raby: 2009). 
   
A toll manufacturer as defined by Raby (2009) is a subtype of a contract manufacturer and 
is very similar, except that a toll manufacturer does not take any legal ownership or title 
with regard to raw materials or products produced. 
 
In practice, HeadCo (SA) may want to contract out its manufacturing function to a related 
party in order to be able to concentrate on further marketing functions or provide more in 
depth management services. In the example HeadCo (SA) is still seen as the actual 
manufacturer but the product is actually built by the related contract manufacturer 
(“ManConCo (I)”) in India. The new diagram would look as follows. 
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HeadCo (SA) DisCo (UK)
ManConCo (I)
The solid line shows the flow of goods 
The dotted line shows the flow of services
Diagram 2A
 
 
Firstly HeadCo (SA) would establish a new manufacturing company in India. Then 
HeadCo (SA) would provide materials and necessary services required to build certain 
cars to ManConCo (I) such as know-how. HeadCo (SA) can now provide DisCo (UK) with 
more in depth marketing services to increase sales in the UK. ManConCo (I) will deliver 
the finished cars directly to DisCo (UK). 
 
It is important to note that HeadCo (SA) would still carry all the risks related to the 
manufacturing. For example, if the contract manufacturer is producing a car in accordance 
with HeadCo (SA)’s contracted blue prints and faults are discovered at a later stage, 
HeadCo (SA) would have to reflect the loss arising from the write-off in its statement of 
financial position, not the contract manufacturer. The business restructuring issues for the 
above example (Diagram 2A) will be discussed in chapter 4. 
 
A fully-fledged distributor is defined by Raby (2009) as a distributor that takes title to the 
merchandise it has to distribute. The fully-fledged distributor generally assumes inventory 
risks, credit risks and may have foreign exchange risks, these being the most common 
risks associated with fully-fledged distributors. One of the determining factors for a fully-
fledged distributor is its marketing responsibilities. Unlike the other distributors discussed 
below the fully-fledged distributor takes full responsibility to market its own merchandise.   
 
Raby (2009) is of the opinion that a limited risk distributor is comparable to a fully-fledged 
distributor except that its risks and marketing functions are limited. 
 
Finally, Raby (2009) acknowledges that a commissionaire or agent (also known as a 
manufacturer’s representative) takes no ownership of any merchandise it sells. The 
representative bears neither credit risk nor inventory risk. The structure is comparable to a 
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toll manufacturer from a distribution point of view. The representative has no marketing 
responsibilities and is typically paid a commission-based fee calculated on the return or 
sales revenue it generates from representing the manufacturer. 
 
For example, HeadCo (SA) may want to set up a limited risk distributor or agent in Asia to 
increase worldwide recognition and market share. HeadCo (SA)’s research of the Asian 
market is inconclusive with regard to the risks and therefore HeadCo (SA) does not 
consider it to be viable to create a fully-fledged distributor. The initial risk seems to be too 
high to risk a substantial capital investment. Instead HeadCo (SA) will create an agent 
(“Agent (A)”) who will receive remuneration according to its costs incurred in selling cars. 
 
HeadCo (SA) DisCo (UK)
Agent (A)
Diagram 2B
The solid line shows the flow of goods 
The dotted line shows the flow of services
 
 
Fris (2003) is of the opinion that from a transfer pricing perspective, when doing a 
functional analysis, the functions performed using the assets and the risks assumed can 
be labelled and categorised into one of the above categories. The ‘labelled’ parties operate 
more or less exclusively as such. This means that a party will fall within one of the 
categories and from that a comparison is made with a similar transaction that falls within 
the same category. It should be noted that it may be difficult to compare additional or 
complementary roles, activities or functions carried out by the parties concerned that do 
not fall within the label given to a transaction. 
 
To further illustrate this, when a manufacturer takes on responsibilities for marketing by 
using its own resources, it would anticipate a higher return from its activities and the 
conditions of the transaction would be different to those of a toll manufacturer, which is 
reimbursed for its costs and receives the income appropriate to its activity. The above 
manufacturer could be defined as a fully-fledged manufacturer and would only tend 
towards a limited risk manufacturer if it did not assume inventory and other risks. It is 
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seldom that a manufacturer or distributor falls exactly within one category but they rather 
have a tendency towards a particular category and are assumed to fall within the particular 
category and are labelled as such, for comparability reasons.   
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) make another point that should be considered for the 
functional analysis. It acknowledges that the economic substance of a purported risk 
allocation needs to be considered carefully. The reason for this is that in arm’s length 
dealings the party with the risk allocated to it has the most control over the risk. Therefore 
in a related party transaction the risk allocation must also make sense in such a way that 
not only one party within a multinational group assumes all the risks. A good example is 
that of inventory risk; a party would not usually assume any inventory risk if it has no 
control over the merchandise or any control over the inventory level. 
 
Contractual terms 
 
The third factor from the OECD Guidelines (2001), the contractual terms, generally defines 
implicitly or explicitly how the responsibilities, risks and benefits are to be divided between 
the parties. Thus an analysis of the contractual terms should be part of the functional 
analysis. Sometimes there is no explicit contract between the parties which means that the 
relationship between the parties needs to be analytically reviewed to gather the required 
information about the transaction. Independent parties would only enter into agreements or 
contracts if it actually benefits them. The same holds true for amending an agreement or 
contract. Independent parties would only agree to change a contract if it benefits both 
independent parties. This must be kept in mind when comparing an MNE contract to that 
of an independent party. 
 
Economic circumstances 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) fourth factor that determines comparability ensures that the 
transaction between related parties being compared to that between independent parties, 
takes the economic circumstances into consideration. An arm’s length price may vary 
across different markets even if the property or service is the same. This can be due to 
saturated markets or less demand or supply for certain properties or services in certain 
markets. The reason for this is that certain markets have more substitutes available for 
property or services than other markets. In order to achieve comparability between the 
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related party transaction and the independent party transaction the markets in which the 
transactions take place may not differ materially, and any differences should have no 
effect on the transfer price or appropriate adjustments can be made. The OECD 
Guidelines (2001:I-13) provide some examples of economic circumstances that may be 
relevant to determining market comparability:  
 
geographic location; the size of the markets; the extent of competition in the markets and 
the relative competitive positions of the buyers and sellers; the availability (risk thereof) of 
substitute goods and services; the levels of supply and demand in the market as a whole 
and in particular regions, if relevant; consumer purchasing power; the nature and extent of 
government regulation of the market; costs of production, including the costs of land, 
labour, and capital; transport costs; the level of the market (e.g. retail or wholesale); the 
date and time of transactions; and so forth. 
 
Business strategies 
 
The last factor from the OECD Guidelines (2001) which determines comparability is the 
business strategy that a party or MNE as a whole may have chosen at the time of the 
transaction. A business strategy can assume many different aspects. The OECD 
Guidelines (2001:I-13) give a few examples: “innovation and new product development, 
degree of diversification, risk aversion, assessment of political changes, input of existing 
and planned labour laws, and other factors bearing upon the daily conduct of business.” 
Business strategies such as the ones mentioned above need to be considered before 
deciding that an independent party transaction is comparable to that of a related party 
transaction. For example, an MNE may be trying to gain a greater market share within a 
certain market or to penetrate a new market. For that reason the MNE may offer its 
merchandise at half price or cheaper than it would normally do in other markets. This does 
not mean that the transaction is not comparable or that, by default, a related party would 
not strive for market penetration through cheaper prices. However, it may mean that the 
transaction is not comparable to that of an independent party within an already established 
market. 
 
The problem that arises as a result of the implementation of certain business strategies is 
that the profit levels will be lower during that year and therefore the relevant tax 
administration would receive a lower tax income. The issue that poses problems is that the 
tax administration needs to establish the legitimacy of the taxpayer’s claim that he is 
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trading at arm’s length. This may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove because there may 
be no comparable transaction. Another point that makes the issue even more problematic 
is that section 79 of the Income Tax Act prevents SARS from re-opening assessments 
older than three years unless deliberate misrepresentations were made. This means that if 
a tax administration should realise that a certain transaction was concluded at a value that 
was too low or too high and there was no demonstrable business strategy behind it, 
resulting in a non-arm’s length transaction, it may be too late to adjust the transaction. The 
OECD is of the opinion that tax administrations usually scrutinise transactions with 
potential business strategy implications carefully. In order for the tax administration to 
satisfy itself it would analyse the consistency of the professed business strategy 
throughout the MNE (OECD: 2001).  To give an example, in Diagram 1A, if HeadCo (SA) 
is trying to obtain a share in a new market, it would charge a lower price to DisCo (UK) 
which can then charge a lower price to potential customers. It would not be viable for one 
party to assume all the costs related to market penetration. Because the market 
penetration would benefit everyone, both distributor and manufacturer alike, it is assumed 
that both parties will share the risks and therefore share in the costs. Furthermore 
marketing and advertising expenditure would increase during the market penetration 
period, which is evident from the parties’ financial statements. 
 
Keeping this in mind and taking the OECD Guidelines (2001) into consideration, tax 
administrations realise that market penetration may lead to an overall loss and therefore 
allow the attendant deductions, provided the loss is justifiable and that in similar 
circumstances an independent party would have been prepared to sacrifice its profitability 
for the same period, under the same economic circumstances and competitive conditions.  
 
2.5.3.2 Actual transaction undertaken 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:I-15) stipulate that “a tax administration’s examination of a 
controlled transaction ordinarily should be based on the transaction actually undertaken by 
the associated enterprises as it has been structured by them, using the methods applied 
by the taxpayer insofar as these are consistent” and acceptable from the transfer pricing 
perspective within the country’s legislation. Only in exceptional cases should the tax 
administration disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for them. 
The reason for this is that restructuring a transaction may lead to double taxation where 
other tax administrations do not share the same view on the characteristics of the actual 
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transaction undertaken. 
 
There are two particular cases in which it is appropriate and legitimate for a tax 
administration to disregard the structure adopted by the taxpayer when entering into a 
controlled transaction. The first case arises where the economic substance differs from its 
form. An example of substance over form is the use of an interest-free loan to finance 
capital in an economy where an independent party would not structure an investment in 
this way. This is also known as “quasi-equity” because the loan acts as equity rather than 
as a loan. The major reason why an independent party would not structure the transaction 
in that way is because the interest expense may outweigh the actual advantage gained 
from the increase in capital. In this case the tax administration may disregard the 
transaction and re-characterise the loan as a capital investment. For example in Diagram 
2A, shown below, ManConCo (I) may require certain factories and/or machinery to build 
the cars to a certain specification. ManConCo (I) cannot borrow money from a bank due to 
its credit rating, therefore HeadCo (SA) agrees to help ManConCo (I) with finance. 
However, the loan as suggested is not at arm’s length due to higher interest rate payments 
which would not make it an economically viable option for an independent party in the 
same situation. 
 
 
In this example that would mean that ManCoCon (I), in taking up the loan, may not deduct 
its interest expense in full from its profits in order to calculate the appropriate tax payable. 
The reason for the tax administration not to allow the deduction of the interest expense in 
this case is that the tax administration is trying to prevent EvoCar from stripping profits and 
claiming the payment of interest for a loan that is not beneficial and therefore this could be 
seen as a profit-stripping mechanism. A second case given by the OECD Guidelines 
(2001:I-16) arises where, “the form and substance of the transaction are the same, the 
arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those 
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which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially 
rational manner and the actual structure practically impedes the tax administration from 
determining an appropriate transfer price.” 
 
An example of the second case in Diagram 2A could be the sale of intellectual property by 
EvoCar’s HeadCo (SA) to ManCoCon (I). In this case intellectual property could be related 
to know-how on manufacturing or certain patents. The problem with this transaction is not 
its form or substance but rather the fact that an independent party would not be willing to 
sell its intellectual property to another party because it would amount to the related party 
selling its future income. Another reason given by the OECD Guidelines (2001) why the 
tax administration may disregard the transaction as it stands is that the profit potential of 
the intellectual property cannot be adequately estimated and therefore it is difficult to 
estimate a price for the intellectual property. 
 
From Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003) as well as the OECD Guidelines 
(2001:I-16) it is clear that  
 
the character of the transaction may derive from the relationship between the parties rather 
than be determined by normal commercial conditions and may have been structured by the 
taxpayer to avoid or minimise tax. In such cases, the totality of its terms would be the result 
of a condition that would not have been made if the parties had been engaged in arm’s 
length dealings. Article 9 would thus allow an adjustment of conditions to reflect those 
which the parties would have attained had the transaction been structured in accordance 
with the economic and commercial reality of parties dealing at arm’s length. 
 
When considering the actual transaction undertaken by an MNE such as EvoCar, it is 
important to keep in mind that related parties usually have more freedom in drawing up 
contracts and agreements and it is easier for the related parties to amend their contracts 
and agreements to suit their needs. For example, there may be certain legal, economical 
or even fiscal reasons to change a contract to ensure that the strategy of EvoCar, globally, 
is adhered to. As stated in the OECD Guidelines (2001), it is important for the tax 
administration to determine what the actual underlying reality is behind the contractual 
arrangements between related parties in applying the arm’s length principle. It should be 
determined what an independent party would have done under the same circumstances. 
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The OECD (2001) is of the opinion that the tax administration should not disregard a 
related party transaction just because it is different when compared to an independent 
party transaction. For example, in EvoCar’s related party transaction between HeadCo 
(SA) and DisCo (UK) (in Diagram 1A), DisCo (UK) may take on all the currency exchange 
risks, unlike an independent party transaction where the manufacturer usually takes on all 
the currency exchange risk. This does not mean that the related party is not trading at 
arm’s length but it may indicate to the tax administration that it should examine the 
economic logic of the structure more closely. Instead of re-characterising the transaction, 
the tax administration should adjust for the difference in risk, meaning that DisCo (UK), 
which assumes the currency exchange risk, should be earning a higher profit margin when 
compared to the independent party transaction. 
 
The evaluation of separate and combined transactions 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) recommend that the arm’s length principle should be applied 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis. But the OECD Guidelines acknowledge that there 
are often situations where separate transactions are so closely linked or continuous that 
they cannot be evaluated on a separate basis. Examples may include but are not limited to 
long-term contracts for the supply of commodities or services, the rights for the use of 
intellectual property and the pricing of similar products within a product line. For these 
types of transactions it may be more reasonable to assess the transactions on a combined 
basis rather than each transaction separately, using the most appropriate arm’s length 
method. Even though, from a transfer pricing perspective, it is acceptable to consider 
combined transactions as one, the tax administration may need to analyse each 
transaction separately from an income tax perspective.    
 
2.5.3.3 Use of an arm’s length range 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that the reason for having an arm’s length 
range to determine a comparable margin instead of having a single value to compare a 
margin for a transaction is that only seldom will it be possible to actually arrive at a single 
value for a transaction. One of the reasons for that given by the OECD Guidelines (2001) 
is that transfer pricing is not an exact science and in most circumstances even the most 
appropriate method may produce a range of figures which are all equally reliable. The 
arm’s length principle in itself only produces a general approximation of conditions that 
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may have been established between independent parties. Another reason given by the 
OECD Guidelines for the range which may be more relevant is that different points within 
the range may represent different prices charged by different independent parties. It is 
common for independent parties to charge different prices for comparable goods. Lastly, 
not all comparable transactions examined may actually be comparable, be it through 
different functions, the assets used or assumption of higher risks. As discussed above, a 
higher risk, more expensive assets or the performing of more functions when compared to 
another transaction, could result in a higher profit or loss and therefore in a higher or lower 
profit margin. 
 
Further the OECD Guidelines (2001) state that an arm’s length range may be the result of 
the use of more than one method to evaluate the same controlled transaction. Both 
methods may be appropriate to examine the arm’s length nature of the transaction 
compared to an independent party transaction, but each method may produce different 
outcomes or a range of outcomes. This difference arises from the different nature of each 
method and the data used. The use of two methods for one transaction may result in a 
more accurate range but on the other hand the results may be unreliable because they 
may present two totally different ranges.  
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:I-20) stipulate that if  
 
the relevant conditions of the controlled transactions (e.g. price or margin) are within the 
arm’s length range, no adjustment should  be made. If the relevant conditions of the 
controlled transaction (e.g. price or margin) fall outside the arm’s length range asserted by 
the tax administration, the taxpayer should have the opportunity to present arguments that 
the conditions of the transaction satisfy the arm’s length principle, and that the arm’s length 
range includes their results.  
 
The requirement given by the OECD Guidelines (2001) is that each transaction should fall 
within the acceptable range or, at least, it can be demonstrated that a transaction falls 
within the range. As to where the transaction falls within the range depends on the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed. If the conditions of a transaction do 
not justify a certain position within the arm’s length range, the tax administration should 
determine an accurate position for the transaction taking its conditions and characteristics 
into account. As mentioned previously a total re-characterisation of a transaction should be 
the last resort of the tax administration.   
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2.5.3.4 Loss makers 
 
From a transfer pricing point of view it is important to note that independent parties may 
realise genuine losses. However the OECD (2001) acknowledges that when a related 
party consistently realises losses, while the whole MNE group is profitable, there may be 
some transfer pricing issues. 
 
Further the OECD Guidelines (2001) argue that, when determining the reason for the loss 
making, the tax administration should take the following into account: start up costs, 
unfavourable economic conditions, inefficiencies or other legitimate business reasons. The 
important point is that an independent party would not be willing to carry such costs for a 
long period of time. An independent party would analyse its losses and ensure that either it 
returns to a profitable position or it would close its business altogether. There is no reason 
for a business to continue if there is no return on the investment. There may be certain 
business strategies that an MNE is following but even if there is a market penetration 
strategy to gain a higher market share through lower prices, this strategy would not last 
forever.  
 
An obvious common reason for a related party to make only losses is because they are 
producing vital goods as part of a product line for the MNE as a whole, where the benefits 
for the MNE are higher than the actual loss realised for the related party. For example, 
EvoCar has established three fully-fledged manufacturers who supply DisCo (UK) with the 
cars to be sold. For ease of reference the fully-fledged manufacturers in Diagram 3 are 
named: FFMan1(C), FFMan2 (I) and FFMan3 (B). The fully-fledged manufactures are 
incorporated in China, India and Brazil respectively 
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FFMan 2 (I)
FFMan1 (C)
FFMan3 (B)
HeadCo (SA)
Diagram 3
DisCo (UK)
The solid line shows the flow of goods
 
FFMan1 (C) and FFMan2 (I) both make reasonable returns on their manufacturing. 
FFMan3 (B) has been running at a loss for the last five years. However, DisCo (UK)’s 
sales are above average in the market which is due to the wide range of cars that it offers 
and it achieves a higher return than normal. When looking at EvoCar as a whole, the net 
returns are higher with the current structure where FFMan3 (B) makes a loss. The reason 
is that DisCo (UK)’s return offsets FFMan3 (B) losses and achieves a much higher profit 
after the set-off than it would without the wide range that it offers. 
 
 An independent party in FFMan3 (B)’s position would not continue trading without 
sufficient remuneration for its activities. This means that, even in an MNE where the 
benefits may outweigh the costs of the company, that company should be remunerated for 
producing the benefits. In the example above, EvoCar could use the extra revenue to 
remunerate FFMan3 (B) for it to achieve a similar return to that of FFMan2 (I) or FFMan1 
(C), depending on the circumstances. The OECD Guidelines (2001) would approach this 
problem by comparing what an independent party should receive in this instance for the 
services rendered and would deem the loss-making entity to receive such an income for 
the purposes of its tax returns assessable by the relevant tax administration. 
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2.5.3.5 General comments  
 
There are certain other issues that have been identified as being relevant to transfer 
pricing and the arm’s length principle. 
 
Use of multiple year data 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that in order to acquire all the necessary information to 
understand the controlled transaction in its entirety it is helpful to analyse the current year 
as well as prior years. The reason for examining prior years is that it gives the examiner a 
better picture of how the transaction was influenced and how it should have been 
influenced were it being traded at arm’s length. For example, analysing prior years may 
give a better insight into the controlled transaction’s history, considering the relevant 
business and product life cycles which may have a material effect on the transfer pricing 
conditions that should be assessed to determine comparability. The same holds true for 
the uncontrolled transaction, to ensure that the transaction is actually comparable to the 
controlled transaction. 
 
Effect of government policies 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) set a general rule for government policies such as price 
controls, price cuts, control over payments, interest controls, controls over royalty 
payments, exchange control, anti-dumping policies or even subsidies to particular sectors 
of the market, which should be treated as conditions of the market in a particular country. 
The question that needs to be answered is whether an independent party would still be 
willing to do business with these government policies in place.  
 
In order to understand whether an independent party would undertake a transaction with 
government policies in place, the actual policies that may affect the pricing should be 
examined. An independent party would not be willing to provide services or products 
without a profit, but a country with certain price controls will affect the obtainable profits. 
Government policies may even disallow certain payments. This means that the party 
cannot pay out money for a certain transaction, which may lead to double taxation.  
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HeadCo (SA) DisCo (UK)
ManConCo (I)
The solid line shows the flow of goods 
The dotted line shows the flow of services
Diagram 2A
 
For example, as previously discussed in Diagram 2A, ManConCo (I) wishes to pay its 
interest expense to HeadCo (SA). However, the Reserve Bank stops the payment due to 
government policies. EvoCar as a whole may be subject to double taxation for its interest 
expense. This is due to the fact that the interest expense is added back to the profit of 
ManConCo (I) for income tax purposes because the payment was not allowed by the 
government in India and HeadCo (SA) is deemed by the government in South Africa to 
have received the interest on the loan. There is no easy answer to this and a solution 
suggested by the OECD Guidelines (2001) is to see the intervention as the arm’s length 
principle. In the above example that would mean that the interest income should not be 
regarded as deemed income by South Africa, which would eliminate the issue of double 
taxation. 
 
It may be very difficult to compare transactions in such circumstances, as independent 
parties usually would not be willing to take the risk of non-payment and therefore there 
may be no comparable transaction.  
 
International set offs 
 
An international set off occurs when two cross-border related parties provide benefits to 
each other, and set off the payment in full or part with a benefit instead of paying for the 
actual benefit received. As an example, EvoCar could share its intellectual property or 
know-how between HeadCo (SA) and ManConCo (I) and vice versa. In order to have an 
international set off, the actual benefits need to be quantified and analysed in terms of the 
arm’s length principle. The OECD Guidelines (2001) have no problem with actual 
international set offs as long as they are at arm’s length and the tax administration agrees 
to the terms. In South Africa the Reserve Bank prohibits international set offs and all- in 
and out-bound transactions are required to be received and paid for.    
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Use of a customs valuation 
 
The OECD (2001) confirms that the customs administration usually adopts an arm’s length 
approach to similar goods of independent parties to value goods imported from related 
parties to ensure fair customs duty. Both tax administrations and customs officials value a 
transaction at the time of import or transfer which means that the valuation of the customs 
official may be useful to the tax administration.   
 
Further the OECD (2001) states that a difference between the customs values and values 
declared for transfer pricing purposes may cause the tax administration to conduct an 
enquiry into the affairs of a company. There are similarities in the objectives and policies of 
a customs duty valuation and a transfer pricing valuation, but this does not necessarily 
imply that a transfer price which is acceptable for income tax purposes will be suitable for 
customs duty purposes, and vice versa. A taxpayer may try to set a low price for customs 
duty purposes in order to save on customs duty but, on the other hand, the taxpayer may 
want to set a high price on imported goods in order to increase the tax deduction. 
 
Use of transfer pricing methods 
 
The most widely accepted transfer pricing methods adopted by global tax administrations 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. To correctly apply the arm’s length principle with 
transfer pricing methods, a condition imposed on financial or commercial transactions 
between related parties should be consistent with the arm’s length principle. It is important 
to note that no one method will suit every possible situation and that no one method can 
simply be rejected. The OECD is of the opinion that the relevant tax administrations should 
not make minor or marginal adjustments to transactions just because they do not like a 
particular method or believe the method is not suitable (OECD: 2001). The OECD 
Guidelines (2001) state that a taxpayer may also use his own method not dealt with in the 
OECD Guidelines, provided the transfer price established through the method satisfies the 
arm’s length principle in accordance with the OECD Guidelines.   
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There are many different methods that a taxpayer can use but the arm’s length principle 
does not require more than one method to be used for one transaction. The OECD 
Guidelines’ (2001) reason for this is that it would place a heavy burden on the taxpayer, 
who would incur higher costs to be tax compliant. It may also create undue reliance on the 
approach chosen. In the process of calculating the correct transfer price, a taxpayer may 
consider more than one method but usually chooses the most appropriate one and then 
uses this method throughout the years. There may be cases for which it is very difficult to 
find a suitable method. In such cases the OECD Guidelines (2001:I-27) state that a 
“flexible approach would allow the evidence of various methods to be used in conjunction. 
In such cases, an attempt should be made to reach a conclusion consistent with the arm's 
length principle that is satisfactory from a practical viewpoint to all the parties involved, 
taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, the mix of evidence available, 
and the relative reliability of the various methods under consideration.”    
 
It is not possible to provide specific rules for every single case that may arise. The general 
rule given by the OECD Guidelines (2001) is to choose a method that is most suitable to 
give an accurate result through establishing the most direct means to compare commercial 
and financial relations between the related parties It is important to keep all useful 
information about the controlled transaction and ensure that a method does not disregard 
particular information. The reason to analyse this useful information is that it may help to 
fully understand the controlled transaction and therefore may lead to a different 
interpretation of the transaction, which may lead to the use of another method.   
 
Non-comparable transactions 
 
Another practical difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle to every single cross-
border transaction is that related parties often engage in transactions that independent 
parties may not engage in. The main reason for this is that an MNE such as EvoCar will 
look for the greater good of the whole group company whereas a single legal entity will 
only do what is best for itself. The OECD Guidelines (2001:I-4) give an example where:  
 
the owner of an intangible may be hesitant to enter into licensing arrangements with 
independent enterprises for fear of the value of the intangible being degraded. In contrast, 
the intangible owner may be prepared to offer terms to associated enterprises that are less 
restrictive because the use of the intangible can be more closely monitored. There is no risk 
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to the overall group's profit from a transaction of this kind between members of an MNE 
group. An independent enterprise in such circumstances might exploit the intangible itself or 
license it to another independent enterprise for a limited period of time (or possibly under an 
arrangement to adjust the royalty). However, there is always a risk that the intangible is not 
as valuable as it seems to be. Therefore, an independent enterprise has to make the choice 
between selling the intangible and so diminishing the risk and safeguarding the profit, and 
exploiting the intangible and taking the risk that the profit will vary from the profit which 
could be gained by selling the intangible. Where independent enterprises seldom undertake 
transactions of the type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm's length principle is 
difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what conditions would have 
been established by independent enterprises.  
 
There are some other factors that may complicate a comparison between an independent 
party transaction and a related party transaction, for example, where a transaction 
between HeadCo (UK) and ManConCo (I) in Diagram 2A involves a specific or specialised 
process that is not readily available, such as certain research and development 
procedures. This transaction could not be compared with an independent party 
transaction. In most cases no two transactions are exactly the same, which means that 
certain hypothetical adjustments have to be made to the affected transactions in order to 
make them comparable.  
 
Administrative burden 
 
Applying the arm’s length principle may lead to an administrative burden in a sense that 
each single transaction will have to be compared to an independent party transaction. This 
means that both the MNE and the tax jurisdiction will have to gather information regarding 
each transaction undertaken. The OECD Guidelines (2001) stipulate that this may be a 
time consuming exercise and it may be difficult to obtain adequate information regarding 
the affected transaction. As a result immaterial transactions usually do not require a full 
transfer pricing analysis to ensure that the transaction complies with the transfer pricing 
guidelines or with section 31 of the Income Tax Act. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 described all the related terms, definitions and aspects of transfer pricing with 
the aid of an example. The arm’s length principle was analysed in detail as it is the 
fundamental principal of transfer pricing. It is important to keep in mind that the arm’s 
length principle is not an exact science. It may be very difficult to apply in certain 
circumstances but theoretically it is the fairest approach available at present. 
 
In order to discuss transfer pricing concepts further the appropriate arm’s length price 
range is discussed in the next chapter. This may shed some light on why anomalies may 
arise from business restructuring by multi-national enterprises.  
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3 Chapter 3:  Determining an appropriate arm’s length price range 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the concept of transfer pricing in detail, as well as the 
arm’s length principle and the basis on which it should be established.  Various factors that 
may have an impact on the arm’s length price were also explained. The hypothetical 
example used to illustrate transfer pricing in the context of business restructurings was 
introduced and used to explain aspects of the arm’s length principle. 
 
The present chapter completes the analysis required to address the first aim of the 
research, which is to discuss the basis for transfer pricing, the arm’s length principle and 
the methods used to determine and apply an arm’s length price. 
 
The methods discussed in the chapter are: 
• the traditional transaction methods, comprising the comparable uncontrolled price 
method, the resale price method and the cost-plus method; 
• the transactional price methods, comprising the profit-split method and the 
transactional net profit method; and 
• the non-arm’s length method, consisting of the global formulary method. 
 
The relationship of the methods with article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003) 
and the advantages and disadvantages of and the difficulties encountered with each of the 
methods are discussed and, where relevant, illustrated with the use of examples. 
 
The aim of chapter 3 is to give a thorough understanding of the methods available to 
determine and apply the arm’s length price. The examples provide a better understanding 
of how the methods apply. 
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3.2 Transactional methods 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The transactional methods are used to calculate an appropriate arm’s length price range. 
There are two different sets of transactional methods given by the OECD Guidelines 
(2001): the traditional transaction methods and the transactional profit methods. The 
traditional transaction methods are the comparable uncontrolled price method (“CUP”), the 
resale price method and the cost plus method, which are the methods preferred by the 
OECD Guidelines (2001) to be used in order to calculate the arm’s length range. However, 
if a transaction does not meet the requirements of a traditional transaction method, the 
taxpayer may consider the transactional profit methods, which include the profit split 
method and the transactional net margin method. 
 
The most appropriate methods from the viewpoint of the OECD Guidelines (2001) are 
illustrated in the following diagram, from the most preferred at the top to the least preferred 
at the bottom.  
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 46
3.2.2 Relationship with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
(2003:12) states that:  
 
[where] conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of 
the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in 
the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.  
 
To put the above into context the Commentary on Article 9 (2003:141) authorises a tax 
administration 
  
for the purpose of calculating tax liabilities [to] re-write the accounts of the [associated] 
enterprises if as a result of the special relations between the enterprises the accounts do 
not show the true taxable profits arising in that State. 
 
The true taxable profits are those that would have been achieved if the MNE had traded at 
arm’s length. Therefore the Commentary to Article 9 does not apply to transactions done in 
open market situations or arm’s length transactions. Simply put by the OECD (2001), this 
means that an account may only be re-written if a special condition or a condition that was 
not at arm’s length was present during an MNE transaction. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:II-2) state that the  
 
most direct way to establish whether the conditions made or imposed between associated 
enterprises are arm's length is to compare the prices charged in controlled transactions 
undertaken between those enterprises with prices charged in comparable transactions 
undertaken between independent enterprises. This approach is the most direct because 
any difference in the price of a controlled transaction from the price in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction can normally be traced directly to the commercial and financial 
relations made or imposed between the enterprises, and the arm's length conditions can be 
established by directly substituting the price in the comparable uncontrolled transaction for 
the price of the controlled transaction. 
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There will not always be comparable transactions available to use in this approach and it 
may be necessary to use less direct methods to establish if the conditions of a related 
party transaction conform to the arm’s length principle. The different approaches and 
methods, including direct and indirect methods, are described below. 
  
3.2.3 Traditional transaction methods 
 
The traditional transaction methods used to apply the arm’s length principle consist of the 
CUP method, the resale price method and the cost plus method. The traditional 
transaction methods are the methods preferred by the OECD Guidelines and the taxpayer 
should always try to use these methods first and only if one of these three methods cannot 
be applied to a controlled transaction should recourse be had to other methods. 
 
3.2.3.1 Comparable uncontrolled price method 
 
The CUP method is the method most preferred by the OECD Guidelines (2001). It 
compares the price charged for a property or service between independent parties to a 
price charged for a property or service between related parties in comparable 
circumstances. In essence the CUP method is applied to transactions which are identical 
or at least very similar between related and independent parties with only immaterial 
differences if any, for which reasonable and accurate adjustments can be made (OECD: 
2001). 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that the CUP method is the most direct and reliable 
way to determine the arm’s length price, but it may be very difficult to find a comparable 
transaction between independent and related parties, without any material differences. In 
practice a small difference in the character of a certain good, such as its quality, may 
influence the price of the transaction even if the business activities of the independent and 
related parties are equivalent. In this case certain adjustments are necessary in order to 
use the CUP method.  For example, EvoCar’s product range may not be comparable to 
any other car manufacturer as it may be using a special engine in a certain range. A 
thorough functional analysis should be carried out before determining whether the use of a 
CUP is appropriate.  
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It is important to note that the effects on the price arising from broader business functions 
must be taken into account, rather than just product comparability, in order to determine if 
the CUP method is applicable. The OECD Guidelines (2001:II-3) stipulate that:   
 
Where differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions or between 
the enterprises undertaking those transactions, it may be difficult to determine reasonably 
accurate adjustments to eliminate the effect on price. The difficulties that arise in attempting 
to make reasonably accurate adjustments should not routinely preclude the possible 
application of the CUP method. Practical considerations dictate a more flexible approach to 
enable the CUP Method to be used and to be supplemented as necessary by other 
appropriate methods, all of which should be evaluated according to their relative accuracy. 
Every effort should be made to adjust the data so that it may be used appropriately in a 
CUP method. As for any method, the relative reliability of the CUP Method is affected by 
the degree of accuracy with which adjustments can be made to achieve comparability.  
 
To better understand the CUP method the following example illustrates the application of 
the CUP method and the adjustments, where necessary, in order to make the transactions 
between related and independent parties comparable.  
 
Assume that an independent distributor sells cars, received from an independent 
manufacturer, of the same type, quality and quantity as DisCo (UK), in the same period. 
The quality refers to the raw materials and machinery used and the way the cars are built 
as well as how the cars handle in day-to-day circumstances. The type refers to the actual 
chassis, engine and other important parts and brands used in the cars. Lastly, quantity 
refers to the actual units sold by the independent party and DisCo (UK). It is important that 
these facts are similar because a different quality in the cars or total output may change 
the price of the cars due to lower or higher input costs. The timing of the transaction and 
where the parties are within the value chain must be similar. This ensures that DisCo (UK) 
is compared to an independent distributor and not a manufacturer within the same 
financial year. Lastly, all other relevant factors such as marketing, warranty and insurance 
of delivery must be similar. The timing must be comparable due to different economic 
circumstances in different periods. The sales of cars have decreased over the last few 
years and therefore one could expect prices to change compared to ten years ago, due to 
equal or greater supply and lower demand. If all of the above circumstances and 
conditions are comparable, without any material differences, the most appropriate method 
to use is the CUP Method. 
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There may be cases where most of the conditions are the same in an independent party 
transaction and a transaction between two related parties, except for a minor condition. 
For example, in the independent party transaction the manufacturer retains ownership of 
the cars, and therefore has more risk and a higher selling price when compared to 
HeadCo (SA)(Diagram 1B) which transfers its ownership of the cars as soon as they leave 
the factory. Therefore DisCo (UK) carries more risk of losing stock during delivery and may 
wish to insure its goods. Usually one can easily adjust for such a difference in price. If the 
goods are insured in the related party transaction one can simply subtract the additional 
cost and then compare the two prices. However, if it is not possible to make a reasonably 
accurate adjustment, the reliability of the CUP Method would be diminished. It may then be 
necessary to choose a less direct method.  
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that a CUP could also exist between a related 
party transaction and that of the same supplier in the related party transaction and an 
independent party. For example, in Diagram 1C below, HeadCo (SA) supplies cars to 
DisCo (UK) as well as to the independent distributor (Diagram 1B above). If all the 
functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by DisCo (UK) and the independent 
distributor are the same, there may be a CUP. Keeping the other factors discussed above 
in mind, one could compare the two transactions to analyse the transfer price between the 
two related parties, namely HeadCo (SA) and DisCo (UK). This CUP may also be referred 
to as an internal CUP, because EvoCar makes its own comparable uncontrolled 
transaction. 
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3.2.3.2 Resale price method 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:II-5) explain that:  
 
The resale price method begins with the price at which a product that has been purchased 
from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise. This price (the resale 
price) is then reduced by an appropriate gross margin (the "resale price margin") 
representing the amount out of which the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other 
operating expenses and, in the light of the functions performed (taking into account assets 
used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit. What is left after subtracting the 
gross margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other costs associated with the 
purchase of the product (e.g. customs duties), as an arm's length price for the original 
transfer of property between the associated enterprises. … The resale price margin of the 
reseller in the controlled transaction may be determined by reference to the resale price 
margin that the same reseller earns on items purchased and sold in comparable 
uncontrolled transactions. Also, the resale price margin earned by an independent 
enterprise in comparable uncontrolled transactions may serve as a guide. 
 
To make the above definition of the resale price method clear it is explained with the aid of 
Diagram 1D below. 
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In order to apply the resale price method, the tested party is required to resell a product 
purchased from a related party. In the above example, Diagram 1D, DisCo (UK) on-sells 
cars which it purchased from HeadCo (SA). There are two ways to compare the related 
party transaction to that of a comparable transaction. Either the transaction is compared to 
the transaction shown above between Comparable Independent Manufacturer and 
Comparable Independent Distributor or it is compared to a transaction between the same 
manufacturer and an independent distributor, such as HeadCo (SA) and Comparable 
Independent Distributor. Once a comparable transaction has been identified the resale 
price margin needs to be determined. A comparison of the related party transaction to that 
of a comparable transaction including the same manufacturer is seen to be more reliable 
as that of a separate manufacturer. The reason is that HeadCo (SA) would be less willing 
to modify its price structure in a transaction with an independent party than with another 
related party and there should be fewer differences to adjust for. If there is no such 
comparable transaction, i.e. a transaction involving the same manufacturer, HeadCo (SA), 
then the related party transaction should be compared to the independent party 
transaction. In Diagram 1D this is Comparable Independent Manufacturer and Comparable 
Independent Distributor. After the resale price margin has been calculated, the next step is 
to ensure that there are no other conditions that may influence the transaction, such as 
customs duties. After the resale price is reduced by the resale price margin and any other 
costs associated with the purchase of the product, the arm’s length price is determined. 
 
In order to apply a resale price method it is important that none of the differences, if any, 
between the comparable transactions could influence either transaction materially and 
therefore distort the resale price margin in the open market. If there should be a difference 
in comparables, these must be adjusted for correctly in order to apply the resale price 
method. It is easier to adjust for differences with a resale price method approach than with 
the CUP Method approach, because a few differences in a product usually have less of an 
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impact on gross margins than actual prices. This is explained by the OECD Guidelines 
(2001:II-6) as follows:  
 
In a market economy, the compensation for performing similar functions would tend to be 
equalized across different activities. In contrast, prices for different products would tend to 
equalize only to the extent that those products were substitutes for one another. Because 
gross profit margins represent gross compensation, after the cost of sales for specific 
functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), product 
differences are less significant. 
 
Taking the above into consideration, the resale price method may be appropriate when 
comparing coffee machines with kettles because the sale of such goods should result in 
similar compensation. The CUP Method may not be applicable as one cannot expect the 
prices of coffee machines and kettles to be the same. However, the resale price method 
would produce a better result if conditions are more comparable.  Differences in products 
may reflect the use of different functions, for example certain intellectual property. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) set out other points to consider when applying the resale 
price method:  
• The reliability may be affected if there are differences in the way the independent 
party conducts business compared to the related parties. The reason for this may 
be that certain inefficiencies in management may increase costs which inherently 
increase the resale price margin. 
• The more value is added by the selling party to the product before it is on-sold the 
more difficult it will be to apply the resale price method. The reason for this is that it 
may be difficult to adjust the transaction for the value added particularly where the 
identity of the product is changed. The same is true for the creation or maintenance 
of intellectual property because it is very difficult to adjust for the value-added 
contribution by the intellectual property. 
• A resale price margin is more accurate the shorter the timeframe from purchase to 
resale. The reason for this is that the time of holding a good may change its costs, 
for example storage costs, exchange losses or insurance costs. 
• The amount of the resale price margin is proportionally affected by the level of 
activities performed by the re-seller. A re-seller that only performs the actual 
passing on of the good as an agent would have a smaller resale price margin 
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compared to a reseller that is involved in extensive marketing, has full ownership of 
the goods, advertising, financing stocks, and so forth. The reason for a higher 
resale price margin is that more functions carry more risks and therefore the party 
should be remunerated for this, in comparison to an agent that carries no risk. 
• It is important to establish if the reseller has the exclusive right to sell the good, as 
this may increase the price of the good as well as the resale price margin. 
• One should ensure that the accounting practices are comparable. The reason for 
this is that in order to compare the resale price margin, the operating and/or selling 
expenses should be comprised of the same costs. For example research and 
development costs may fall under operating expenses or cost of sales depending 
on what accounting method is used.        
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) stipulate that the resale price method is probably most 
useful where it is applied to marketing operations. 
 
3.2.3.3 Cost plus method 
 
The cost plus method is very similar in its application to the resale price method. The 
difference in the cost plus method is that, instead of calculating a resale margin and its 
relating arm’s length price, all costs incurred in rendering a specific service or supplying a 
product are added up and a cost plus margin is added to the total cost in order to arrive at 
an arm’s length price. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:II-11) state that:  
 
the cost plus method begins with the costs incurred by the supplier of property (or services) 
in a controlled transaction for property transferred or services provided to a related 
purchaser. An appropriate cost plus mark up is then added to this cost, to make an 
appropriate profit in light of the functions performed and the market conditions. What is 
arrived at after adding the cost plus mark up to the above costs may be regarded as an 
arm's length price of the original controlled transaction. This method probably is most useful 
where semifinished goods are sold between related parties, where related parties have 
concluded joint facility agreements or long-term buy-and-supply arrangements, or where 
the controlled transaction is the provision of services.  
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The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that in order to ensure the cost plus mark up is applied 
at arm’s length, it should preferably be compared to a cost plus mark up on a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction either between two independent parties (Comparable 
Independent Manufacturer and Comparable Independent Distributor), or where the same 
related supplying party transacts with an independent party under the same circumstances 
as with its related party (HeadCo (SA) and Comparable Independent Distributor). Refer to 
Diagram 1D below. The same principles for a comparable uncontrolled transaction apply. 
In order for a transaction between two related parties and that of independent parties to be 
comparable none of the conditions may materially affect a transaction and, if there is a 
material difference, it must be adjustable to render the difference immaterial (OECD: 
2001). 
 
 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that the cost plus method may need fewer 
adjustments than the CUP Method due to its methodology of not comparing prices but 
rather the cost factors. This may lead to different comparisons within transactions and 
more weight is given to cost factors that influence the arm’s length consideration rather 
than on the price itself. 
 
There are difficulties that may arise in the application of the cost plus method, particularly 
in the determination of costs. Every company will have to recover its cost in order to stay in 
business. The problem with certain costs is that there is not always a link that can be 
established between revenue realised and costs incurred as they may have been realised 
in different years. For example, certain marketing strategies may take a year to increase 
revenues. This may make it difficult to apply the cost plus method because the actual 
costs between the parties are dissimilar. A good example from the OECD Guidelines 
(2001:II-12) is: “where a valuable discovery has been made and the owner has incurred 
only small research costs in making it.” 
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It is important to adjust for such costs correctly. Another important aspect of the cost plus 
method is that a comparable mark up needs to be applied to a comparable cost basis. 
When determining if a mark up from a comparable uncontrolled transaction is applicable a 
closer look must be had at its cost basis. This means a mark up may not be comparable if 
the functions involved in the cost base differ between the potential comparable 
transactions. For example, in Diagram 1D, HeadCo (SA) renders marketing services when 
supplying goods to Comparable Independent Distributor to help market the cars. However, 
HeadCo (SA) renders no marketing services when supplying goods to DisCo (UK) for the 
same cars delivered. The latter transaction should receive a lower cost plus margin 
because DisCo (UK) should be remunerated for its marketing function and not HeadCo 
(SA). Therefore the price to DisCo (UK) should be lower. This may render the potential 
comparable uncontrolled transaction incomparable and the OECD Guidelines (2001:II-13) 
state that “therefore, differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions that 
have an effect on the size of the mark up must be analyzed to determine what adjustments 
should be made to the uncontrolled transactions' respective mark up.” 
 
 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) consider other points when applying the cost plus method as 
follows:  
• The comparability of the accounting methods and principles used and applied to 
ensure consistency between the potential comparable parties; this is important to 
ensure that the same types of costs are used to calculate a comparable cost base. 
• Some costs, such as labour or material costs, vary over time and therefore it may be 
appropriate to average these costs over a period of time. It may also be appropriate to 
average costs for fixed assets where production output fluctuates. The averaging of 
costs may give a more comparable cost base and can be applied to different costs as 
long as it makes economic sense. 
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There is no general rule or guidance that sets out all the situations that may arise from a 
cost plus method perspective but the OECD Guidelines (2001:II-16) state that: “[t]he 
various methods for determining costs should be consistent as between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions and consistent over time in relation to particular enterprises.”   
 
3.2.4 Transactional profit methods 
 
Traditional transaction methods are the methods preferred by the OECD Guidelines (2001) 
as they are the most direct means to establish whether commercial and financial 
conditions between two transactions are at arm’s length. However, in the modern day 
economy, complex business structures and the difficulties of obtaining certain relevant 
information, may put practical problems in the way of actually applying these more direct 
comparison methods. Where there is insufficient information or no reliable information, 
transactional profit methods may be considered. 
 
The transactional profit methods examine the profits of related party transactions. The 
OECD Guidelines (2001:III-1) state that the only “profit methods that satisfy the arm’s 
length principle are those that are consistent with the profit split method or the 
transactional net margin method as described.” 
 
It is unusual for companies to enter into a contract where the profit is a condition made or 
imposed in a transaction and in reality companies almost never use a transactional profit 
method to establish their prices. Nonetheless the OECD Guidelines (2001:III-1) state that 
profits “arising from a controlled transaction can be a relevant indicator of whether the 
transaction was affected by conditions that differ from those that would have been made 
by independent enterprises in otherwise comparable circumstances. Thus, in those 
exceptional cases in which the complexities of real life business put practical difficulties in 
the way of the application of the traditional transaction methods and provided all the 
safeguards” required are present, the application of a transactional profit method may be 
consistent with the arm’s length principle.  
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It is important to note that one cannot apply a transactional profit method simply because it 
may be difficult to find relevant data. The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-2) state that: “The 
same factors that led to the conclusion that it was not possible to reliably apply a traditional 
transaction method must be reconsidered when evaluating the reliability of a transactional 
profit method. Rather, the reliability of a method should be assessed … including the 
extent and the reliability of adjustments to the data used.”  
 
The OECD Guidelines only accept methods based on profits if they are compatible with 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
 
3.2.4.1 Profit split method 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-3) explain the application of the profit split method as 
follows.  
 
Where transactions are very interrelated it might be that they cannot be evaluated on a 
separate basis. Under similar circumstances, independent enterprises might decide to set 
up a form of partnership and agree to a form of profit split. Accordingly, the profit split 
method seeks to eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions made or imposed in a 
controlled transaction ... by determining the division of profits that independent enterprises 
would have expected to realise from engaging in the transaction or transactions. The profit 
split method first identifies the profit to be split for the associated enterprises from the 
controlled transactions in which the associated enterprises are engaged. It then splits those 
profits between the associated enterprises on an economically valid basis that 
approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an 
agreement made at arm's length. The combined profit may be the total profit from the 
transactions or a residual profit intended to represent the profit that cannot readily be 
assigned to one of the parties, such as the profit arising from high-value, sometimes 
unique, intangibles. The contribution of each enterprise is based upon a functional analysis 
…, and valued to the extent possible by any available reliable external market data. The 
functional analysis is an analysis of the functions performed (taking into account assets 
used and risks assumed) by each enterprise. The external market criteria may include, for 
example, profit split percentages or returns observed among independent enterprises with 
comparable functions.  
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One of the advantages of the profit split method given by the OECD Guideline (2001) is 
that it does not rely directly on closely comparable transactions and therefore can be used 
if no comparable transaction can be determined from available data. The profit split in the 
transaction is based on functions performed by each party. The more functions are 
performed and risks assumed with the assets used, in comparison to the other party, the 
more profit should be allocated to that party. The profit split method does not analyse the 
division of profit to each party but it analyses the functions performed and whether the 
contribution made is in accordance with the profit received in order to transact at arm’s 
length. This makes it possible for the profit split method to take specific and unique facts 
and circumstances into consideration which may not be found in independent transactions, 
while still maintaining an arm’s length approach by reflecting what an independent party 
would reasonably have done in a similar position. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) analysed another advantage of the profit split method. The 
advantage is the profit split method analyses both parties and therefore it is less likely that 
one party will end up with extreme and unjustified profits. This is especially helpful when 
analysing a transaction involving intellectual property. This two-sided approach is also 
advantageous in ensuring a fair division of profits from economies of scale or other joint 
efficiencies achieved by MNEs that satisfy both taxpayer and tax administrations. 
 
On the other hand the OECD Guidelines (2001) determined that there are a few 
disadvantages when applying the profit split method. One of the main disadvantages is 
that the method is less direct in the comparison of transactions with independent parties. 
This may lead to a more subjective result in allocating the profits. Another disadvantage is 
the actual application of the profit split method. At first glance the profit split method may 
seem easy and quicker to apply than other methods because the method relies on less 
information from independent parties. This is due to the fact that independent parties do 
not usually use a profit split method to determine their transfer prices unless they are 
acting within a joint venture. However it may also be difficult to find relevant information 
from related parties. Even if all the information required is examined, it may still be difficult 
to measure the combined revenue and costs of each related party participating in the 
transaction. The reason for this is that in order for the profit split method to work one would 
have to state all the relevant book entries on a common basis and make the relevant 
adjustments to each accounting policy, practice and its currency. The application of the 
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profit split method may be even more difficult when it is applied to operating profit because 
it may not be clear what operating expenses are associated with the actual transaction and 
how to allocate the costs (OECD: 2001). 
 
To further understand the profit split method, it is illustrated in an example below with the 
aid of Diagram 4. 
        
 
In Diagram 4, above EvoCar has three interrelated party transactions shown as 1, 2 and 3.  
The interrelated transactions depend on each other, meaning that one transaction would 
not be commercially and economically viable without the other transactions occurring 
simultaneously. This makes the set up of the transactions unique and it may be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to find a direct method to compare these transactions to an 
independent party. Therefore the profit split method, even though less direct, may be more 
appropriate to apply as it allows for adjustments for unique transactions.  
 
An example of a transaction where the profit split method is appropriate with regard to 
Diagram 4 above can be demonstrated as follows. EvoCar incorporated three companies, 
RDCo1 in the USA, RDCo2 in India and RDCo3 in Germany, involved in the research and 
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development of new engines for EvoCar’s vehicles and the manufacturing of relevant 
prototypes. The research and development of new engines is very specialised and 
performed by skilled employees in all three related entities (RDCo1 (USA)/RDC02 
(I)/RDCo3 (G)). Due to the nature of the transaction and the type of industry, it is very 
difficult to find a comparable transaction. A profit split method may be applicable in this 
example because all three related entities work together to research and develop new 
engines and it cannot be valued as a single transaction, because without any of the related 
companies there may not have been an outcome. Another reason which justifies the use 
of a profit split method rather than a traditional method is that it may be impossible to 
gather required information from independent parties due to the confidentiality restrictions 
within the industry. In order to apply a CUP method, cost plus method, or a resale minus 
method, one would need to know all the details of the transactions in order to estimate the 
value added and to determine the relevant arm’s length price. An independent party would 
not be willing to publish its secrets and relevant information to a tax administration if it 
were in the same industry as the related party.  
 
When applying a profit split method the OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that the 
potential profit to be achieved and split between the related parties is only an estimate of 
what independent parties would do and therefore may change due to unforeseen 
economical circumstances, as the estimates are based on current circumstances for future 
events. This is particularly important for the relevant tax administrations. When considering 
an accurate split, they need to realise that in certain instances the taxpayer could not have 
foreseen the actual outcome and a taxpayer should not be penalised for a wrong estimate. 
If this is not taken into consideration, the tax administration could penalise or reward the 
taxpayer by using the profit split method, which is contrary to the arm’s length principle. 
Independent parties could not have foreseen future impacts either and may have made the 
same wrong estimates. 
 
There are different ways of estimating the division of profits between related parties, based 
on potential or actual profits. That is why the OECD Guidelines (2001) express the opinion 
that the tax administration should follow the same approach as the related party to ensure 
the estimation of the division of profits is at arm’s length. If however the related party has 
not determined the conditions in the controlled transaction on a profit split method basis, 
the tax administration would evaluate the conditions on the actual profit realised by each 
related entity. 
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The OECD Guidelines’ (2001) usual approach to allocating profits to each related party in 
the participating transactions analysed, is by valuing each function performed, risk 
assumed and assets used by each related party involved. This is also known as a 
contribution analysis. The value of the function performed, risk assumed or assets used 
should be proportional to the amount of profits or losses to be earned from the 
participating controlled transaction. If possible the estimated division of profit may have to 
be amended with available independent party information with regard to their division of 
profits in similar circumstances. Obviously where the division of profit can be measured 
directly with an independent party it might not be necessary to estimate the value of each 
controlled party from its functions performed, risks assumed and assets used. Generally in 
the contribution analysis the relevant operating profit is combined to ensure correct and 
fair profit to be allocated to each party. In some instances where an MNE has general 
expenses, the gross profit of all the related parties may be combined and then the total 
cost of the group may be deducted from the gross profit. 
 
Another approach analysed by the OECD Guidelines (2001) is also known as the residual 
analysis which divides the profits of the related parties within the controlled transactions in 
two stages. In the first stage profits would be allocated to each related party based on the 
basic type of transaction performed. This ‘basic return’ for the type of transaction 
performed would be based on market returns achieved for similar types of transactions 
performed by independent parties. Once the basic return has been allocated accordingly 
to each party a residual profit or loss should remain because the basic return does not 
account for unique and valuable assets owned by each party. In the second stage this 
residual profit is allocated among the parties taking into account how this residual would 
have been divided between independent parties considering the facts and circumstances 
of the functions performed, risks assumed and assets used. Further the OECD Guidelines 
(2001:III-7) state that: “Indicators of the parties' contributions of intangible property and 
relative bargaining positions could be particularly useful in this context.”   
 
The residual profit derived in the residual analysis approach may be derived from the 
application of traditional methods discussed above. There are many approaches an MNE 
may base its profit split method on. Any of these applications may be acceptable as long 
as the approach is similar to that of an independent party or it determines a fair profit split 
in line with an arm’s length profit split. The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-8) state that the 
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“overriding objective should be to approximate as closely as possible the split of profits 
that would have been realised had the parties been independent enterprises operating at 
arm's length.” 
 
3.2.4.2 Transactional net margin method 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-9) describe the transactional net margin method as 
follows:  
 
The transactional net margin method examines the net profit margin relative to an 
appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer realizes from a controlled 
transaction... Thus, a transactional net margin method operates in a manner similar to the 
cost plus and resale price methods. This similarity means that in order to be applied 
reliably, the transactional net margin method must be applied in a manner consistent with 
the manner in which the resale price or cost plus method is applied. This means in 
particular that the net margin of the taxpayer from the controlled transaction ... should 
ideally be established by reference to the net margin that the same taxpayer earns in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions. Where this is not possible, the net margin that would 
have been earned in comparable transactions by an independent enterprise may serve as a 
guide. A functional analysis of the associated enterprise and, in the latter case, the 
independent enterprise is required to determine whether the transactions are comparable 
and what adjustments may be necessary to obtain reliable results.  
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) acknowledge that the transactional net margin method has 
distinct advantages as well as disadvantages. One of the advantages is that the net 
margin method is less likely to be affected by transactional differences compared to actual 
prices as used in a CUP Method. The transactional net margin method may also be more 
lenient when it comes to comparing differences between functions in controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions, unlike the CUP method. One of the reasons for the leniency is 
that companies may have different gross profit margins due to different functions which 
reflect in the operating expenses. But one can assume that net profits in similar 
transactions, even with some differences in functions, should remain similar (OECD: 
2001). 
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Another advantage described by the OECD Guidelines (2001) that the transactional net 
margin method has over the profit split method is that it does not have to determine the 
functions performed, assets used or risk assumed by more than one of the related parties. 
Practically one would find the simplest related entity and ensure it is dealing at arm’s 
length. This can be more cost efficient because less time is spent in analysing the required 
information. It is not necessary to obtain every single related company’s financial 
statements and records of all their activities. This is very advantageous if an MNE has 
entities with very complex business structures in terms of its functions performed. 
 
On the other hand the OECD Guidelines (2001) also note that the transactional net margin 
method has weaknesses, one of which is that a net margin can be more easily influenced 
through certain factors than the price of a commodity or the gross margin. This may make 
it difficult to accurately and reliably determine an arm’s length transaction based on net 
margins. 
 
A further disadvantage of the transactional net margin method identified by the OECD 
Guidelines (2001) is similar to that of the other methods explained above. There may not 
be sufficient information available to compare the controlled transaction to an uncontrolled 
transaction. This may be due to independent parties not publishing their financial 
information for similar transactions or that the information provided is not detailed enough 
to extract a net margin. 
 
The advantage of the one-side approach discussed above is also a disadvantage because 
the transactional net margin method is only applied to the simplest related party. The 
OECD Guidelines (2001) further reflect that even though the one-sided approach is no 
different from other methods, the resale minus and cost plus method also have this 
feature, the problem is highlighted with the transactional net margin method due to the fact 
that it is less reliable to consider only the net margins. The net margin may also be more 
easily influenced than the gross margin or price of a commodity. The OECD Guidelines 
(2001:III-12) state that there are different factors which may directly influence the net 
margin of a company as follows:  
 
threat of new entrants, competitive position, management efficiency and individual 
strategies, threat of substitute products, varying cost structures (as reflected, for example, 
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in the age of plant and equipment), differences in the cost of capital (e.g. self financing 
versus borrowing), and the degree of business experience (e.g. whether the business is in 
a start-up phase or is mature). Each of these factors in turn can be influenced by numerous 
other elements. For example, the level of the threat of new entrants will be determined by 
such elements as product differentiation, capital requirements, and government subsidies 
and regulations.  
 
From the above it is clear that even if two companies are in the same industry and have 
the same functions the difference in market share or its competitive position may result in 
different profitability.   
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-11) mention another disadvantage that should be 
considered.  
 
There may also be serious difficulties in determining an appropriate corresponding 
adjustment when applying the transactional net margin method, particularly where it is not 
possible to work back to a transfer price. This could be the case, for example, where the 
taxpayer deals with associated enterprises on both the buying and the selling sides of the 
controlled transaction. In such a case, if the transactional net margin method indicates that 
the taxpayer's profit should be adjusted upwards, there may be some uncertainty about 
which of the associated enterprises' profits should be reduced.  
 
It is important to note that the transactional net margin method is the method least 
preferred by the OECD Guidelines, but in some instances this method may provide a 
practical solution to otherwise insoluble transfer pricing problems. However, the 
transactional net margin method must be used sensibly and with appropriate adjustments 
to ensure comparability (OECD: 2001). 
 
3.2.4.3 Global formulary apportionment 
 
The global formulary apportionment has been suggested as an alternative to the arm’s 
length principle to compare a cross-border related transaction and its related profits for 
each participating tax administration. The OECD (2001) expresses the opinion that some 
tax administrations have tried to use the method without success. The global formulary 
apportionment method is not seen as a suitable method to determine the arm’s length 
price and the OECD Guidelines do not recommend the use of the global formulary 
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apportionment. 
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001:III-20) provide a description of how the method works.  
 
A global formulary apportionment method would allocate the global profits of an MNE group 
on a consolidated basis among the associated enterprises in different countries on the 
basis of a predetermined and mechanistic formula. There would be three essential 
components to applying a global formulary apportionment method: determining the unit to 
be taxed, i.e. which of the subsidiaries and branches of an MNE group should comprise the 
global taxable entity; accurately determining the global profits; and establishing the formula 
to be used to allocate the global profits of the unit. The formula would most likely be based 
on some combination of costs, assets, payroll, and sales. 
 
The global formulary apportionment should not be confused with the transactional net 
margin method. The two may sound similar but there are certain distinctions, the main one 
being that the global formulary apportionment method has a pre-determined formula that it 
has to adhere to. That in itself is contrary to the arm’s length principle as no independent 
party would agree to such a formula.  
 
The OECD Guidelines (2001) state that advocates promoted the use of the global 
formulary apportionment method as an alternative because it would have greater 
administrative convenience and certainty for taxpayers. Another belief is that with an MNE 
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate business reality as most transactions are 
believed to be interrelated and therefore one cannot determine what contribution each 
single related party makes to the total profit of the MNE. Lastly the OECD Guidelines 
(2001) state that this method would reduce the taxpayer’s compliance cost as only one set 
of accounts is needed for the whole group. 
 
The global formulary apportionment method is not accepted by OECD member or 
observer countries and therefore is not a realistic alternative for the arm’s length principle. 
The reason given by the OECD Guidelines (2001) is that the global formulary 
apportionment does not achieve the protection against double taxation or ensure taxation 
of the profit by a single fiscal authority. In order to achieve this, it would require extensive 
international coordination and consensus on the global formulary apportionment method. 
The difficulty in this is that every single tax administration must agree to the method and its 
predetermined formula. A common accounting system would have to be chosen and 
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adopted within all the tax jurisdictions, even the non-member countries. To achieve this 
may be very time consuming, extremely difficult and there is no guarantee of no double 
taxation, because if one tax administration does not apply the method in its jurisdiction 
there would be a problem. 
 
There are other concerns such as that the global formulary apportionment disregards 
market conditions. However for the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to understand that 
the method and the transition to a global formulary apportionment system present  
 
enormous political and administrative complexity and require[s] a level of international 
cooperation that is unrealistic to expect in the field of international taxation. Such 
multilateral coordination would require the inclusion of all major countries where MNEs 
operate. If all the major countries failed to agree to move to global formulary apportionment, 
MNEs would be faced with the burden of complying with two totally different systems 
(OECD, 2001:III-22). 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the various traditional transactional methods and transactional 
profit methods that can be applied to approximate an arm’s length price between related 
parties. The hierarchy of the different models has been discussed and each method was 
further analysed with a practical example.  The advantages and disadvantages of each 
method and the difficulties experienced in their application were also discussed. 
 
Now that it is clear how the arm’s length principle is applied in arriving at a transfer price, 
the concept of business restructuring will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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4 Chapter 4: The concept of business restructurings in relation to the Income 
Tax Act and OECD Guidelines 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The second aim of the research was to discuss business restructurings, why it creates 
anomalies within transfer pricing regulation in relation to cross-border transactions and 
potential solutions to these anomalies.  The present chapter explains the restructurings of 
MNEs and the reasons for such restructurings.  Four issues, in particular, relating to 
business restructurings are discussed: 
• the conversion of risk; 
• the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation; 
• the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring; and 
• the recognition of the actual transaction performed. 
 
Each of the issues are analysed in detail and explained with the aid of the EvoCar 
example. 
 
The aim of chapter 4 is to give a thorough understanding of business restructurings and 
how the arm’s length principle is determined by different changes in functions, assets and 
risks. 
 
4.2 Treatment of business restructurings 
 
The treatment of business restructurings from a transfer pricing perspective has been an 
issue of great controversy and no solution to the problem has yet been found. However it 
was agreed by the OECD, that the OECD Guidelines and arm’s length principles should 
not apply differently to restructuring and post-restructuring transactions than to 
transactions structured in that way from the outset (OECD: 2008). 
 
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs (“CFA”) defines business restructuring as:  
 
the cross-border redeployment by a multinational enterprise of functions, assets and/or 
risks. A business restructuring may involve cross-border transfers of valuable intangibles. 
 68
Business restructurings that are within the scope of the OECD’s project primarily consist of 
internal reallocation of functions, assets and risks within an MNE, although relationships 
with third parties ... may also be a reason for the restructuring and/or be affected by it 
(OECD, 2008:6). 
 
The OECD (2008) analysed business restructurings and determined that they mainly 
consist of: 
(i) Conversion of fully-fledged distributors into limited risk distributors or 
commissionaires for a related party that may operate as a principal; 
(ii) Conversion of fully-fledged manufacturers into contract manufactures or toll 
manufactures for a related party that may operate as a principal; 
(iii) Rationalisation and/or specialisation of operations (manufacturing sites, 
processes, research and development); 
(iv) Transfer of intellectual property rights to a central entity within the group (for 
example an IP company). 
 
The main aspect of business restructurings is the reallocation of profits within the group of 
an MNE either immediately after the restructuring or a few years later. The issue arising 
from the restructuring is that it must comply with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and therefore be in line with the arm’s length principle. It is important to 
establish that the business restructuring by the related group is in line with what an 
independent party would do. It needs to be determined if the reallocation is consistent with 
that of the arm’s length principle or more generally how the arm’s length principle applies 
to business restructurings. The difficulty created by the arm’s length principle within 
business restructurings is stated by the OECD (2008:7) as follows:  
 
The implementation of integrated business models and the development of global 
organisations, where they are done for bona fide commercial reasons, highlight the difficulty 
of reasoning in the arm’s length theoretical environment which treats members of an MNE 
group as if they were independent parties.  
 
Alicandri (2009:4) of the Tax Executives Institute, Inc. gives a more comprehensive list of 
reasons for business restructurings: 
• allowing more expedient and efficient globalization and expansion of cross-border 
activity into new jurisdictions 
• creating a nimble organizational structure that adapts more rapidly in response to 
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changes in customer or supplier markets 
• affording faster deployment of resources and innovation in product development and 
design and thus faster times to market 
• increasing transparency in management accounting, thereby improving the visibility 
of the value drivers in business lines and providing management with an opportunity 
to provide guidance for improving efficiency and growth 
• redistributing decision-making authority to facilitate the MNE’s core objectives and 
strategies, e.g., to implement matrix organizations or segregate marketing from 
manufacturing functions 
• improving business portfolio management (especially where the MNE has multiple 
business and product lines) and managing changes in the business, product, or 
service mix 
• permitting more efficient sharing of best practices, e.g., in manufacturing, marketing, 
and service across jurisdictional boundaries or across lines of business 
• affording closer access to suppliers and customers by consolidating global 
operations and key people functions in regional centres of excellence, thus driving 
value up and down the supply chain 
• pooling risks to make the company stronger and more financially secure in 
recessionary times  
• Optimising cash flow in the supply chain and in financing the legal structure of the 
enterprise 
• reducing investments in working capital thereby increasing free cash flow 
• increasing the visibility of inventory management in the supply chain thereby (1) 
reducing investments in stock through better deployment of inventory in the various 
markets and (2) obsolescence risk 
• improving the sourcing of raw material and other supplies 
• aligning globally or regionally with customer or supplier organizations that are also 
globalising or consolidating along regional lines 
• improving the management of customer accounts receivable and supplier payables 
• streamlining the supply chain to improve efficiency and drive down costs 
• enhancing the use of Internet-based technology thereby increasing speed of 
response to market conditions and customer or supplier demands and reducing 
costs 
• increasing specialization, thereby permitting personnel to focus on critical tasks they 
must do well in order to achieve excellence, e.g., a plant manager can focus on 
managing production in the most efficient and environmentally sustainable fashion 
when she no longer has sales responsibilities 
• enhancing human resource management, including succession planning and the 
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deployment of skilled people where most needed 
• improving teamwork 
• reducing transfer-pricing risk by standardizing business operations and 
documentation 
• enhancing cash flow by improving the administration of indirect taxes, e.g., by 
reducing the number of required VAT registrations and consolidating the tax 
compliance functions, for which the enterprise serves as a tax collector 
• to correct for gradual changes in a business 
 
In addition, MNEs are increasingly focused on developing centralised centres of expertise – 
whether for research and development, design, engineering, development, product launch, 
marketing, or services. 
 
Business restructurings as discussed in the present thesis do not deal with restructurings 
that result from mergers or acquisitions and only deals with internal restructurings of an 
MNE. 
 
Business restructurings should not only be seen as a single issue as it can change many 
aspects of how an MNE is taxed. There are four main issues determined by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) which will be 
discussed below: 
• conversion of risk; 
• the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation; 
• the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring; and 
• recognition of the actual transaction performed. 
 
4.2.1 Conversion of risk 
 
The conversion of risks is very important in the context of business restructurings. The 
reason for this given by the OECD (2008) is that business restructurings usually result in 
the conversion of local operations into low risk operations as seen in 2.5.3.1 in Diagram 
2A. This leads to a lower allocation of profits due to the decrease in risks which may be 
achieved with a guaranteed profit allocation. The entrepreneurial risks such as marketing 
risk and inventory risk, for example, are borne by the other related party who will also 
receive the residual profit or loss in some cases. This point is crucial for tax 
administrations because the tax administration must ensure that the risk transfer and its 
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consequences are in accordance with the arm’s length principle in relation to the business 
restructuring itself and to post restructuring transactions. 
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003) starts by examining the contractual 
terms between related parties to identify the risks borne by each party. However, the 
contractual obligation is only respected if it has economic substance, in other words, if it is 
similar to a contract that an independent party would agree to. Therefore it is not enough 
to analyse the contracts between related parties, but sufficient information must be 
collected to show that such a business restructuring would be entered into by independent 
parties as well. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008) acknowledges further points that should be considered as follows:  
• if the related parties actually conform to the risk allocation;  
• is the risk allocation at arm’s length with regard to potential profits;  
• is the risk economically significant; and  
• are there any transfer pricing consequences with regard to the risk allocation. 
 
4.2.1.1 Examination of adherence to the risk allocation 
 
To examine if a related party adheres to its risk allocation is an essential part of the 
functional risk analysis and the OECD (2008) states that it should commence with a review 
of the contractual terms between the related parties. Once the terms of the contract have 
been determined it needs to be established if the related parties actually conform to the 
terms. The best evidence concerning the actual allocation of the risks is the business 
conduct of each party. For example, HeadCo (SA), as the manufacturer, sells cars to 
DisCo (UK), the distributor. The two related parties have contracted all the market risks to 
the manufacturer. However, when looking more closely at the transaction it becomes clear 
that the distributor actually takes on currency exchange risks because the distributor is not 
given a varying transfer price from the manufacturer to ensure that the cost of the cars is 
constant. In this case, if there is no adjustment made to eliminate the currency exchange 
risk for the distributor, the OECD (2008) expresses the opinion that the tax administration 
may wish to challenge the allocation of the currency exchange risk. 
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
acknowledges that there may be instances when there is no formal contract between 
related parties, but there should be evidence in other correspondence between the related 
parties. If there is no evidence of any contract between two related parties then the OECD 
assumes that the parties are dealing as independent parties. It is important to note that 
when independent parties deal with each other the divergence of interest will ensure that 
each party will hold the other party to the contract and that a contract will only be amended 
or ceded if it is in the interest of both parties. This divergence of interest between related 
parties may not exist within a related party transaction and therefore it is important to 
examine the conduct of the parties in relation to the terms in the contract.  
 
4.2.1.2 Determining if the terms of the contract are at arm’s length 
 
As previously discussed, if the risks assumed by the related parties are similar to those of 
independent parties then the contractual risks between the related parties are considered 
to be at arm’s length. It is more difficult to ascertain that the risks are at arm’s length when 
there are no comparables. As discussed, however, there are different methods to 
determine the arm’s length price. The OECD (2008) states that if there is no comparable 
independent party transaction that does not mean that the actual transaction of the related 
parties is not at arm’s length. However, for an independent party to assume more risks in a 
transaction it would be expected to earn more potential profits. 
 
The risk allocation goes hand in hand with the actual control over a transaction. The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion draft (2008:16) 
defines control with regard to risks as:” the capacity to make decisions to take on the risk 
(decision to put the capital at risk) and decisions on whether and how to manage the risk 
internally or using an external provider.” This definition of control separates the monitoring 
of a risk and actually transferring a risk. The difference is that even though a company may 
want to outsource certain functions, the ultimate decision and therefore the risk may still lie 
with the company. For example in an investment fund the risk lies with the party who 
actually invests the money. Even though the investment manager may have some 
decision-making capacity within the fund in deciding what to invest in, within its 
parameters, the control of the finance is with the investing party. The investing party 
makes the ultimate decision as he can decide which area he wants to invest in, whom to 
hire, he sets all the objectives and if the fund makes losses these are carried by the party 
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who invested the initial capital and not the fund manager. This shows that the fund 
manager has some control over the investment, but the ultimate control still lies with the 
investing party and therefore the ultimate risk lies with the investing party.  
     
4.2.1.3 Determining whether the risk is economically significant 
 
The OECD (2008:19) identified that “one important issue is to assess whether a risk – and, 
as a consequence, the transfer of that risk, where applicable – is economically significant”. 
This is because not all transferred risks of related parties have any significant profit or loss 
potential attached to them, taking into account the size of the risk, the possibility of its 
realisation and its preventability. The acceptance or transfer of immaterial risk should not 
change the potential profit or loss of that transaction, as an independent party would not 
be willing to lose potential profits for transferring an immaterial risk.  
 
The OECD (2008) is aware that it may be quite a delicate exercise to determine if a risk is 
material or not. The most straight-forward way would be to analyse accounting statements 
of the related parties to verify if a potential risk has a contingent liability reflected on the 
balance sheet of the particular related party. If there is no contingent liability it would seem 
as if management does not think it is likely that the risk will actually materialise and 
therefore one can argue the risk is immaterial. If the potential risk is recognised by a 
contingent liability it gives a good indication of the value of the risk and, in most cases, it 
will be material. It is important to note that not all risks can be quantified and therefore may 
not carry a value and cannot be represented on the financial statements of a company. 
Such risks include but are not limited to customer appetite or possible discrepancies in 
pricing. 
 
4.2.1.4 Determining the transfer pricing consequences for the risk allocation 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:20) states that 
 
In general, the consequence for one party of being allocated the risk associated with a 
controlled transaction, where such a risk allocation is found to be consistent with the arm’s 
length principle, is that such party should: 
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(i) Bear the costs, if any, of managing (whether internally or by using related or unrelated 
service providers) or mitigating the risk (e.g. costs of hedging or insurance premium); 
(ii) Bear the costs that may arise from the realisation of the risk. This also includes, where 
relevant, the anticipated effects on asset valuation (e.g. inventory valuation) and/or the 
booking of provisions, subject to the application of the relevant domestic accounting 
and tax rules; and 
(iii) Generally be compensated by an increase in the expected return…  
 
To illustrate this in an example, HeadCo (SA) is a fully-fledged manufacturer in South 
Africa who distributes goods to DisCo (UK) who is a fully-fledged distributor, as shown in 
Diagram 1A below and discussed in chapter 2.3. 
 
 
 
DisCo (UK) would like to strip out its risks for economic reasons by converting into a 
limited risk distributor. In this case the transfer of risks also results in the transfer of 
functions and assets as these are interrelated. For example DisCo (UK) will transfer its 
marketing function and all relevant assets to HeadCo (SA) and therefore carries less risk 
with regard to return on investment. The first step in the restructuring entails determining 
which party assumes what risks just before the restructuring. This can be done by looking 
at the contracts between HeadCo (SA) and DisCo (UK) as well as the four points 
discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft in 4.2.1. To keep the example simple it is assumed that DisCo (UK) performed all 
functions related to a fully-fledged distributor. 
 
The actual restructuring will be considered next. 
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4.2.2 The actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
explains that a business restructuring may involve the transfer of functions, assets and 
risks between related parties. Further, restructurings may also be a result of the 
termination of a contract or its non-renewal, as well as substantial re-negotiation of existing 
arrangements. In order to properly understand a business restructuring and its effects on 
the compensation for each party, one needs to understand the changes that have taken 
place in the restructuring process, how the changes affect the functional analysis of the 
parties, what the business reasons are for both parties to the business restructuring and 
what options would have been available to independent parties in similar conditions. Only 
if these topics are understood can one determine an arm’s length compensation for the 
restructuring itself.    
 
The following points from the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008) describe this in more detail: 
• Comprehend the actual restructuring itself; 
• The reallocation of profit and loss potential due to business restructurings; 
• The transfer of intangible assets; and 
• Indemnification to the transferor for detriments suffered from the restructuring itself. 
 
4.2.2.1 Comprehend the actual restructuring itself 
 
Business restructurings vary from transaction to transaction and may involve different 
numbers of parties. In order to comprehend a restructuring entirely the OECD (2008) 
states that one needs to identify the restructuring transactions, functions, assets and risks 
transferred before and after the restructuring. This means that it is necessary to have two 
functional analyses of each party, one for each party before the restructuring and one after 
the restructuring. This will help to determine what functions, assets and risks have been 
transferred from which party. This will also help to evaluate the rights and obligations of 
each party and if these will change during the restructuring. In order for the business 
restructuring to be at arm’s length the functions, assets and risks as well as the obligations 
and rights transferred must reflect the economic principles that generally are upheld by 
independent parties. 
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As previously discussed, MNEs increasingly restructure to provide more centralised 
management functions. The role of synergies and economies of scale within an MNE have 
vast advantages and increase efficiencies and lower costs which is the main factor driving 
business restructurings. The related party involved in the restructuring should document all 
the benefits and disadvantages from the restructuring itself in order to support its business 
restructuring, when justifying the point to the tax administration. This document will help to 
support the MNE’s decision to restructure the business. Before the actual restructuring 
itself, the related party should also consider all other realistic options available to it in order 
to determine if the restructuring is something an independent party would also consider. 
Benefits may not include only higher potential profits but could also be better quality 
products or a greater market share, which it may not have been able to achieve without 
the business restructuring. 
 
A last point to note is that synergies of an MNE may not always work out as planned and a 
restructured party may actually incur losses. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion draft (2008) recommends that tax administrations do 
not use hindsight, and change the transaction back to its original position, as that 
interferes with the basis of the arm’s length principle. However, that does not mean that if 
the discrepancy in the planned profitable outcome which resulted in a loss was due to 
another related party not performing as agreed, that the underperforming party should 
carry the actual loss incurred and compensate the other related party. 
 
The OECD (2008:23) mentions one important point to be taken into account:  
 
the arm’s length principle applies on a separate entity rather than group-wide basis, local 
synergy gains or losses may contribute to the profit/loss potential of the restructured entity, 
and may need to be taken into account in the analysis of the transfer pricing consequences 
of the restructuring, depending on the rights and other assets of the restructured entity at 
the time of the restructuring. 
 
The last point to consider from the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) with regard to the actual business restructuring 
itself is the arm’s length options realistically available to the restructured entity. An 
independent party would compare the potential restructuring to other available 
transactions before making its decision and would only choose the available restructure if 
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it is the most attractive option. When comparing all the options available each party needs 
to examine which option is the most attractive one taking into account the potential profits, 
compensation and indemnifications of the restructuring and include the option of not 
entering into the business restructuring at all. There may be instances where the 
restructured entity has no option available but to enter into the restructuring and therefore 
has to accept the conditions of the restructure regardless. This may happen in instances 
where a party prematurely exits a contract with just cause, in accordance with the exit 
clause of the contract. Therefore the restructuring would still be at arm’s length but no 
other options at the time of the restructuring may be available. 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that it is important to determine whether the transfer 
of functions, assets and risk is motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the 
MNE group as a whole or if the restructuring is at arm’s length from the perspective of both 
the transferor and the transferee. The reason for this is that an independent party, if it can 
legally prevent the contract cancellation, would not be willing to restructure its business if 
there is no potential benefit to its own operation, which means from an MNE perspective, 
even though a transfer may result in better synergies to the whole group, the actual 
restructuring may not be at arm’s length. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the business restructuring must be at arm’s length from 
the perspective of the related party who performs the restructuring and not the perspective 
of the MNE as a whole. 
 
To better understand the points discussed above they are explained in an example below 
which continues from example 4.2.1.4. 
 
When converting a fully-fledged distributor to a limited risk distributor, many transactions 
may be converted, for example, inventory functions, marketing functions and finance 
functions. To keep this example simple, it only concentrates on the marketing function of 
the conversion to a limited risk distributor. 
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This makes the identification of the actual restructuring simple as it is the marketing 
function only. DisCo (UK) will cease to render marketing services and transfer the whole 
function to HeadCo (SA). The risks transferred are those related to the marketing function 
such as bad publicity due to bad marketing or money spent on marketing that has no effect 
on the market. Assets transferred with regard to the marketing function include, for 
example, client lists and any intellectual property related to marketing. 
 
The advantage of converting to a limited risk distributor for DisCo (UK) in unpredictable 
economic times is that it achieves a constant predetermined return. This means that in bad 
economic times DisCo (UK) will still achieve an adequate profit margin which it would 
otherwise not achieve. On the other hand, is a disadvantage because during good 
economic times when higher profits may be achievable, DisCo (UK) will still receive the 
same constant predetermined return, which is usually lower. 
 
DisCo (UK)’s other options realistically available with regard to the marketing function 
would be to outsource the service. One can argue either way that to outsource the service 
will result in a better and cheaper service or to render the service internally will be better 
and cheaper. Generally the latter can be argued due to the points discussed in chapter 2.2 
which can be summarised as follows. MNEs increasingly restructure to provide more 
centralised management functions. The role of synergies within an MNE as well as the 
economies of scale have great advantages and increased efficiencies and lower costs, 
which is the main factor driving business restructuring. 
 
EvoCar would save money due to economies of scale or synergies, or EvoCar would be 
able to facilitate internal functions which result in more efficient management and therefore 
in cost savings. Any of the above points can be considered to be sound commercial 
reasons for a business restructuring. 
 
4.2.2.2 The reallocation of profit and loss potential due to business restructurings 
 
In order for business restructurings to be in accordance with the arm’s length principle it is 
expected that the transfer of functions, assets and risks should result in a reallocation of 
profit or loss potential between the transferee and transferor. 
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The main problem identified by the OECD (2008) is to determine how the transferee 
should compensate the transferor for the reallocation of risks and its potential profits or 
losses and vice versa. It is important to distinguish between the profit or loss potential of a 
transaction, and the right or asset that is transferred, which carries the potential profit or 
loss. The arm’s length principle does not require actual compensation for the profit 
potential as such, but the right or assets transferred do require compensation under the 
arm’s length principle. The two meanings are closely interrelated and if an asset holds 
considerable profit potential it is assumed to receive a higher compensation when 
compared to that of a right with no profit potential. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:25) examines the value of rights and assets through their actual profit or loss 
potential and stipulates that the reallocation of risks should take into account: 
• Whether compensation by the transferor to the transferee for the transfer of potential 
losses and liabilities would be agreed between independent parties at arm’s length, taking 
account of both the amount of the possible losses and the probability of the risk’s 
materialising, and whether it would be preferable for the transferor to pay the transferee 
to take over the activity rather than to simply stop performing the activity and incur the 
associated windup costs; 
• Whether compensation by the transferee to the transferor for the associated transfer of 
profit/loss potential would be agreed between independent parties at arm’s length, taking 
account of the other options realistically available to the parties, and of the future 
profit/loss expectations in relation to the risk at hand. Accounting standards for evaluating 
risks can prove very helpful in that respect; 
• Consequences attached to the subsequent exercise of activities by the transferor and the 
transferee in accordance with their new risk profiles.  
 
In order for the compensation payable as a result of the business restructuring and the 
transfer of profit and loss potential to be at arm’s length, a number of factors should be 
determined. These include but are not limited to the following as identified by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008): 
• the other options realistically available to the transferor and transferee in order to 
ensure that the actual restructuring is at arm’s length, based on the rights and 
assets and the compensation determined with regard to the profit or loss potential; 
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• the expected return after the restructuring for each related party involved; as 
previously discussed a higher risk profile should result in higher potential profits or 
losses; and 
• the compensation that may be payable to the party that surrenders its future profit 
potential through the surrender of certain rights and assets. 
 
Continuing the example from 4.2.2.1 where DisCo (UK) is the transferor and HeadCo (SA) 
is the transferee, the reallocation of the marketing function and its risks and assets may 
result in the reallocation of a profit or loss potential. In good economic times it would more 
than likely be a profit situation and in bad economic times it would more than likely be a 
loss situation. This profit or loss potential that HeadCo (SA) assumes does not result in 
any kind of remuneration to DisCo (UK). However DisCo (UK) is appropriately 
remunerated for the transfer of the marketing function and its assets and risks such as the 
sale of its client list. 
 
4.2.2.3 The transfer of tangible and intangible assets 
 
Business restructurings can involve the transfer to a foreign related party of tangible 
assets such as equipment and/or intangible assets such as intellectual property. The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) states 
that generally tangible assets do not raise any issues with regard to transfer pricing from a 
business restructuring perspective, but the valuation of the intangible asset may at times 
be tricky.  When a party cedes its right to the ownership of a tangible asset such as 
inventory there are different methods to value the inventory. The use of the appropriate 
method depends on which party is less complex within the transaction and, therefore, can 
be valued with greater certainty, as well as the timing of the transaction. The following 
three methods from the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008) are examples and only give some possibilities on how to value 
tangible assets. 
1. By reference to comparable uncontrolled prices, the arm’s length principle should 
be applied to the price of the tangible, taking all the issues into consideration 
discussed under the CUP method, for example market prices.  
2. Another way to calculate the transfer price of tangibles could be by using the 
resale price to customers, minus an arm’s length remuneration for all functions to 
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be performed that will no longer occur due to the restructuring. The functions in 
this example can entail distribution and marketing functions.   
3. Another approach to determine a transfer price for tangibles could be to start with 
the manufacturing cost and add an arm’s length mark up to the cost to fairly value 
the manufacturing functions performed, assets used and risks assumed. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
recognises that the transfer of intangible assets is more difficult than tangible assets due to 
the difficulty in actually identifying the intangible transferred and its valuation. The reason 
why it may be so difficult to identify the intangible is that it may not be legally protected or 
even registered and not all intangibles are recorded in the financial accounts. A few 
examples of intangible assets include patents, trade names, know how, designs, models 
and trade secrets. It is an important part of business restructurings to identify all 
intangibles transferred and their value to ensure that the restructurings are performed at 
arm’s length. Lastly, the arm’s length price of the intangible property right transferred 
should take into account the perspective of the transferee and transferor alike. 
 
A good example in the context of business restructurings with regard to the transfer of 
intangibles is the specialisation of manufacturing sites within an MNE group such as 
EvoCar, in the car manufacturing industry. Before the restructuring there may be many car 
manufacturers within a group in different geographical locations which manage and own a 
series of patents as seen in Diagram 5A below. There are three manufacturers, one in the 
USA, one in India and one in Germany. For ease of reference the manufacturers are 
named Man1 (USA), Man2 (I) and Man3 (G) respectively. The patents owned by the three 
car manufacturers may overlap and at times certain car manufacturers may even pay 
royalties to independent parties to receive certain intangible assets. 
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From EvoCar’s group perspective taking into account the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects 
of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) it may be more viable economically to 
centralise all the patents and manage them from the head office and specialise each 
manufacture by the type of manufacturing process needed in each geographical area 
rather than by patents owned. As seen in Diagram 5B this may help to identify a 
duplication of patents and may increase production due to specialised manufacturers and 
the head office, HeadCo (SA), has a better control of stocks and can ensure a quicker 
turnaround time. For example, instead of each manufacturer, Man1 (USA), Man2 (I) and 
Man3 (G) building a whole car, after the restructuring each manufacturer will be 
specialised to produce certain parts of a car and collectively produce one model of a car. 
For example, Man1 (USA) may build the engines, Man2 (I) may build the car’s chassis and 
Man3 (G) may assemble all the parts and add finishing touches to the car. In order to 
achieve this EvoCar will give contractual rights to each manufacturer for the products 
falling in the new areas of competence by using patents previously owned by other related 
parties or itself as shown in Diagram 5B below. 
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DisCo (UK)Man2 (I)
Man1 (USA)
Man3 (G)
HeadCo (SA)
Diagram 5B
The solid line shows the flow of goods, 
tangible or intangible, only 
The dotted/solid line shows the flow of 
services and goods, intangible or tangible
 
 
One issue that arises with the transfer of intangible assets is explained by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008:29) as follows.  
 
The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions made or imposed 
between related parties, at the level of each of them. The fact that centralisation of 
intangible property rights may be motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the 
MNE group does not answer the question whether the disposal is arm’s length from the 
perspectives of both the transferor and the transferee.  
 
This may pose a problem particularly when a related party, Man1 (USA), disposes of its 
intangible property rights to another related legal entity, HeadCo (SA), but after the 
business restructure, continues to use the intangible asset and may even pay royalties for 
the use of the previously-owned patent. This highlights the fact that the conditions of the 
transfer should be assessed from the perspectives of both the transferor and the 
transferee. As previously discussed, when analysing from the perspective of the transferor, 
other options available to the transferor should be taken into account, such as the option 
not to transfer the intangible asset at all. It is important to consider the arm’s length 
principle and compare the transfer to what an independent party would have done. The 
OECD (2008) agrees that in most instances an independent party would not be willing to 
transfer its intangible property if, without it, it could no longer manufacture its products, 
unless the transfer of the intangible property may result in further research and 
development by the transferee which will benefit both parties. 
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
states that the transfer of intangible property is even more complex when the intangible 
property does not have an established value and especially if the gap between the 
expected future profits that were estimated at the time of the restructuring differs vastly 
from the actual profits derived by the transferee. This could raise the question whether the 
valuation of the transfer was at arm’s length and was bona fide, taking the available 
information at the time of the restructuring into account. If this was not the case, the 
transfer price may be adjusted. An example of such a possible transaction is that of pre-
exploitation rights within large MNE mining companies such as BHP Billiton. 
 
Other intangible assets considered by the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) are local intangibles and contractual rights. Local 
tangibles may be non-transferrable as they are inherent to the local market and operation, 
for example, a customer list.  If an MNE group would like to strip all risks from a related 
party it could achieve this by royalty payments. The transferee would remunerate the 
transferor for the patent as the actual intangible would not leave the transferor. However, 
the transferor is remunerated for the intangible property in order to transfer all the risks 
associated with the intangible property to the transferee. Contractual rights can also be 
seen as intangible property and should be remunerated at arm’s length from the 
perspective of both the transferor and the transferee.   
 
Business restructurings may involve the transfer of an ongoing concern. The only 
difference between the transfer of an entire concern and a single function as stated by the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) is that 
the transfer of a going concern entails the total bundle of assets and liabilities associated 
with particular functions, assets and risks. The difference is that the total bundle may be 
valued differently compared to valuing each single function, asset or risk associated with 
the transfer. This difference is often seen as goodwill and should not create any problem 
provided the transfer of the concern is at arm’s length from the perspective of both the 
transferor and the transferee. 
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4.2.2.4 Indemnification of the transferor for detriments suffered from the restructuring 
itself 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
states that in a business restructuring the transferor may have certain expenses or 
disadvantages due to the termination of contracts or substantial renegotiations, such as 
restructuring costs, re-conversion costs and a loss of profit potential. To ensure that the 
restructuring is at arm’s length, it should be determined what an independent party would 
have agreed to as indemnification under similar circumstances. Indemnification in this 
instance can be any compensation that may be paid to the transferor from the transferee 
for the disadvantages suffered. This may entail, but is not limited to, up-front payments, 
the transferee sharing in the restructuring costs, or lower purchase prices in the context of 
post-restructuring operations. It should also be noted that contract terminations do not 
always end up in adverse consequences and expenses and therefore do not guarantee a 
right to an indemnification. To ensure that an indemnification is at arm’s length four points 
should be considered. 
 
Firstly the OECD (2008) argues that it needs to be ascertained if the arrangement that is 
terminated, not renewed or substantially renegotiated is in writing and provides for an 
indemnification clause. Independent parties would usually only modify or ignore contracts, 
if it is in the interest of both parties, otherwise the one party would hold the other party to 
the contract and its indemnification clause. If there is no indemnification clause in the 
contract between the two related parties it does not mean that the termination, non-
renewal or renegotiation is at arm’s length but rather the contrary, as an independent party 
would not have entered into such a contract in the first place. 
 
Secondly the OECD (2008) considers whether the terms of the contract and its 
indemnification clause or other type of guarantee are at arm’s length. To determine if a 
contract is actually at arm’s length, it should be analysed in the light of whether an 
independent party would have agreed to such terms, with other options realistically 
available under similar circumstances. The substance of the agreement must be analysed. 
For example, in some instances, a contracting party may have to invest large amounts in 
its production line in order to be able to deliver on the undertakings made in the contract. 
In such instances it is expected that the contract should have a longer term with higher 
indemnities when compared to the situation where no initial investments are needed to 
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adhere to the contract, in order to arrive at an arm’s length return. Some contracts may 
ensure that both parties bear the risk of termination of the contract by splitting the 
termination costs evenly. In some other cases the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008:35) states “it may be that, on the basis of 
an examination of the substance of the arrangement and of the actual conduct of the 
related parties, an implicit longer term contract should be implied whereby the terminated 
party would have been entitled to some indemnification in case of early termination.” 
 
It should be considered whether certain indemnification rights are provided for by 
commercial legislation. If there should be such legislation that would mean that even if 
there is no indemnification clause in the contract, there are still certain indemnification 
rights and terms and conditions that each party must adhere to. Keeping this in mind, if 
there is no indemnification clause in the contract but commercial law has certain 
requirements relating to the termination of specific types of agreements, these rules should 
be followed and therefore the contract may still be at arm’s length. However, the OECD 
(2008) expresses the opinion that related parties would rarely seek to have such 
indemnification by the related party enforced by the courts.  
 
Further the OECD (2008) considers whether an independent party would have been willing 
to actually indemnify the other party who suffers adverse effects from the termination or 
renegotiation of the agreement. As previously described it is always important from a 
transfer pricing perspective to take account of both perspectives of the transferor and 
transferee. It may not always be possible to derive a single answer for each case but the 
responses should be based on the examination of the facts, circumstances and economic 
rationale for the termination for each case. One should determine what the benefits are for 
each party involved in the restructuring and any other options realistically available to the 
parties at arm’s length. 
 
A last point worth mentioning from the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) with regard to the actual restructuring and the 
arm’s length compensation is that not all restructured entities losing functions, assets or 
risk or suffer a loss of expected future profits. It may be the case that the transferor, 
instead of losing a profit-making opportunity, may actually be saved from a loss-making 
opportunity. The same principles apply as discussed above, but a question may arise if the 
transferee should be compensated by the transferor for taking over this loss-making 
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activity. The norm is to compare the loss making activity to what an independent party 
would have done. 
 
4.2.3 The application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring 
 
The transfer pricing approach and determination of the arm’s length principle for post-
restructuring controlled transactions have not yet been finalised by the OECD. This section 
of the thesis will discuss the current situation and the proposed method and conclusions 
by the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
on how to deal with such post-restructuring controlled transactions. It is important to keep 
in mind that the arm’s length principle and OECD Guidelines should not apply differently to 
post-restructuring transactions compared with transactions that were structured in such a 
way from the outset. There are, however, certain issues which deserve special 
consideration. The following points should be considered when analysing business 
restructuring transfers (OECD: 2008). 
 
4.2.3.1 General guidance on choosing a transfer pricing method 
 
The methods and guidance on transfer pricing methods have been discussed in detail. 
The general transfer pricing methods should not be applied differently to post-restructuring 
controlled transactions.  
 
4.2.3.2 Difference between business restructuring and structuring 
 
It has been emphasised previously that a post-restructure transaction should not be 
treated differently to a transaction structured as such from the outset. The OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008:40) gives the following 
reason for this:  
 
Doing otherwise would create a competitive distortion between existing players who 
restructure their activities and new entrants who implement the same business model 
without having to restructure their business. Comparable situations must be treated in the 
same way. The selection and practical application of an appropriate transfer pricing method 
must be determined by the comparability analysis, including the functional analysis of the 
parties and a review of the contractual arrangements. The same comparability standard 
and the same guidance on the selection and application of transfer pricing methods apply 
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irrespective of whether or not an arrangement came into existence as a result of a 
restructuring of a previously existing structure. 
 
A point to note is that the comparability analysis of a restructuring might change when 
comparing the transaction pre-restructure to post-restructure. Therefore, the OECD (2008) 
concludes that it is essential to list all the functions, assets and risks from both the 
perspective of the transferor and the transferee. However, the transfer pricing method 
should be applied to the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, hence the 
transfer pricing method may change in relation to the post-restructuring transaction when 
compared to the pre-restructuring transaction, but the same principles still apply when 
compared to a transaction structured as such from the outset. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
acknowledges that there may be differences between the starting position of a newly set 
up operation and that of an arrangement which replaces an existing arrangement due to 
prior contractual and commercial relationships. From an arm’s length perspective this may 
affect the negotiation options realistically available to the transferee and transferor, as well 
as the conditions of the whole business restructure arrangements. For example, Man1 
(USA) from Diagram 5B has proven to HeadCo (SA) that it is able to manufacture quality 
products on time. It may not necessarily have a trial period clause, whereas new 
arrangements may have a trial period clause in the new agreement. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
identified that an issue that may arise in the transfer of functions, assets and risks is the 
determination of remuneration. The issue is whether a party’s remuneration should only be 
affected before it is converted, while it is converted or after it is converted, or a 
combination of the three possibilities. In order to establish how and when a related party 
should be remunerated, the risks transferred should be considered. It is important to 
determine if the risk transferred existed at the time of the restructuring or only after. For 
example, DisCo (UK), a fully-fledged distributor, is restructured to a limited risk distributor, 
continuing the example from 4.2.1.4. Before the restructuring DisCo (UK) has provisions 
for bad debts, but the bad debt risk is transferred to HeadCo (SA) and therefore the now 
limited risk distributor carries no bad debt risk. In order to determine how DisCo (UK) 
should be remunerated it must be clarified which party carries the risk of the bad debt prior 
to the restructuring, or when the risk is actually transferred, and should be remunerated 
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accordingly. The longer the risk was assumed by DisCo (UK) or the more likely a bad debt 
is to be realised, the less DisCo (UK) would be remunerated for the transfer of bad debts. 
The same principle, as in this example, applies to issues of timing for research and 
development or certain sales activities.     
 
4.2.3.3 Selection and application of transfer pricing methods to post-restructuring 
controlled transactions 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
states that the selection and application of a suitable transfer pricing method to a post-
restructuring controlled transaction should be the same as for a normal transaction. 
Because a transaction has been restructured does not mean that it should be treated 
differently from a new transaction. As discussed previously, that would lead to either 
advantages or disadvantages for taxpayers of restructured transactions. Therefore a post-
restructuring controlled transaction must be tested against a comparability analysis which 
explains in detail what functions are performed, the assets used and risks assumed and 
which party performs, uses or assumes them. During the comparability analysis particular 
attention should be paid to intangible assets and their correct allocation to the right party 
and if the allocation of intangibles and their risks satisfy the arm’s length principle. 
 
As previously discussed, for related party transactions the same traditional and 
transactional methods apply for restructured transactions with the same preferred 
rankings. In order to choose the correct method both parties should be considered to 
determine which party uses what assets to perform certain functions and the risks 
assumed. The OECD (2008) expresses the opinion that the method itself should be 
chosen to suit each party’s characteristics, but the characteristics can only be properly 
classified if both parties’ functions, assets and risks are understood. 
 
There may be cases when a taxpayer’s comparability analysis does not agree with the 
view of the tax administration. This is not a specific business restructuring issue but it may 
aggravate the problem due to the effectiveness and consistency with the arm’s length 
principle as presented by the taxpayer. The OECD (2008) gives the following example 
where a taxpayer may believe that the restructured entity carries no more risk, whereas 
the tax administration believes the restructured party still carries intangibles or bears 
significant market risks.    
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:47) identifies a main issue arising from the selection of a transfer pricing method as 
follows: 
 
Post-restructuring arrangements may pose certain challenges with respect to the 
identification of potential comparables in cases where the restructuring implements a 
business model that is hardly found between independents. 
 
The OECD (2008) notes that the identification of potential comparables should be made 
with the objective of finding the best available data. However, it may also be necessary to 
determine what an independent party would have done in the same circumstances in order 
to arrive at an arm’s length remuneration. 
 
4.2.3.4 Relationship between up-front compensation and remuneration over time for the 
restructuring and post-restructure 
 
The OECD (2008) encountered cases where the related parties to a business restructuring 
decided to forgo the receipt of part or all the up-front compensation and instead will be 
remunerated over time by changing the transfer price between the related parties. For 
example, HeadCo (SA) would like to contract out its manufacturing function as discussed 
in 2.5.3.1 (refer to Diagram 2A below). Instead of HeadCo (SA) receiving an up-front 
compensation from ManConCo (I), ManConCo (I) agreed that it will buy the raw materials 
from HeadCO (SA) at a higher price than normal over a certain period of time in order to 
offset the compensation that should have been received in an arm’s length situation. 
 
HeadCo (SA) DisCo (UK)
ManConCo (I)
The solid line shows the flow of goods 
The dotted line shows the flow of services
Diagram 2A
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:49) summarises this as follows: 
 
In other words, in this situation where the taxpayer will have an ongoing business 
relationship as supplier to the foreign party that carries on an activity previously carried on 
by the taxpayer, the taxpayer and the foreign party have the opportunity to obtain economic 
and commercial benefits through that relationship (e.g. the sale price of goods) which may 
explain for instance why compensation through an up-front capital payment for transfer of 
the business was foregone, or why the future transfer price for the products might be 
different from the prices that would have been agreed absent a restructuring operation. 
 
4.2.3.5 Difference between profits earned before and after the restructuring 
 
The requirements of Article 9 of the Model Tax Convention (2003) would not be met by a 
before-and-after comparison of profits. However, such a comparison can be useful to gain 
valuable indications to assess the risks assumed or transferred in combination with 
functions performed and assets used. With this in mind the OECD (2008) believes that a 
before-and-after comparison could help to better understand the restructuring itself and 
assess whether the business restructuring is actually at arm’s length. A proper 
comparability analysis would be required with a functional analysis to determine if the 
restructuring is at arm’s length.   
 
4.2.3.6 Location savings 
 
The OECD (2008) explains that location savings may be achieved by an MNE through 
reallocating certain functions of its related parties to another country to save costs. Costs 
can include labour costs or real estate costs. A problem may arise where such location 
savings result from a business strategy that has significant savings and the question of 
how to allocate such savings among the parties. The norm would be to check what an 
independent party would do in similar circumstances, depending on the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed by each party, as well as their respective 
bargaining powers. 
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4.2.4 Recognition of the actual transaction performed 
 
The recognition of the actual transaction carried out is a vital part and an important starting 
point for any transfer pricing analysis. As previously discussed it is important to look at the 
contracts drawn up between the restructuring parties, but it is the actual transaction that 
determines its characterisation. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008:53) states that:  
 
MNEs are free to organise their business operations as they see fit. Tax administrations do 
not have the right to dictate to an MNE how to design its structure or where to locate its 
business operations. MNE groups cannot be forced to have or maintain any particular level 
of business presence in a country. They are free to act in their own best commercial and 
economic interests in this regard. In making this decision, tax considerations may be a 
factor. Tax administrations, however, have the right to determine the tax consequences of 
the structure put in place by an MNE, subject to the application of treaties and in particular 
of Article 9 of the Model Tax Convention. This means that tax administrations may perform 
where appropriate transfer pricing adjustments in accordance with Article 9 of the Model 
Tax Convention and/or other types of adjustments allowed by their domestic law (e.g. under 
general or specific anti-abuse rules), to the extent that such adjustments are compatible 
with their treaty obligations.   
 
It is important to study and examine the actual transaction undertaken by the related 
parties and not only the contractual terms. As discussed previously, Article 9 of the Model 
Tax Convention (2003) gives a tax administration the right to adjust the profits of the 
taxpayer where the conditions of a controlled transaction do not agree with what an 
independent party would have done in comparable circumstances. The OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) adds that the rights of 
a tax administration in a business restructuring are the same as discussed for a normal 
transaction structured in a particular manner from the outset. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a detailed analysis of business restructurings and the 
consequences, from a transfer pricing perspective. It discussed the four issues that may 
arise from business restructurings in functions, assets and risks, namely: 
• conversion of risk; 
• the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation; 
• the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring; and 
• recognition of the actual transaction performed. 
 
The discussion dealt with both pre- and post-restructuring situations. The chapter 
emphasised the point that, even though there are certain guidelines on how to deal with 
business restructurings, each case needs to be determined on its own merits as no two 
cases are the same. At first some cases may appear to be the same but it is important that 
all the facts are understood correctly in order to conclude on the correct transfer pricing 
approach for the business restructuring and the related arm’s length principle. 
 
The next chapter will critically analyse the OECD Guideline’s approach to business 
restructurings. It will compare the theory of the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft to how it actually is perceived to work in practice 
by well known legal and audit firms. 
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5 Chapter 5: A critical analysis of the OECD Guidelines and the OECD Model 
Tax Convention in relation to transfer pricing and business restructurings 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters dealt with the first two aims of the research.  They dealt with the 
concept of transfer pricing and business restructurings, setting out the principles and 
definitions applying in determining when a transaction triggers the arm’s length principle 
and the relevant transfer pricing methods.  The present chapter discusses the last three 
aims: 
• advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement procedures, triangular cases, 
the  vital role they play in business restructurings and how they might help or hinder 
business restructurings;  
• best practice guidelines and how they may be applied to business restructurings; 
and 
• avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes. 
 
This chapter critically discusses the arm’s length principle having regard to the OECD 
Guidelines (2008) and the OECD Model Tax Convention (2003).  In addition, the chapter 
compares the theory of business restructurings as set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) with how it actually is 
perceived by legal and audit firms to work in practice.  
 
As previously discussed, South Africa is not an OECD member country but it follows the 
OECD Guidelines, as such it is influenced by any principles or methods published by the 
OECD including the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008). 
 
The chapter will discuss why business restructurings may create anomalies within the 
transfer pricing regulations in relation to cross-border transactions and will discuss 
potential solutions to the anomalies. Such solutions may include advance pricing 
agreements and mutual agreement procedures. Finally, the chapter examines global best 
practice in avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes. 
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5.2 The arm’s length principle 
 
According to Fris (2009) the arm’s length principle is sound in theory, but there are 
arguments that it is inherently flawed. The most observable fact is that the arm’s length 
principle does not account for economies of scale related to integrated systems when 
compared to independent parties. For example MNEs are known to have great cost 
savings through centralised management structures and cost centres as discussed above, 
but these savings are not taken into account in the determination of the arm’s length 
range. The main advantage of an MNE is that of cost savings due to synergies and other 
cost saving opportunities discussed previously.  
 
5.2.1 Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
Cross-border transactions have changed as a result of different business models adopted 
in different periods. Earlier business models had manufacturing structures which delivered 
their products directly to the distributors. In the modern day business model it is common 
to have an MNE with central cost centres and IP companies or virtual management 
structures that service many different related companies. Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (2003) may be outdated. The OECD Model Tax Convention (2003:12) as it 
stood on 15 July 2005 states in Article 9(1) that “conditions are made or imposed between 
the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations” and in Article 9(2) it states “of 
that State”. At the time of the last OECD Model Tax Convention update it was assumed 
that only two parties would be involved in a transaction and therefore only the issue of two 
related parties and their tax administrations was taken into account.  
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention should be updated so as to include more 
than two parties to a transaction. Fris (2003:201) states that:  
 
today’s integrated business models generally involve not only two, but more enterprises in 
joint operations. Art. 9(1) [of the OECD Model Tax Convention] should therefore be read as 
“two or more enterprises”, whereas Art. 9(2) [of the OECD Model Tax Convention] should 
emphasize that “the other states” must make the corresponding adjustment(s).  
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5.2.2 Guidance for applying the arm’s length principle correctly 
 
As alluded to in chapter 2, the arm’s length principle requires that each inter-company 
transaction is remitted to the same level that would have applied had the transaction taken 
place between independent parties, all factors remaining constant. In order to determine if 
transactions are similar each entity can be classified into a certain group. For example, 
DisCo (UK) may be classified as a limited risk distributor, or HeadCo (SA) as a fully-
fledged manufacturer.  
 
This classification of parties into certain categories may lead to an inflexible approach and 
may be incorrect in certain instances. The reason is that each transaction has to be 
labelled, which is done by analysing its functions, risks and assets. The norm with labelled 
parties is that once they are classified, they would operate exclusively as such and, if not, 
they are deemed not to be comparable. Therefore Fris (2003:196) is of the opinion that 
“parties are either eliminated from the comparison that serves to identify arm’s length 
behaviour or adjusted in their outcomes by applying a ’synthetic’ approach in bringing 
together distinct additional or complementary roles, activities or functions carried out by 
the parties concerned.” According to Fris (2003) the current model fails to bring together 
functions, assets and risks in a coherent model. To understand the issue better the 
problem is illustrated with an example. 
  
The situation can be illustrated by an example from Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). 
There is one party with 26 black cards and 26 parties each holding one red card. Each pair 
of cards, one red and one black card, is worth R100 but unpaired cards are worthless on 
their own. The negotiation between the parties is free. The only restriction is that the 26 
parties with one red card each cannot get together and bargain as a group.   If the party 
with the 26 black cards would offer R20 for a red card to any party, would that other party 
accept? The question is who is in a stronger position and if there is a stronger position why 
is that so? The general consensus from the example is that parties that react impulsively 
tend to accept an offer such as the R20, however, parties that do not accept the offer and 
wait for a better one have the most likely outcome of a 50 – 50 split. In this example that 
would be R50 per card.  
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By way of comparison, the same situation as above applies, except that the player with the 
26 black cards now only has 23 black cards. In this example the player with the black 
cards has about 12 percent less than in the prior example. From this it seems clear that 
the split now should be 44 – 56. Is this assumption correct? If the party with the black 
cards offers R20 to a party with a red card is that party not better off with the money than 
having only a red card, which is worthless? If a player does not accept the offer of R20 he 
might end up with nothing, in which instance even R10 would be better than a red card. 
From this it is clear that the arm’s length principle lacks certain coherence.  
 
Fris (2003:196) summarises the problem as follows: 
 
The context for the arm’s length game is constituted by the value chains in which parties 
concerned play their role and to which they contribute their added value. But in order to 
understand how parties would behave ’at arm’s length’, one must first be able to more 
accurately identify the relevant characteristics of the players (the parties involved in the 
related transactions); this should be done with a view to map more realistically the ‘similar 
circumstances’ underlying appropriate applications of the arm’s length principle. 
 
This statement is especially true with regard to an MNE. The reason for related parties to 
operate as part of an MNE is to add value, as discussed in detail in chapter 2.2 and even 
though the benefits are known to the tax administrations and the OECD alike, Fris (2003) 
believes these benefits are still not considered when applying the arm’s length principle.  
 
In theory the value-chain and its consequences may be easily understood but in practice it 
would be very difficult to apply. The reason for a synthetic approach to the arm’s length 
principle which analyses the basics of a transaction and only its main value-adding drivers 
is to make it easier to define and compare transactions for every party involved, which in 
turn may result in a smaller tax compliance burden for the taxpayer. The problem has been 
analysed but no solution has yet been found for labelling transactions in such a way as to 
account for the value-chain of each transaction. 
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5.3  Critical analysis of business restructurings and the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects 
of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft  
 
The concept of business restructurings and the related treatment of transfer pricing is 
relatively new. The latest OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008), which limits itself to internal restructurings only, reflects 
substantial work in the field. However, there are certain issues that may require a more 
thorough understanding. Baker and McKenzie (2009:2) are of the opinion that many “tax 
administrations have now publicly expressed concern about such transactions, and some 
have already initiated examination, litigation, or legislative efforts.”  
 
Demade (2009) and Baker and McKenzie (2009) are of the opinion that consensus 
between OECD members in relation to the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) may be lacking and this may lead to the risk of 
double taxation due to ambiguous definitions. With the new draft, the OECD has 
introduced new terms which have not been defined adequately. In order to provide more 
certainty in the draft, the following terms should be defined beyond question: profit 
potential, location savings, all alternative options realistically available and commercial 
rationality. Without each tax jurisdiction understanding the meaning of each term, there 
may be a risk of double taxation due to potential different tax treatments in each tax 
jurisdiction. It is important to note that any change in definition or the adoption of a new 
definition should not be contemplated without careful consideration by stakeholders and 
especially policymakers and the relevant tax administrations, to ensure that the issue of 
double taxation is dealt with accordingly. 
 
A general matter which in Vrind’s (2009) opinion should be addressed more clearly in the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) is that 
no tax administration should be able to dictate to an MNE how it should run its business. 
The tax administration should only be able to adjust the MNE’s taxable income. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
should also consider the treatment of intangibles. Vrind (2009) is of the opinion that it 
should be made clear by the OECD Guidelines which intangibles are transferable and may 
lead to an actual transfer of intangibles. For example, only legally enforceable intangibles 
can be seen as transferable.  
 99
Another important point raised by Baker and McKenzie (2009:4) that should be considered 
is the following: 
 
A literal reading of some portions of the Discussion Draft might suggest that business 
restructurings may be taxed differently from other transactions in some respects, 
notwithstanding the initial statement rejecting such an approach. We [Baker & McKenzie] 
submit that this would be inappropriate as a matter of policy. In addition, it is unclear how 
special rules for business restructurings would work in practice; given the Discussion Draft’s 
broad and imprecise definition of business restructurings, the scope of special rules likely 
would not be clear enough to enable voluntary compliance and equitable administration. 
Provisions of the Discussion Draft that could be read to suggest different treatment for 
business restructurings should be clarified. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
identifies the existence of contracts between related parties and the review of the contracts 
as an important part of a business restructuring and its conversion of risks. This may result 
in an increased administrative burden for the taxpayer. The United States Council for 
International Business (Walker, 2009:2) summarises the intercompany agreements, 
functional and economic analysis and accounting treatment from the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) as follows: 
• Contractual arrangements concerning the restructuring; 
• Business reasons for the restructuring; 
• Transactions involved in the restructuring; 
• Options realistically available to achieve the objectives of the parties other than the 
transactions selected; 
• Identification of intangibles involved in the restructuring, and their profit-making potential; 
• Identification  of functions, assets, and risks involved in the restructuring;  
• Presence of indemnification to the transferor; 
• Terms of any termination or renegotiation of any existing agreements; 
• Application of two-sided as well as one-sided TPM [transfer pricing method] analysis, 
indicating, as it has in other contexts, that profits split methods (two-sided) may need to be 
used to confirm a one-sided method (such as TNMM); 
• Identification of potential comparables; 
• Functional analysis of what has actually changed before and after the restructuring; 
• All other elements of the transaction in question that is pertinent to the respective elements 
of the Discussion Draft.  
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Keijzer and Dijckmeester (2009) are of the opinion that another more important issue that 
may arise through this is that there is an increased focus on a form above substance 
terminology, which is not in accordance with the OECD Guidelines. The norm is to look at 
the substance of a transaction over its form.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
discusses a two-sided review in order to assess business restructurings from the 
perspective of the transferor as well as the transferee. However Baker and McKenzie 
(2009) are of the opinion that the OECD Guidelines should be applied in the same manner 
to all situations and therefore there should not be a special rule for restructured entities. 
 
Baker and McKenzie (2009) emphasise that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft should be in alignment with the OECD 
Guidelines and indicate consistently throughout the draft that the current OECD Guidelines 
do not permit re-characterisation of the taxpayer’s transactions except for two very limited 
cases which do not normally arise in business restructurings.  
 
Huibregtse of the Transfer Pricing Association (2009) suggests that the OECD should 
implement a threshold for business restructurings. The threshold should be measured on 
the shift in profits between the related parties. The reason for this suggestion is that an 
MNE may go through hundreds of business restructurings which must be documented in 
detail as the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
reads at present. This may result in a heavy tax compliance and administrative burden for 
the MNE.  
 
Neuenschwander (2009) from Deloitte discusses the importance of the difference in 
decision making between related and independent parties. Often related parties do not 
have the same decision making process for transactions when compared to independent 
parties. Neuenschwander (2009:3) believes that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft should  
 
recognize that decisions to proceed with business restructurings within MNEs are usually 
made at the group level, not by individual subsidiaries acting alone. We [Deloitte] believe 
that it would be more useful if tax administrations were to focus on the outcome of what an 
MNE has done, rather than on the process by which the MNE arrived at that point. 
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Requiring subsidiaries of MNEs to document something they do not otherwise do would be 
an extension of the [OECD] Guidelines, and would impose a substantial compliance 
burden. MNEs should not be required in their internal operations to replicate an approach 
that would be adopted between independent enterprises. 
 
5.3.1 Comments on the conversion of risk 
 
It has been established that the contractual arrangements between the restructuring 
parties are the stepping stones for determining which party bears the risk. Keijzer and 
Dijckmeester (2009) state that this may be difficult in practice, especially for MNEs as they 
do not document everything in contracts, but an MNE may have internal policies or 
directives which determine the allocation and control of risks. This means that contracts 
between MNEs usually only cover the essentials and internal documentation should also 
be examined, in addition to the contracts in place. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) suggests that where no contract is in 
place between two related parties it is necessary to determine if the actual allocation of 
risks is similar to that which independent parties would agree to in similar circumstances.  
 
It should also be determined who has the control over the risk and who has the financial 
capacity to bear the risk, in order to determine if the allocation of risks is at arm’s length. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
raises the question of which related party has the greater control and therefore should 
carry the risk. From an MNE perspective this may not be as easy. The OECD tries to 
weigh each party’s level of control and related risk to determine if the allocation is at arm’s 
length. However, in practice, the control of an MNE may be manifested through many 
different instruments, for example, binding policies, operating boards and council or 
authorisation rules. This indicates that, even though an independent party will only rely on 
the contract, from a related party perspective, the substance of the transaction must be 
taken into account in order to ensure that there is no confusion. Keijzer and Dijckmeester 
(2009:3) believe that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008) should “reconfirm that only risks relating to the corporate structure 
and related contracts between legal entities are relevant for tax purposes, not the 
organizational structure that allows ... [the] MNE to function as one. This distinction is a 
pillar of the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines.”  
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The framework, in terms of which the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft discusses risks, may result in detailed assessments of 
how risks are controlled. Ernst & Young (2009:7) believe that the analysis should provide 
the bigger picture “i.e., the general pattern of control of risk.”  
 
Ernst & Young (2009:7) state that  
 
[t]his is important because we [Ernst & Young] believe that the proposed guidance may be 
interpreted as increasing the scope to challenge the allocation of risks to a greater extent 
than is practical or necessary. The allocation of risks by the taxpayer should in the first 
instance be respected and only be open to challenge by tax administrations in extreme 
cases. Challenges should be limited to cases in which there is a systematic mis-alignment 
between the contractual allocation and control of significant risks to the point that the 
arrangement lacks economic substance and business purpose.  
 
Implementing the approach discussed by Ernst & Young may give taxpayers greater 
certainty with regard to their risk allocation.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
also mentions the fact that if there are no contracts in place between related parties, the 
tax administration may speculate about how, in practice, independent parties would have 
dealt with the same issue with regard to the control of the risk. Hannes (2009:25) from 
McDermott, Will & Emery suggests that a tax administration  
 
should respect a taxpayer’s allocation of risks with an affiliate, even in the absence of a 
third-party contract that allocates risks similarly, if the related parties’ actual conduct with 
respect to who bears the risk is consistent with the terms of the contract… [T]he only 
potential viable exception to this general rule is where it is demonstrated by the tax 
authority, with empirical evidence, that unrelated parties in similar circumstances 
consistently do not share risks in the manner in which the related parties have chosen by 
contract and have implemented through their conduct and that the choice of the affiliates 
results in a distortion of income or expense that cannot be reasonably addressed by a 
reallocation of income or expense.  
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The suggestion made by Hannes (2009) of McDermott, Will and Emery emphasises that a 
tax administration should not be able to freely second-guess contracts and behaviours of 
related parties by assessing how an independent party would have dealt with the 
allocation of risk. As previously discussed, only because an independent party may not 
enter a similar agreement, it does not mean that the contract itself is not economically 
sound. If a tax administration analyses a transaction in the manner that it thinks an 
independent party would treat it rather than treat the transaction as it actually works, the 
arm’s length principle becomes irrelevant. The reason for this is that the actual transaction 
must be compared to an independent party transaction from which any differences are 
analysed. The arm’s length principle does not give the tax administrations any right to 
hypothesise transactions. This suggestion may also help by decreasing the tax burden of 
compliance. 
 
Ernst & Young (2009) believe that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft should provide more detail on what control really means. 
MNEs choose virtual management structures in order to collectively control economically 
significant risks within the group. The definition of control as stated in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft does not clearly state how a 
virtual management structure should be dealt with. Ernst & Young (2009:6) goes into 
further detail by questioning what control really means: “ultimate responsibility, primary 
share of collective responsibility, or something else.”  
 
Andrus, Dykes, van Linden & Plotkin (2009:7) of PricewaterhouseCoopers recommend 
that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
should:  
 
state clearly and straightforwardly, that a taxpayer’s allocation of commercial risk must be 
respected by tax administrators where: (i) the allocation of risk is reflected in 
contemporaneous written agreements; (ii) the conduct of the parties is substantially 
consistent with those agreements; and (iii) the entity asserted to be bearing a risk has the 
managerial and economic wherewithal to assume, manage and bear the risk. 
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This would help MNEs to understand clearly what is required of them in order to have risk 
allocations in business restructurings accepted by the relevant tax administrations.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
considers accounting statements to be a source of information from which to determine 
whether a risk is economically significant. Keijzer and Dijckmeester (2009) state that even 
though accounting statements may be a good reference point for determining the 
significance of risks, the actual relevance should not be overestimated. Firstly financial 
statements have a purpose other than to determine significance of risk. The term 
“significant” with regard to risk may be interpreted differently by different people and may 
not match the materiality level of the MNE from a transfer pricing perspective. Financial 
statements are governed by strict rules that determine materiality levels of risks and the 
probability of the risk materialising, but further guidance is needed. One of the main 
reasons not to use only the financial statements to determine risks is that the financial 
statements will reflect the costs and outcome of managing the risk rather than the potential 
risk. Financial statements report historical costs. Lastly, many potential risks that an MNE 
faces are not quantifiable and therefore would not even be shown in the financial 
statements. 
 
The problem arising with the concept of “economically significant” is to determine which 
risks fall under this definition. Chandler (2009) of KPMG states that risk profiles may differ. 
For example, there are risks that may occur all the time, but which are not material. Then 
there are risks that may not occur at all, except for unforeseen extraordinary 
circumstances, but if they do occur they may be devastating for the business. There may 
also be risks that were thought to be minor but actually turned out to be significant. An 
example of the latter would be the bad loans resulting from sub-prime housing loans. 
Chandler (2009:13) from KPMG suggests that the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft should “acknowledge that there are significant 
complexities to the evaluation of risk and that these complexities may vary with industry 
and with the specific circumstances of specific taxpayers.” 
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Instead of using financial accounting statements to determine the economic significance of 
risk, the United States Council for International Business believes that a “standard 
functional analysis identifying the functions, assets and risk borne by each party is a more 
practical way to characterize the types of risks transferred that then can be quantified by a 
standard financial risk model” (Walker, 2009:4).      
 
Hannes (2009) is of the opinion that the OECD should have regard to another point when 
determining whether a related party has control over a risk, in addition to the points 
discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft. In order to determine if a related party has control over a risk it should be 
determined if that party has the actual financial capacity to cover such a risk. For example, 
if a risk could reasonably amount to R100 million but the financial capacity of that party is 
only R1 million and the party is not insured to cover that risk if it should materialise, it can 
be concluded that the party does not have the necessary control over the risk. A tax 
administration should therefore make an appropriate reallocation of the risk. In order to 
keep the arm’s length principle intact, the tax administration should not be able to simply 
allocate the risk to the other related party involved in the transaction, but should determine, 
with the aid of contracts, which party in practice bears the risk and try to allocate the risk 
accordingly.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
uses the term ‘goodwill’ which Chandler (2009:17) believes “has widely varying 
interpretations and therefore references to goodwill are likely to be interpreted in 
significantly different ways by different tax authorities.” Further Chandler (2009) from 
KPMG is of the opinion that the term ‘goodwill’ should be replaced with the statement used 
in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:53):  
 
MNEs are free to organise their business operations as they see fit. Tax administrations do 
not have the right to dictate to an MNE how to design its structure or where to locate its 
business operations. MNE groups cannot be forced to have or maintain any particular level 
of business presence in a country.  
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The OECD Guidelines should not approach a related party transaction differently to that of 
an independent party transaction just because the parties are related. For example, if 
EvoCar is moving one of its manufacturing plants to a different location for economically 
sound reasons, EvoCar should not have to pay compensation to any related party unless it 
is bound to do so by a contract. Chandler (2009) is of the opinion that the mere fact of a 
related party moving to another location should not trigger a payment as no independent 
party is required to pay compensation for moving countries either. 
 
From another viewpoint, if this is not recognised in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft it may lead to confusion and unfair 
discrimination which may result in double taxation. For example, a car manufacturer 
invests in certain suppliers to try to cut the costs of the total manufacturing process. Due to 
the investment the suppliers now fall under the related party definitions, but because the 
MNE has no experience in the distribution industry it actually has more unexpected costs 
and decides to revert  to its previous manufacturing business only and sell off the previous 
acquired distributors. By pulling out of the distribution market, the manufacturer may be 
expected to pay the distributor certain compensation if stipulated in a contract. Chandler 
(2009) is of the opinion that currently one could interpret the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft in such a way that the manufacturer 
has to pay ‘exiting’ penalties. As this was an investment decision and had nothing to do 
with transfer pricing, the MNE should not be penalised just because the investment was in 
a related party, rather than an independent party. This example takes the case to the 
extreme, but some tax administrations may try interpret investing options in such a way 
and try to increase the country’s revenue.  
 
5.3.2 Comments on the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
discusses the importance of related companies evaluating and documenting other possible 
options available to them to strengthen their case that business restructurings have been 
at arm’s length. In theory this may be acceptable but, in practice, an MNE follows its 
business vision and mission for the group as a whole. It appears that the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft neglected to take into 
account the reason why MNEs exist and how they operate in practice. Keijzer and 
Dijckmeester (2009) state that an organisational structure of an MNE may follow its 
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business vision, which may be truly global, and therefore would not consider each single 
related party involved in the decision making. To expect an MNE to evaluate and 
document every available option for each legal entity and perform an analysis would be 
too costly and time consuming. This may severely hamper an MNE’s business process 
and place a heavy burden on the taxpayer, which may not be acceptable. 
 
The OECD should consider providing a safe haven for MNE restructurings when the 
restructuring is considered to have commercial rationality. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) states that each restructuring 
of an MNE must be looked at in isolation and at each individual taxpayer level, regardless 
of what the overall MNE’s mission and vision is. Alicandri (2009:8) who speaks on behalf 
of the Tax Executives Institute, Inc. believes that “most business restructurings are driven 
by sound commercial reasons apart from tax savings. Assuredly, when management 
determines that a restructuring is necessary an MNE’s tax advisors will seek to obtain the 
most beneficial tax result for the restructuring as well as the post-restructuring 
transactions.” The tax administrations should accept business restructurings where the 
MNE can show that its post-restructuring effective tax rate falls within a reasonable range 
for the different tax administrations involved. Therefore, it should be acceptable as being 
commercially rational and at arm’s length.  
 
It should be established in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008:23)  that not having adequate documentation with regard to other 
”options that would have been realistically available to the restructured entity” does not 
imply that a transaction is not at arm’s length. Otherwise this may place a heavy 
compliance burden on the taxpayer. The principle of ‘substance over form’ established in 
the OECD Guidelines should continue to apply. Keijzer and Dijckmeester (2009) are of the 
opinion that the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should provide a more balanced approach with regard to documentation and the 
increasing compliance burden on taxpayers. To document other options may also be very 
difficult due to timing differences. Each option may change and many factors may be 
unknown during the decision making process. Another point to consider is that a 
restructuring decision of an MNE may be based on financial as well as non-financial 
factors. These non-financial factors may be impossible to quantify. 
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Dunahoo, Sprague and Boykin (2009) from Baker and McKenzie are of the opinion that 
the suggestion of the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft with regard to implied terms in contracts, based on speculation as to what other 
parties may have done, is inappropriate. The OECD Guidelines indicate that a transfer 
pricing analysis should set an arm’s length price for the arrangement and/or transaction 
actually entered into by the related parties. Considering this, it is inappropriate to assume 
or infer terms that are not negotiated by the related parties in the contract. Dunahoo, et al. 
(2009:7) is “starting to see some tax administrations attempting in the examination context 
to impute significant changes in the terms of the parties’ agreements as a first resort, even 
attributing ownership of IP from one entity to another. The Discussion Draft should clarify 
that such analyses are inconsistent with the Guidelines.”   
 
The Tax Executives Institute, Inc. (Alicandri, 2009:10) summarises the above as follows:  
 
First[ly], the requirement is open ended and seemingly requires taxpayers to consider and 
document a range of possible alternatives to the restructuring transaction. Second[ly], the 
standard introduces considerable subjectivity into the examination of arm’s length 
conditions. Rather than examining the transaction actually entered into by a taxpayer, tax 
authorities would be permitted to consider what other options ‘might’ have been considered 
by independent third parties. On balance, we believe the proposed standard considerably 
lowers the threshold in the current TP Guidelines for recharacterising transactions… tax 
authorities will be given discretion to substitute their judgment for what constitutes a 
‘commercially rational’ transaction. As a practical matter, the standard is likely to discourage 
much needed business restructurings and require taxpayers to maintain inefficient business 
operations.  
 
Ernst & Young (2009:11) go a step further with regard to other options realistically 
available to the taxpayer and suggest that “the burden of proof should rest with tax 
administrations to demonstrate that the option chosen at the time by the taxpayer was 
perverse, or not credible”. However, as previously mentioned, this analysis should be done 
with information reasonably available to the taxpayer and the tax administration should not 
use hindsight.  
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
discusses the issue of compensation for the transfer of assets and risks, but it does not go 
into detail or specify what constitutes a transfer. Walker (2009) from the United States 
Council for International Business is of the opinion that where, in particular situations, 
related parties engaged in long-term contracts or long-standing relationships alter that 
contract or relationship under a termination clause, that should not constitute a transfer 
that requires compensation, especially where the contracts have been negotiated at arm’s 
length and there is no statutory right of compensation. 
  
A major concern highlighted by Keijzer and Dijckmeester (2009) that arises is that the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft does not take 
the nature of an MNE into account, because, from an MNE’s point of view, it may not be 
possible or realistic to assume that each legal entity’s alternatives will be hypothesised 
accordingly to satisfy the assumption that every possible structure has been analysed. 
Another point that is important to keep in mind is that each MNE and its legal entities are 
free to organise their business operations as they see fit and should be taxed accordingly. 
An MNE is not obliged to adopt a system seen as ‘the best fit option’ from a tax 
administration’s perspective.   
 
With regard to the renegotiation of contracts or the termination of the contract, Vrind 
(2009) states that there may be an instance when a less favourable contract is better than 
no contract at all. In such a situation an independent party would probably also enter into 
such a transaction. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft should mention such a possibility to ensure completeness. 
 
The valuation of intangibles and the good faith of the initial valuation may raise some 
issues. As discussed in section 4.2.2.3, the valuation of intangibles must be performed 
with information reasonably available at the time of the restructuring and arrived at in good 
faith. Demade (2009) is of the opinion that this may lead to confusion because the 
valuation of intangibles is subject to judgement and therefore the actual value may be 
different to the value determined. A tax administration should be very careful before 
qualifying any valuation as being made in bad faith. More guidance or clarity should be 
given to ensure more certainty for taxpayers in this regard.  
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
discusses the issue of compensation as a result of a restructuring.  Demade (2009) states 
that even though it is addressed in the draft it is still vague and needs to be clarified. The 
issue is that the discussion about the profit and loss potential is interrelated with the asset 
or right that is transferred. The arm’s length principle does not require actual compensation 
for the profit potential as such, but the right or assets transferred do require compensation 
under the arm’s length principle. Further, the examples given in the draft do not conclude 
on the issue and this issue appears to be open to a subjective interpretation. The 
“consensus on this significant issue is not obvious and the balance seems to be in favour 
of a required compensation in case of any restructuring transferring a profit/loss potential” 
(Demade, 2009:6).  
 
As discussed previously, the issue of conversion of risk should be determined with the aid 
of contracts and other written documents. Less emphasis is placed on the substance of 
the actual transaction itself. When considering the compensation of the restructured 
entities, the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008) suggests examining the substance of a transaction rather than the legal contracts. 
It emphasises the need to consider the actual conduct of the entity and base the 
compensation on the substance of the arrangement and the conduct of the related parties. 
Demade (2009) is of the opinion that even though this is in line with the OECD Guidelines, 
this may be confusing when related to the conversion of risk because there is no 
consensus in this regard on how to deal with a restructuring. Both points are very 
important. The legal agreements, as well as the substance of a transaction, should be 
taken into account. However, some limit should be placed on the substance over form 
approach as the taxpayer should not lose its protection from written contracts by having 
tax administrations ignoring them and claiming that  the substance of a transaction is 
different to its form.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
discusses the role of the terms of a related party contract. However Hannes (2009:17) 
states that, tax administrations “should be strongly discouraged from assuming or 
speculating about what contractual terms and conditions, such as the number of years of a 
contract’s term, ‘would have been reasonable’ for independent parties to agree upon, 
particularly on the basis of hindsight.” [Author’s emphasis] Instead, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft should follow the OECD 
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Guidelines and emphasise that a contract entered into between related parties should be 
implemented consistently with its terms and adhered to. It should be enough to accept the 
transaction from a tax administration’s view point as long as the actual compensation 
within the contract is at arm’s length. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:35) mentions that “an implicit longer term contract should be implied”. This position 
may give tax administrations potential authority to remake a contract. The Tax Executives 
Institute, Inc. (Alicandri, 2009:6) recommends that the statement should be eliminated as it 
stands in contrast with the OECD Guidelines where tax administrations do not “have an 
implied right to impute a contract duration longer than that agreed to by the parties.”     
 
According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft (2008) business restructurings involve either a transfer of functions, assets and/or 
risk jointly or separately. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft is very vague on how the term “functions” and its transfer should be dealt 
with. Deloitte (Neuenschwander, 2009:6) understands that compensation may only be 
required for an actual transfer of risks, rights, or assets or something of value. Functions, 
however, are not discussed. Deloitte believes that “functions are not transferred – rather, 
one function ceases and another one starts somewhere else.” 
  
5.3.3 Comments on the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring 
 
The issue regarding an increased tax compliance burden also relates to the application of 
the arm’s length principle after the restructuring. The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) requires a comparability analysis of each 
party’s characteristics to be performed for both pre-restructuring and post-restructuring 
arrangements as well as the actual transaction undertaken. This puts an additional tax 
compliance burden on the taxpayer.  
 
Another point mentioned by Demade (2009) regarding the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects 
of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft is that a restructured entity is not necessarily 
in the same position as a newly structured entity, which may make it very difficult or 
impossible to find comparables. It was explained in the draft that a restructured entity 
always retains some valuable intangible in the converted entity. This could be true in 
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certain cases, but should not be taken as true for every case.    
 
Emphasis is placed by the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft (2008) on whether the comparison of post-restructuring profits compared 
to its pre-restructuring profits can be used with the help of a comparability analysis as a 
sanity check to determine if the post-restructuring profits are at arm’s length. The problem 
is that many different external factors can influence the level of profits before and after the 
restructuring that had nothing to do with the restructuring itself. Demade (2009) is of the 
opinion that it is important to acknowledge that a comparison may be distorted and 
therefore no adjustment by any tax administrations should be made on this basis. One 
may be able to use the comparison as a sanity check, as long as a deep review of factors 
including internal and primarily external factors have been examined, that may influence 
the post-restructuring profit.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Andrus et al., 2009:9) believes that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft:  
 
should not state or imply that a transfer between members of the same multinational 
enterprise of the opportunity to engage in certain business functions is itself a taxable 
event. Unless such business opportunities are accompanied by intangible assets that give 
the owner the ability to exclude others from carrying on similar business activities, a 
business opportunity is not a unique asset and should not need to be paid for.  
 
With regard to location savings, the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) should explicitly state that location savings should 
be evaluated in terms of specific facts and circumstances relevant to each transaction and 
it should not be based on a general rule.  
 
It has been KPMG’s experience that tax authorities in high wage cost countries tend to 
assume that the buyer of products made in low cost areas should be able to capture all or 
most of location savings while the tax authorities in low wage cost countries assume that 
their local manufacturers should be able to realize high profits because of their low costs. 
As a practical matter, the answer is likely to turn on the functions, capabilities and 
circumstances of the specific legal entities involved. If the legal entity in the low wage 
country has significant capabilities that cannot be readily replicated by alternative suppliers 
in the same or other low wage countries, it may be able to sell at prices that reflect a higher 
 113
cost base than it has and therefore realize substantial profits. Conversely, if the local entity 
has very limited capabilities and is closely supervised by the legal entity that is buying its 
product, it may be unlikely to receive anything more than a low routine profit. Finally, it is 
important to realize that in many cases the “location savings” may be passed onto the third 
party customers of the taxpayers, and that they may therefore not lead to higher profits for 
any of the specific subsidiaries (Chandler, 2009:25). 
 
5.3.4 Comments on the recognition of the actual transaction performed 
 
Keijzer and Dijckmeester (2009) continue the discussion that an MNE may set up its 
organisation and structure as it sees fit, and state that it also applies to recognition of the 
actual transaction performed. A tax administration should not just ignore a method applied 
because the tax administration does not like the method. However this does not mean that 
artificial structures should not be questioned, but the tax administration should rather adopt 
an open approach to analysing the MNE approach.    
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft 
(2008:55) speaks about the non-recognition of a transaction due to the restructuring of the 
transaction not “behaving in a commercially rational manner”. Crüger (2009) and Dunahoo 
et al (2009) are of the opinion that this commercially rational manner test may lead to 
confusion and may be very difficult to enforce due to two reasons. Firstly, when looking at 
the commercial rationality, the whole environment of the restructured entity should be 
taken into account, which may be very difficult. Secondly there are many different business 
models within an MNE and it may be difficult to find comparables for the restructured 
transaction that are reliable. 
 
Ernst & Young’s (2009:2) response is very similar and states the problem with non-
recognition of a transaction as follows. 
 
Our own view is that tax administrations should only be able to disregard a business 
restructuring if there is no commercial rationale for it from a group perspective. Other cases 
can be dealt with through conventional transfer pricing adjustments where appropriate. 
Unless powerful safeguards are applied, we [Ernst & Young] fear that the number of cases 
in which recourse is had to these provisions, even if only to put pressure on the taxpayer to 
settle, will increase further.  
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The OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) 
recognises the difficulty of defining commercially rational clearly and does not provide a 
definition. However, Andrus et al. (2009:4) lists the following principles that should apply:  
• The totality of the circumstances and not individual elements of a transaction must be 
considered. 
• The fact that comparably structured transactions among unrelated parties cannot be 
identified is not a sufficient reason to disregard a transaction on the ground that it is not 
‘commercially rational.’ 
• Where real functions, assets and risks are transferred, the fact that the restructuring is 
undertaken to achieve tax savings does not cause the transaction to fail the ‘commercial 
rationality’ test. 
 
Even though the commercial rationality standards were described and an attempt made to 
explain them in the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion 
Draft, there is no consensus and no clear definition by the OECD participants. Andrus et 
al. (2009:4) believe that this unclear definition may give rise to controversy and may be 
difficult to resolve. This problem has been heightened “by public comments of some 
individual tax authorities following publication of the Discussion Draft to the effect that their 
countries would routinely seek to disregard transactions where the arrangements 
themselves are not” arm’s length. More clarity and guidance is required with regard to 
disregarding an actual transaction, to ensure it is dealt with consistently and in terms with 
the OECD Guidelines.  
 
To put this into perspective, a tax administration should not be able to disregard a 
restructuring which was prompted by bona fide business purposes. As mentioned by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Andrus et al., 2009:4), tax administrations should certainly not 
“be allowed to do so based merely on a subjective declaration that similar transactions 
would not be engaged in by unrelated parties.” The bona fide restructuring transaction 
taking place should be evaluated to ensure that it complies with the arm’s length principle 
at each individual entity level. This is very important. The assertion made by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008:57) that 
“transaction[s] must be arm’s length at the level of each individual taxpayer, taking account 
of its rights and other assets, expected benefits from the restructuring arrangement, and 
realistically available options” should not be seen as a basis to disregard the MNE group’s 
authenticity. In the view of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009), the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft should be rewritten in such a way 
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that it analyses whether each individual party to the whole restructuring has been 
appropriately compensated for the actual transfer of assets, risks or functions, and 
whether that transfer is in accordance with the arm’s length principle.  
 
The current proposal by the OECD raises some points that need additional clarification 
with regard to the recognition of a transaction between related parties. The United States 
Council for International Business (Walker, 2009:9) lists these issues as follows: 
• How much business and economic substance is required to have a restructuring accepted? 
• Should Article 9 of the Model Tax Treaty permit tax authorities to challenge the 
restructuring itself? 
• Do domestic anti-abuse rules apply…? 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Andrus et al., 2009:4) believes that “[n]on-arm’s-length behavior 
should, as far as possible, be dealt with on the basis of pricing adjustments, rather than by 
re-characterizing all or part of the actual transactions undertaken.” This is in line with the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which view a re-characterisation of a transaction or part 
thereof as a last resort, especially as it may result in double taxation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116
5.4 Summary of the main concerns 
 
The major concerns raised on the arm’s length principle, Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and business restructurings are summarised in the table below: 
 
Area of concern Concern raised Suggested changes 
Arm’s length principle   
 The arm’s length principle does 
not account for economies of 
scale. 
No change to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft has been 
proposed. 
 The arm’s length principle 
results in a static approach that 
fails to bring together functions, 
assets and risks, especially 
with regard to MNE. 
No change to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft has been 
proposed. 
Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention 
  
 The OECD Model Tax 
Convention may be out-dated 
as it only takes two parties for 
a transaction into account.  
Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention should be 
updated to include more than 
two parties for transactions. 
Business restructuring in 
general 
  
 Consensus between OECD 
Member countries may be 
lacking which may lead to 
double taxation; this has been 
addressed with the new OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft but some 
terms need further clarification. 
Clarify the relevant terms and 
ensure tax administrations and 
taxpayers alike understand all 
the terms. 
 No tax administration should 
be able to dictate how an MNE 
should run its business. 
Clarify that tax administrations 
should only be able to adjust 
an MNE’s taxable income in a 
worst case scenario. 
 The treatment of intellectual 
property is not clear enough. 
Further discussions or 
examples should be given in 
the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft. 
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 There may be an increased 
administrative burden through 
the review of contracts which 
may also result in an increased 
form over substance approach, 
which is not in accordance with 
the OECD Guidelines. 
The norm is to look at the 
substance over its form. 
 Tax administrations should not 
be able to re-characterise 
taxpayer’s business 
restructurings except for very 
limited cases. 
It should be clarified that the 
OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft does not give tax 
administrations the ability to 
simply re-characterise 
transactions.  
Conversion of risk   
 The determination for the 
allocation and control of risk. 
It should be determined who 
has the control over the risk 
and who has the financial 
capacity to bear the risk, in 
order to determine if the 
allocation of risks is at arm’s 
length. However this is not as 
easy as it sounds. 
 If there are no contracts in 
place between the related 
parties it seems as the tax 
administrations may speculate 
about how, in practice, 
independent parties would 
have dealt with the same 
issue. 
Tax administrations should 
respect a taxpayer’s allocation 
of risks unless they can prove 
with empirical evidence that 
independent parties in similar 
circumstances do not share 
risks in the same manner. 
Therefore Tax administrations 
should not be able to second 
guess contracts and 
behaviours of related parties. 
 The use of financial statements 
to assess whether a risk is 
economically significant.  
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should acknowledge that 
financial statements may be a 
good reference point but 
should not be overestimated. It 
may be more appropriate to do 
a functional analysis for each 
party involved in the 
restructuring to identify 
functions, risks and assets, 
characterising the types of 
risks transferred which then 
could be quantified through a 
financial risk model. 
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 In order to determine if a 
related party has control over a 
risk it should be determined if 
that party has the actual 
financial capacity to cover such 
a risk. 
Further guidance should be 
given in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft. 
 The term goodwill is used 
rather loosely.  
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should clearly state or 
define what it means with 
“goodwill” as the term has 
widely varying interpretations. 
Actual restructuring and the 
arm’s length compensation 
  
 Related parties should 
evaluate and document other 
possible options available to 
them to strengthen their case 
that the business restructuring 
is at arm’s length. This may 
severely hamper an MNE’s 
business process and place a 
heavy burden on the taxpayer. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should consider providing 
a safe haven for MNE 
restructurings when the 
restructuring is considered to 
have commercial rationality.  
 
Further it should be clarified 
that not having adequate 
documentation in place to 
prove an analysis of other 
options realistically available 
does not imply that a 
transaction is not at arm’s 
length. 
 
Another suggestion is that the 
tax administration should carry 
the burden of proof to 
determine that business 
restructurings were not at 
arm’s length.   
 The compensation for profit 
and loss potential is 
interrelated with the asset or 
right that is transferred. Even 
though this has been 
discussed by the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft it is still vague 
and open to subjective 
interpretation. 
Further guidance and 
clarification should be given. 
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 The term “functions” and its 
transfer within a business 
restructuring should be dealt 
with in more detail. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should clarify and define 
“functions” and how it proposes 
to deal with one function 
ceasing and another starting 
as functions are not 
restructured but rather ended 
and/or started. 
Application of the arm’s 
length principle after the 
restructuring 
  
 There is an increase in tax 
compliance burden due to the 
requirement of a comparability 
analysis of each party’s 
characteristics to be performed 
for both pre-restructuring and 
post-restructuring 
arrangements and the actual 
transaction undertaken. 
No change to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft has been 
proposed. 
 It may be difficult to find 
comparables for the newly 
restructured entity. Further 
guidance is needed for such 
instances. 
No change to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Aspects of 
Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft has been 
proposed. 
 Location savings should be 
evaluated in terms of specific 
facts and circumstances 
relevant to each transaction 
and it should not be based on 
a general rule. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should acknowledge that 
more than just a general rule is 
needed for location savings 
and related business 
restructurings.  
 As previously discussed the 
transferred profit or loss 
potential needs further 
guidance. It is important that 
the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft acknowledges that a 
comparison between before 
and after profit or loss potential 
may be distorted through 
external factors. Tax 
administrations should not just 
be able to make adjustments 
on a general basis without 
taking external factors into 
account. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should acknowledge that 
profit and loss potentials are 
not a straight forward 
comparison but further 
guidance and clarification is 
needed. 
 120
Recognition of the actual 
transaction performed 
  
 The test applied to determine if 
a transaction is commercially 
rational may lead to confusion 
and may be difficult to enforce 
due to two reasons. Firstly the 
whole environment must be 
taken into account and 
secondly it may be difficult to 
find comparables.  
The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Aspects of Business 
Restructurings Discussion 
Draft should further define and 
clarify how tax administrations 
should deal with “no 
commercial rationale”. Further 
safe guards may be needed to 
protect taxpayers. 
 
5.5 Advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement procedures 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:49) write as follows: 
 
 With fiscal deficits at record levels in major countries, governments face tremendous 
pressure to enforce tax laws and maximize their tax revenue. Governments are cooperating 
internationally to exchange information about taxpayers, and multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are subject to simultaneous tax audits. Tax conflicts relating to the development 
and use of technology and marketing intangibles also exists between developed and 
emerging countries. As a result, MNCs are facing a daunting array of rules concerning 
documentation of transactions, disclosure of financial information, transparency of tax 
issues, analyses of tax reserves, and reasoned conclusions regarding tax exposures. 
These global forces are leading to a dramatic increase in tax audits, disputes and tax 
adjustments around the world. At the same time, there are significant competitive pressures 
on MNCs to operate efficiently and to produce a competitive global effective tax rate. 
 
The world needs efficient mechanisms to enhance and secure international economic 
relationships, thereby leading to more certainty in an uncertain environment. The 
importance of abolishing double taxation is obvious in this context. Advance pricing 
agreements (APAs), mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) between competent authorities, 
and arbitration procedures serve this goal. 
  
Advance pricing agreements are defined by the OECD (2001:G-1) as: 
 
[a]n arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set 
of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical 
assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those 
transactions over a fixed period of time. An advance pricing arrangement may be unilateral 
involving one tax administration and a taxpayer or multilateral involving the agreement of 
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two or more tax administrations. 
 
KPMG (2008:7) believes it is worthwhile to consider entering into an advance pricing 
agreement if one or more of the following outcomes may be generated: 
• create an opportunity to realize an important objective, such as removing uncertainty or 
achieving a given TP [transfer pricing] result 
• allow the taxpayer to switch from decision-makers who seem to be entrenched in an 
unfavourable position to a more open-minded APA [advance pricing agreement] team  
• change the timeframe being assessed, and thus the facts used in negotiations with the 
tax authorities 
• allow several years to be covered in one negotiation 
• establish a favourable precedent for other transactions.  
 
From the above it can be concluded that an advance pricing agreement is established to 
give the taxpayer assurance with regard to the cost that may be incurred by him for future 
transactions entered into. 
 
Even though SARS does not enter into advance pricing agreements with its taxpayers at 
present, KPMG (2008) is of the opinion that they should be considered. There are about 
forty countries that currently have advance pricing agreements with their taxpayers and 
those countries that do not have any legislation for advance pricing agreements, such as 
South Africa, may be willing to use their mutual agreement procedure to resolve any 
advance pricing agreements that may be brought to the table by other tax administrations.  
 
A mutual agreement procedure is defined by the OECD (2001:G-6) as: 
 
[a] means through which tax administrations consult to resolve disputes regarding the 
application of double tax conventions. This procedure, described and authorized by Article 
25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could 
arise from a transfer pricing adjustment.  
 
KPMG (2008) states that an advance pricing agreement enables a taxpayer to manage 
transfer pricing uncertainties and audit risks proactively. In some cases it has been argued 
that an advance pricing agreement between the effected tax administrations may be a 
solution to the wide controversy that has arisen due to business restructurings.  
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The basic procedure for an advance pricing agreement as explained by KPMG (2008) 
starts with the taxpayer’s proposal to the relevant tax authorities dealing with the pricing 
method and structures for the relevant intra-group, cross-border transactions. The 
proposal must also include a description of circumstances that may affect the transfer 
price, such as a functional analysis with the key value drivers for the transaction and the 
parties thereto or data relating to economic situations and what would happen if these 
change. Following the submission of the proposal, the relevant tax administration will 
review the proposal. Once everything has been reviewed by the tax administration the 
taxpayer and the relevant tax administration will start negotiations regarding the prices to 
be charged for the related cross-border transactions. The negotiation, depending on how 
many countries are involved, may be between more than one tax administration and the 
taxpayer. Once an agreement between the parties has been reached the advance pricing 
agreement is executed. 
 
Further, KPMG (2008) highlights that problems with the negotiation process may arise 
where the proposal submitted is partially or wholly unacceptable. This may happen where 
the taxpayer believes his proposal is at arm’s length, but one or more tax administrations 
believe a wrong method is used which may result in a wrong price. 
 
As previously discussed, business restructurings may require a substantial amount of 
documentation and many aspects are very vague with regard to the actual disclosure of 
business restructurings even where the OECD Guidelines are followed. The main reason 
for this is that the OECD Guidelines are just that, guidelines. These guidelines can be 
interpreted differently by different taxpayers and tax administrations. In many instances 
there are clear-cut rules, but these guidelines are not legislated. In countries such as 
South Africa there is no case law to give guidance that may be upheld in court.  
 
Taking the above into account, an advance pricing agreement between the relevant 
parties to a related cross-border restructuring and the tax administrations may lead to 
more certainty and therefore may be seen as a possible solution to the problem that 
business restructurings face. 
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5.6 Triangular transfer pricing cases 
 
In the present day economy, with an ever-increasing number of MNEs and their desire to 
centralise departments to decrease costs and increase synergies within the MNE, 
transactions flowing between related parties involve, more frequently, three or more 
countries.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:41) explains the emergence of triangular transfer pricing 
cases as follows: 
 
Initially, transfer pricing cases generally arose from the transfer of tangible or intangible 
property between two related companies in two tax jurisdictions. In those cases, the 
assessments made by the tax authorities in each jurisdiction at times created bilateral disputes. 
The difficulties and complexities involved with resolving those cases are well documented. 
Now, however, we are seeing a new development in transfer pricing cases that is adding a 
layer of complexity and raising challenging – and as yet unanswered – questions. We are 
observing an increasing number of situations whereby multinational entities are involved in 
transaction flows that give rise to transfer pricing disputes in more than two countries, 
otherwise known as a ‘triangular case.’ These new multilateral cases generate many difficult 
procedural and substantive issues and increase the difficulties of reaching a global agreement 
among all countries involved.  
 
 To get a better understanding the following examples indicate certain circumstances that 
a typical MNE may face. 
 
The simplest example would include three legs to a cross border related transaction or two 
cross border transactions that are interlinked between different related parties. For 
example, in the auto manufacturing business the car manufacturer has its intellectual 
property and related research and development in country “A”. A licence for this 
intellectual property is provided to country “B” where the manufacturing takes place. Once 
the products are manufactured they are sent to country “C” for sale and distribution. 
Historically there would have only been a bilateral dispute, a dispute between both country 
“A” and country “B” or both countries “B” and “C”, as shown in the diagram below 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) – amended). 
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Country “A” 
(R&D with IP functions)
Country “B”
(Manufacturing function)
Country “C”
(Distribution & Sales function)
Country “B”
Or
Country “D”
(Cost sharing arrangement)
 
However, in the modern transfer pricing environment, the effect of a transfer pricing 
adjustment in one country will usually affect the other countries, hence a triangular case. 
 
Even if the example is made more complex, for example by introducing a cost-sharing 
arrangement within the group in another related party in either the same country (i.e. 
country “B”) or a separate country (i.e. country “D”) the outcome is similar.     
 
The problem with a triangular case, in the view of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008),  is that 
each tax administration wants its fair share of the profits achieved in the whole value-
added chain of the transaction. The main issue with the profit allocation is how to divide 
the profits between the different tax administrations. Because transfer pricing legislation is 
emerging in most tax administrations, more legs are being added to the transaction and 
each tax administration wants its share of the global tax revenue. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) also states that certain products which require complex 
research and development phases in multiple countries in order to be saleable may pose a 
challenge. The difficulty that arises is to calculate exactly how much the research and 
development added to the value-chain within each country and both MNE and tax 
administrations may believe that the actual value added may be different.  
 
The OECD convention does not yet deal with such issues. It may be possible to use 
certain definitions provided by the OECD but that is not wholly satisfactory as a solution to 
the problem at hand. When considering the example above, the main issue identified by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) is that even though each country may have a tax treaty 
with other countries, such treaties do not address a relationship between three or more 
countries. This means there is a litigation issue on how to resolve conflicts arising between 
three or more countries. Is there a certain order to be followed when looking at the 
 125
countries? For example should a manufacturer be examined first before following the 
value-chain or should the arbitration start from the selling price of a commodity? A more 
creative approach may be necessary to ensure that the issue is dealt with in a timely and 
cost–efficient manner.  
 
There is one international body, namely the European Union Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
that has actually addressed the issue of triangular cases. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2008:47) argues that “a number of pragmatic solutions could prevent the need to alter the 
Arbitration Convention to accommodate the possibility of triangular cases. These 
suggested solutions include an additional MAP between the additionally affected countries, 
extending the workings of existing bilateral treaties to third parties, or even an extension of 
the Arbitration Convention to a third state.”  
 
The problems of triangular cases are likely to increase over the coming years, due to the 
expected increase in global trade and the mounting economic pressures from the relevant 
tax administrations. A practical solution is needed in order to give MNEs certainty in their 
dealings and to avoid heavy burdens of uncertainty or even double taxation in certain 
instances. International cooperation is needed from both the taxpayer and tax 
administrations alike, in order to realise these goals (PricewaterhouseCoopers: 2008). 
 
5.7 Global best practice in avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) states that transfer pricing audits and disputes may be 
protracted and expensive. In addition to the costs they also involve management time of 
both the taxpayer and tax administration.  Certain MNEs will have more frequent transfer 
pricing audits and disputes, with the relevant transfer pricing policy being questioned by 
the tax administration. Such transfer pricing audits and disputes may impose significant 
costs and penalties. An MNE should be even more alarmed if there are recurring transfer 
pricing audits and disputes, as this may indicate a deeper malaise within the MNE. 
 
In order to avoid transfer pricing audits and disputes the MNE should take proactive steps 
and work together with the tax administration rather than just sitting back and waiting for 
the tax administration to start asking questions and finding problems. These proactive 
steps include but are not limited to those listed below.  
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5.7.1 Start from the outset 
 
The first step to show a tax administration that the MNE is acting in a bona fide manner is 
to establish a transfer pricing study or policy setting document. This study or document is 
analysed and should focus on proper planning to comply with local legislation and 
regulations in order to avoid disputes. The most common approach to achieve this is to 
document the study or policy in such a way as to identify all relevant transfer pricing issues 
that the related cross-border transaction may attract. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:20) 
states that: “This should include not only a review of various ’hot’ issues in the specific 
countries concerned, but also other developments around the world. We live in an 
increasingly connected global tax environment, and governments are increasingly 
identifying certain issues and examining those issues in their tax environment.” For 
example, it is vital to stay up to date with the definition of permanent establishments in 
double tax agreements between tax administrations, as the smallest change in the 
definition may have effect on how to deal with a transaction from a tax perspective.  
 
In order to have a transfer pricing study or policy setting document that is complete and 
sufficient to address all the issues that a tax administration may want to audit or dispute, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) is of the opinion that it should contain: 
• corporate structure and transaction flows for each particular business activity; 
• identification of the particular transfer pricing methods associated with the above, 
explaining how the identified method suits each transaction best; 
• overall transfer pricing framework and strategy (i.e. how the transactions are dealt 
with, how functions are remunerated and who bears the risks); and 
• the transfer pricing protocol when executing business strategies and transactions. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that all material related cross-border transactions need to be 
addressed in this transfer pricing study or policy setting document, using the simplest 
approach possible to deal with the issues at hand. 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:20) highlights the following,  
 
issues relating to moving intellectual property from one jurisdiction to another will need to be 
addressed with greater particularity. Having established the fundamental approach, the 
strategy process can then engage the right stakeholders at headquarters and in the local 
jurisdictions. 
  
5.7.2 Building concrete foundations 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) is of the opinion that, in order to document a solid 
transfer pricing study or policy setting document, the project will usually involve senior 
stakeholders in order to define the functions of the material transactions and the whole 
project is usually driven by the corporate tax department. As each transaction is different in 
its function it is important to have operational staff who can explain the main value drivers 
of each transaction. This may include certain intellectual property specialists. 
 
When an MNE is planning to restructure a cross-border related transaction, transfer pricing 
is an important element of that plan. An MNE may conclude that certain costs can be 
saved by establishing a cost centre, due to economies of scale. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2008) acknowledges that in the planning stages it is important to discuss and visualise 
what the issues may be from a tax administration perspective and to document the 
relevant steps to ensure business restructurings will be at arm’s length. 
 
The next step is to implement the actual plan effectively to ensure that the planned 
structure, transaction flow and pricing are implemented as planned. With the 
implementation it is important to establish the corporate entities with the required 
intercompany agreements in order to prove to tax administrations that the actual transfer 
pricing policy is adhered to. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:22) believes that the reason 
for this is that “[c]ommercial documentation precedes the establishment of the transfer 
pricing documents that support the various methodologies chosen for pricing, services 
rendered, and functions performed. The corporate documents in question should describe 
in detail the commercial agreements that establish the functions and risks of the respective 
corporate entities, ensuring the proper debt-equity ratios and intercompany agreements 
are in place.”  
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Lastly, once the above is completed, the required transfer pricing policies are drafted to 
complete and support the financial results, including the flow of the documented 
transactions and the costs related to the relevant functions and methods used. An 
important aspect of this is to ensure that the transfer pricing documentation actually 
reflects the reality of the corporate documentation. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:23) 
describes this as follows. If transfer pricing documents and agreements do not “accurately 
reflect the underlying corporate structures and relationships or the type of relationships 
that unrelated parties would enter into” there may be larger issues at hand which a tax 
administration may question and take advantage of the mismatch. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:23) gives the following example on how a tax 
administration may go about taking advantage of a mismatch: 
 
... a mismatch in the allocation of risks between entities creates issues for tax authorities to 
investigate. Worse, it could provide an entrée for them to question the commerciality of the 
overall arrangement. A focus on the quality of the transfer pricing documentation should not 
detract from attention to the quality and detail of the intercompany agreements created at the 
outset. Investing in that documentation is a key step, but one that can be overlooked in the 
concern to ensure that transfer pricing documents meet the highest standards. By this stage, 
completing documentation should be a simple process demonstrating that the dealings and 
agreements are at arm’s length. 
 
5.7.3 Aligning form and substance 
 
One major point highlighted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) to keep in mind is that the 
form of the transfer pricing policy must reflect the substance of the actual transaction 
performed. If this is not the case the nature of the transaction may be questioned and can 
lead to transfer pricing audits and disputes. In order to ensure that form and substance are 
aligned the standard operational procedures may be described in the transfer pricing 
policy document. 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:23) explains that “[o]nce a structure is established and 
functionally operational, it is important to implement a periodic review to test the ’course of 
conduct.’” This includes the examination and verification of the following: 
• Validate the structure to ensure it is still in line with the latest transfer pricing 
regulations in the relevant jurisdictions. 
• Ensure that the operations and transaction flows are still in line with the transfer 
pricing policy as well as the relevant regulations in the different jurisdictions. 
 
“The testing should include an analysis of financial results and the application of the 
selected transfer pricing methodologies to assess whether the related structures and 
operations are within the appropriate range” (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008:23). 
  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) notes that even with the best planning and 
implementation of a recommended transfer pricing policy there may be a dispute between 
the tax administration and the taxpayer. This is due to the conceptual chasm between the 
tax administration and the taxpayer. 
 
For example, this presently is the case in the United States on issues relating to cost sharing. 
There is a significant philosophical difference between what the revenue authorities believe 
taxpayers should do and what taxpayers and their advisors believe is necessary and 
appropriate. In such cases, no amount of careful planning or implementation can bridge the 
divide between the two parties. But even in these instances, making sure that the steps taken 
are consistent with best practices should make it possible to defend a position effectively. The 
steps required to do this may be: first, to identify when this situation exists; then to assess the 
likely risks; and finally, to ensure that the arrangement, analysis and documentation either 
maximize the chance of acceptance by the tax authorities or minimize the likelihood of 
penalties (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008:24). 
 
In summary, in order for a taxpayer to adhere to global best practices in avoiding transfer 
pricing audits and disputes, the taxpayer should have a transfer pricing study or policy 
setting document in place from the outset of any planned cross-border transaction. As 
discussed, the document should disclose certain information to tax administrations to show 
that the company is acting in good faith and at arm’s length regarding its cross-border 
related transaction(s). Such information includes, but is not limited to: company 
background, functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the company, an 
economic analysis and a conclusion on the transfer pricing method used. The document 
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should be updated on a regular basis and the substance of the transaction should be 
reflected in the transfer pricing document and related contracts to align form and 
substance. Even though there is no guarantee that a tax administration will not audit a 
company, if all the discussed steps are in place it should make it possible for the taxpayer 
to defend its position effectively.   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter critically analysed the OECD Guidelines and the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. It was established that the arm’s length principle is sound in theory but there 
are valid arguments that it has certain flaws. Further the arm’s length principle was 
analysed with an example which demonstrated how important it is to accurately identify the 
parties’ characteristics which can be achieved through mapping ‘similar circumstances’ 
and that the arm’s length principle in practice may not always work as demonstrated in 
theory. 
 
The chapter also critically analysed business restructurings and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft. The analysis indicated that 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft provides 
sound guidelines on how to approach business restructurings but there are certain points 
that lack consensus from the public. It is a very well written first draft but it should further 
analyse some of the problems discussed in this chapter and give clearer guidance. The 
OECD should further discuss the subjectivity of the tax administrations in relation to 
business restructurings. The crux of the issue regarding subjectivity is that the arm’s length 
principle is objective and should not be subjective. 
 
The chapter also discussed advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement 
procedures and the transfer pricing consequences of three or more countries involved in a 
cross border related party transaction. Lastly the chapter discussed global best practices 
in avoiding transfer pricing audits and disputes.      
 
The final chapter provides a brief summary of the issues discussed and the conclusions 
arrived at in the thesis. 
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Globalisation and the accompanying increase in MNEs has given rise to more, and more 
complex, transfer pricing considerations, with the attendant global tax concerns.  Also 
driven by globalisation and the need to increase efficiency and decrease costs or increase 
profits through economies of scale or by taking advantage of synergies, MNEs are 
increasingly entering into restructuring exercises.  The application of the OECD Guidelines 
in the context of business restructurings has exposed many deficiencies in the guidelines. 
 
The research thesis, being cognisant of the OECD Guidelines, the Income Tax Act, 
international case law, the Transfer Pricing Aspects on Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft and publicly available comments, addresses several important transfer 
pricing aspects and the anomalies that arise through internal business restructurings.  
 
The aim of chapter 1 was to give a brief outline on the context and goals of the research 
thesis. It explained the research method and design applied to yield the anticipated results, 
including certain limitations to the scope of the research thesis 
 
Chapter 2 aimed to describe all the related terms, definitions and aspects of transfer 
pricing with the aid of an example. To achieve its aim chapter 2 analysed the arm’s length 
principle in detail, as it is the fundamental principle of transfer pricing. It is important to 
keep in mind that the arm’s length principle is not an exact science but theoretically it is the 
best there currently is. It may not incorporate everything such as the cost savings through 
synergies of MNEs but it promotes international trade and investment by keeping 
transactions fair, unlike the global formulary apportionment. The arm’s length principle 
gives the closest approximation to a fair transaction price between international related 
parties. The main methods to arrive at an arm’s length range were analysed and even 
though there is a hierarchy of preferred methods, traditional methods over transactional 
methods, each case may warrant a different method to arrive at the arm’s length range.  
 
The aim of Chapter 3 was to describe the various traditional transactional methods and 
transactional profit methods that can be applied to approximate an arm’s length price 
between related parties. The different methods were discussed and the hierarchy of the 
different models was depicted with the help of a diagram. Each method was further 
analysed with a practical example. 
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Chapter 4 presented a detailed analysis of business restructurings and the consequences, 
from a transfer pricing perspective. It discussed the four issues that may arise from 
business restructurings in functions, assets and risks, namely: 
• conversion of risk; 
• the actual restructuring and the arm’s length compensation; 
• the application of the arm’s length principle after the restructuring; and 
• recognition of the actual transaction performed. 
 
Further, the chapter emphasised the point that, even though there are certain guidelines 
on how to deal with a business restructuring, each case needs to be determined on its own 
merits as no two cases are the same. At first glance, certain cases may appear to be the 
same but it is important that all the facts are understood correctly in order to conclude on 
the correct transfer pricing approach for business restructurings and the related arm’s 
length principle. 
 
The aim of chapter 5 was to critically discuss the arm’s length principle having regard to 
the OECD Guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention. Further, the chapter’s aim 
was to compare the theory of business restructurings as set out in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft (2008) with how it actually is 
perceived by legal and audit firms to work in practice.  
 
In chapter 5 it was established that the arm’s length principle is sound in theory but there 
are valid arguments that it has flaws. Further the arm’s length principle was analysed with 
an example which demonstrated how important it is to accurately identify the parties’ 
characteristics, which can be achieved through mapping ‘similar circumstances’ and that 
the arm’s length principle in practice may not always work as demonstrated in theory. 
 
The chapter also critically analysed business restructurings and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft. The analysis indicated that 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft provides 
sound guidelines on how to approach business restructurings but there are certain points 
that lack consensus from the public. It is a very well conceptualised first draft but it should 
further analyse some of the problems discussed in chapter 5 and give clearer guidance. It 
was found that business restructurings appear to put a strain on the creditability of the 
arm’s length principle. The reason for this is that while the OECD Guidelines and its 
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Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings Discussion Draft reflected consensus 
among OECD member countries across many issues, there are also differences of opinion 
on some crucial points. The main issue within business restructurings is that the arm’s 
length principle compares international related party transactions to that of independent 
parties. Independent parties do not restructure their businesses the same way related 
parties may do and therefore no comparables may be available. This may lead to 
subjective conclusions of tax administrations and eventually it may lead to the re-
characterisation of transactions which goes against the arm’s length principle, which is 
intended to be objective.   
 
Further the aim of chapter 5 was to discuss and analyse advance pricing agreements and 
mutual agreement procedures and the transfer pricing consequences of three or more 
countries involved in a cross-border related party transaction. Chapter 5 established that 
advance pricing agreements may be a possible alternative solution on how to avoid 
transfer pricing audits and disputes but are not always in the interest of the taxpayer. At 
times they may not be fair, very lengthy and not suitable if the transaction disclosed in the 
advance pricing agreement changes due to unforeseen circumstances. Triangular cases 
may also increase the taxpayer’s burden because several tax administrations have to be 
dealt with. However, the application of the arm’s length principle remains the same.  
 
Lastly chapter 5 aimed to discuss global best practices in avoiding transfer pricing audits 
and disputes. The chapter provided best practice guidelines which should be followed and 
may be applied to business restructurings.  
 
It is submitted that the recommended business restructurings approach of the Transfer 
Pricing Aspects on Business Restructurings Discussion Draft is realistic and pragmatic but 
some more clarity is needed especially with regard to the subjectivity of tax 
administrations. The biggest issue with transfer pricing, including the business 
restructuring aspect, is that it is not an exact science and as such there is no set way on 
how to determine a transfer pricing transaction. Different professional legal or audit firms 
approach the same international related party transaction differently and no one answer 
may be seen as correct by the tax administrations. 
 
The OECD published new OECD Guidelines in July 2010 which may shed some light on 
the issues. Further research analysing the new OECD Guidelines that incorporate the 
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Transfer Pricing Aspects on Business Restructurings Discussion Draft should be 
performed.  
 
It is important to note that the OECD Guidelines are just that, guidelines and each example 
should be looked at differently. It may be impossible to fairly value each transaction but the 
OECD Guidelines and the Transfer Pricing Aspects on Business Restructurings 
Discussion Draft appear to provide the basis for a fair balance to taxpayer and tax 
administration alike.   
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